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Free Trade's Costs

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Our Kennedy Problem

THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR

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

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THE CONTINUING CRISIS

•December passes, and it now appears that Mr. Walter Mondale actually won the election. He promised to clean the conservatives out of the State Department, and Secretary of State George Shultz is doing just that. He promised an arms control agreement, and that too is being boomed in Washington. He promised an end to the so-called Reagan Revolution, and there are no signs that it is continuing. Perhaps it is time for conservatives to attend to the problems of the future and let the pragmatists attend to the present alone.

•Grim famine continues to lay waste to life in Africa, particularly in progressive Ethiopia. There in refugee centers organized by Western relief workers tens of thousands of emaciated Ethiopians starve beneath enormous pictures of Drs. Marx and Lenin, two of history's most insatiable liars. Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, the gangster now presiding over Ethiopia, journeyed to Moscow toward the end of the month to praise the Soviet system and coax from the Kremlin more aid to complement the tons of useless Russian trucks and tractors already rusting in Ethiopian fields. Lt. Col. Mengistu's arrival caught the Soviets by surprise, but Mr. Konstantin U. Chernenko, the agile Soviet leader, adroitly set aside time for a genial chin wag during which these two Marxist reformers reproached the West for sabotaging Lt. Col. Mengistu's showcase of African Marxist-Leninism. Then Mr. Chernenko promised still more Soviet largess, perhaps a few million tons of Soviet cement or fish netting knitted by the reliable fingers of inmates now lodged in growing multitudes in the Soviet Union's gruesome Gulag. Midway through the month Senator Edward Kennedy's office announced that the Senator and two of his children intended to spend Christmas Eve and Christmas in Ethiopia and the Sudan, working with relief agencies and hoping that the sight of the Senator's prodigious corpulence will inspire the locals to opt for a "mixed economy" rather than imbecile socialism.

•Fear stalks the University of California campus at Berkeley. There, treacherous student Republicans misrepresented themselves at the beginning of the semester, hornswoggling university administrators into listing them in university directories as the authorized representatives of such respected leftist organizations as the Berkeley Students for Peace, the Progressive Student Alliance, and the People's Park Council. Throughout the semester prospective members of these wholesome groups have been duped into directing their inquiries to the frightening Nixonites only to be told that the aforementioned groups now subscribe to Republican political principles, Newtonian physics, and heterosexuality. How much psychological damage has been done can only be estimated, but university administrators are trying to undo the mischief and bring the Republican rogues to justice. Unfortunately, modern-day Republican youths are devilishly clever and work with the full support of the Pentagon, the FBI, and the CIA, as will doubtless someday be revealed in the *Nation* magazine. At the University of California at San Diego, the right-wing *California Review* is even manipulating a Federal District Court by claiming that its editors are as entitled to university offices as the more idealistic anti-American publications. And at Dartmouth, the unspeakable *Dartmouth Review* is publishing the names of professors who do not wear ties to class and in some cases cannot even tie them without getting their fingers hopelessly strung up around their necks. These are grim times for balding Aquarians!

•In Campbell, California, 26-year-old Mr. Nathan Biggs was booked for shouting "Jump!" to a college student who was threatening to do just that from a 100-foot ladder on a water tank. Mr. Huey P. Newton, Ph.D. shed light on why we have been hearing so little about his good deeds in recent years when the ex-Black Panther and Supreme Servant of the People notified the *San Francisco Examiner* that throughout 1982 and 1983 he was holed up in his spacious Oakland Hills house imbibing two quarts of Courvoisier daily and indulging a ravenous appetite for cocaine, heroin, Valium, and Kool cigarettes.

•On December 21 the Soviet Union launched a second Vega spacecraft scheduled to rendezvous with Halley's comet in March 1986, whereupon the Soviets will investigate whether or not the comet can be put to military use.



The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to meet in Geneva, Switzerland, to discuss that arms race of theirs, which has been so controversial in some circles. Investigators in Geronimo, Oklahoma, are attempting to verify whether a massacre during a local bank robbery that left four dead and three wounded may have been prompted by one of the victims' callous quips about the alleged robbers' homosexual lifestyle. If so, the survivors could be in deep trouble with Geronimo's Human Rights Commission.

•The Reagan Administration put forward plans to reduce the Congress's deficit, and in France the former emperor of the former Central African Empire, Jean Bedel Bokassa I, saw his monthly bath become but a faraway memory when the Paris waterworks discontinued service to his chateau. The erstwhile Third World magnifico, who had not paid his bill since December 4, 1983, issued an appeal from his empty bathtub "to the entire world and particularly to the government of Mitterrand," vowing to put on a terry cloth robe and demonstrate in front of the Elysée Palace because "I cannot let my family die." In Great Britain, Mr. George Baker, a 48-year-old farmer from Somerset, has sufficiently captured the esteem of all good Thatcherites to put himself in line for knighthood. Mr. Baker was fined $283 by some lop-eared judge for spraying fox hunt protestors with nearly fifty gallons of liquid feces from the "muck spreader" of his trusty tractor. The South African Embassy in Washington, D.C. was the scene of over a dozen celebrity protests in December, and in San Francisco, Mayor Dianne Feinstein took umbrage when Dr. Helen Caldicott returned the key to the city in protest of the mayor's efforts to have the USS *Missouri* stationed there. "It's the first time the key has ever been used politically," Mayor Feinstein repined somewhat stupidly. After all, it was Dr. Caldicott's anti-defense bawlings that had inspired the city's idiotic supervisors to award her the key in the first place.

•Once again Americans celebrated the season of Peace On Earth & Good Will Toward Men with rancorous pro-

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tests against Nativity scenes, though there were very few complaints against the appalling presence of Saint Nick, that overweight throwback from bygone days who forces eight tiny reindeer to pull him at breakneck speed over rooftops, and in a contraption bereft of seat belts or air bags or crashproof bumpers or any federally prescribed safety features whatsoever. Why is it that this absurd fellow raises so few objections from progressive rigorists, though they go into fits over a stable scene featuring rustic shepherds, Third World potentates, and a new-born babe who is half-Jewish? My guess is that they are appeased by the fat one's career. Consider their economic views. They really believe in Santa Claus.

•Santa Claus did attract controversy on at least two occasions. In Burlington, Vermont, 25-year-old Brian Pearl was slammed into the calaboose for shouting to children at a shopping mall that Santa Claus is a fraud; and in Lincoln, Nebraska, Mr. Robert L. Stewart, 39, a shopping mall Santa, was charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor for persuading one of his teenage female elves to pose while he made video nasties of her. Finally, evidence accumulates that the Iranian government is attempting to ingratiate itself with the nations of the civilized world. In September two of its judges assaulted a Swedish judge at The Hague, and now it is promising to send two more!

—RET

CORRESPONDENCE

Breadwinner Feminism

In his otherwise admirable article "Condemned to Liberation: The Woman As Breadwinner" in your November issue, William Tucker omits the demand-for-labor aspect of his argument. This may inadvertently encourage some readers to jump to the incorrect conclusion that direct or indirect influence over the supply of labor is alone sufficient to determine its price.

At least as important as the supply offered of labor is the quantity of it employers will demand. No matter how much unions or some implicit social consensus may fiddle with the supply of labor, no employer will offer a wage higher than the market price of the additional product turned out when he adds one more unit of labor (what the Austrian School calls labor's marginal value product, or MVP). That, in turn, has a lot to do with the quantity and quality of the capital goods at labor's disposal, things over which "family wage" and women's liberation movements have little or no control.

It is probably no coincidence that the consensus on the "family wage" was only reached early in this century, after the sharpest rise in labor's MVP in the world's history had occurred during the previous generation. For the first time since the beginning of the industrial revolution wages could rise high enough to permit the luxury of only one wage earner per family.

Conversely, Women's Lib probably could only begin to goad (or rather seem to goad) large numbers of otherwise "unliberated" women to enter the labor force during a time when a relative dearth of people in the productive age groups, diversion of savings-investment to taxes, and a general decline in morale and coherent thinking caused labor's MVP to grow only feebly. Even non-yumpie families, whose notions of a dignified standard of living had not undergone any great inflation, discovered that economic leisure for all but one family member had become a no longer affordable luxury.

Tucker comes close to making these points, particularly the last one, but they are worth making explicit lest we forget that there are economic limits to intellectual and social evolution.

—Edward H. Kaplan
Bellingham, Washington

William Tucker's very stimulating essay, "Condemned to Liberation," makes the astounding point, among others, that the large-scale influx of women into the labor force has actually tended to reinforce the economic necessity of the nuclear family because the paychecks of solitary individuals just don't stretch as far as they once did. Although Tucker cites no figures for this point, I am inclined to believe him, but I wonder why the principal reason for this state of affairs, i.e., the inflation of the 1970s, gets such short shrift in his article. Surely the women's liberation movement only gave the majority of potential women workers an *ideological* excuse to seek to remedy the all too real problem of their families' shrinking economic worth.

Tucker would like to believe that although inflation is down and the economy is expanding, women are not leaving the workforce to return to those very important duties of childrearing, housekeeping, and community service. They may not be, but I submit the verdict is not yet in: It took many years of inflation to restructure the workforce, and it may well take as many or more to set things aright again. After all, a mere four years of Reaganomics does not a family wage make, especially in view of the enormous economic problems Reagan inherited.

But even if we have a sustained economic expansion and women do *not* return home, I'm not at all comfortable with the prospect of this Tucker-styled nuclear family. To be sure, Tucker is right on the money when he says the nuclear family is "a most durable institution" and is highly efficient economically, yet shouldn't we resist the kind of reductionism which sees the family almost exclusively in economic terms? I find it hard to understand how this newly-conceived, atomistic, individualistic, "every man and woman for him/her/self" kind of nuclear family will promote "the emotional and personal satisfactions" and social stability which characterized the old-style nuclear family of the one breadwinner days. These intangible quantities have proved to be some of the most important for establishing our culture as the preeminent force for good in the world. We compromise those sources of strength to our peril, as the going-nowhere single-parent families of the urban ghettos testify.

Self-sacrifice should be the order of the day, not self-aggrandizement. A more generous dose of the former will be salutary for all, especially the poor. More of the latter might mean not only the necessity of female participation in the workforce, but child-labor as well. Women of the world, unite! . . . and go home.

—John S. Meyer
Boulder, Colorado

Carrier Strategy

With respect to John Train's article ("*America* the Beautiful," *TAS*, November 1984) extolling the advantages of carriers in warfare, he carefully limits his discussion of war to that of brushfire engagements, where everyone politely refrains from using serious weapons.

Radar satellites can and do plot the positions of all surface ships (at least, the Soviets do—we apparently don't have any in orbit!). In addition to that, jamming of well-designed synthetic aperture radars has been shown to have little effect on such detection. (Soviet orbital radars have been demonstrated to be able to locate submerged subs—an interesting item when considering the "invulnerability" of our missile subs.)

In the event of a "serious" war, programming intermediate-range missiles or ICBMs to drop a few warheads around each carrier task force would have a truly remarkable effect on our Navy. We have *no* defenses against such ballistic missiles, remember?

Then, in terms of the ability to detect enemy subs "100 or more miles away," well, just a few months ago, we were desperately trying to locate a Soviet sub with our fancy ASW gear, and having very little luck, when the sub fouled one of our new high-tech transponders and took it home. Newer Soviet subs are getting quiet, folks, in addition to being able to dive twice as deep as ours, withstand far more underwater explosive force, and even outrun some of our modern torpedoes!

Try another scenario: The Soviet sub (like the one which managed to collide with one of our carriers recently), quietly patrols near the carrier task force until the preset attack time. It then launches its torpedoes, perhaps nuclear-tipped, to run at depth (perhaps 1,000 feet) until reaching the task force. Then, either nuclear detonation beneath the task force, or a steep climb to hit ships of the task force from directly below.

Maybe you could hear those approaching torpedoes. What, pray tell, are you going to do to stop them? And let's not play the game that even a big carrier could take a hit from a small nuclear warhead below the water line!

The truth is that very few, if any, of our present weapons systems could survive a determined Soviet first-strike at this time. Their sub-launched ballistic missiles would hit each SAC base within five to seven minutes, as well as other strategic targets and some ICBM silos. Without doubt, the increasing accuracy of Soviet ICBMs means that Minutemen, MX, and proposed Midgetman ICBMs will be terribly vulnerable unless a launch-on-warning policy is adopted. And that, in view of the risks attached to all-too-frequent false alarms, is not really the way to go.

The "invulnerable" missile subs, of course, are completely vulnerable when located and tracked, and every indication says the Soviets have successfully bought, stolen, or developed the technology necessary to accomplish this sub hunt.

Mutual assured suicide (MAD) isn't

(continued on page 47)

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EDITORIALS

KIRKPATRICK

by R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

Some Americanos have a curious avidity for making matters more difficult than they are. Perhaps they fear idleness. Possibly they forgot to read the instructions. Quite often they simply lack the grit to face up to the requirements of the task at hand; they are deluded or lazy or inescapably timid.

Consider those handwringing Democrats now demonstrating on the op-ed pages of our great and good daily papers. Listen as they cerebrate earnestly on the tube: "The oldest political party in the world, where lies its future?" The party has captured but one presidential race since 1964, and the 1976 victory was attended by certain incomparable conditions, never to be repeated one prays. Moreover, the indefatigable *Wall Street Journal* recently noted that though Democrats outnumber Republicans in the House of Representatives by 253 to 182 this is more a reflection of their ability to gerrymander than their ability to fetch support in congressional districts. Nationwide their congressional delegation snagged a mere 39,000 more votes than the Republican delegation.

So now the party's sages are coming out with blueprints for a happy future. Just recently the party's governors assembled in Washington with a learned treatise, "Facing the Facts: The Democratic Governors' View From the States." All these exertions are quite unnecessary and only make matters more difficult than need be. After all, the Democratic party was the most successful political organization throughout the middle decades of this century. Its policies still reign over vast areas of American life. Democrats seeking renewal should look to their roots. Look to FDR, HST, and JFK. Now, my Democratic friends, look around you today. If you really want to find a modern-day proponent of the policies of these successful Democratic pols you will find yourself looking right into the face of Jeane Kirkpatrick, possibly the most popular Democrat in the country.

Adapted from RET's weekly Washington Post *column syndicated by King Features.*

She is admired by voters of both parties. She has overseen a long and quite successful tenure at the United Nations. She writes and speaks eloquently. And for those New Age Democrats so given to envisaging America as a land of victims hounded by oppressors, she—being female—qualifies as a capital victim; but then, according to the calculations of George Gilder, so do 70 percent of her fellow Americanos, who account for more than three-fourths of the nation's wealth.

What is more, she labored for the party in every presidential campaign of her adult life until 1980 when she took up the campaign of a fallen-away Democrat. He promptly showed the good sense to hire her, though her politics have not markedly changed since she voted for Adlai Stevenson. She has been a friend of Big Labor, a friend and loyal supporter of Hubert Humphrey, and to the end she supported Scoop Jackson. Ambassador Kirkpatrick has, then, impeccable Democratic credentials. That she resisted the gaudy promises of McGovernism cannot be held against her. McGovernism's rise marked the beginning of her party's incompetence.

Unfortunately, few of her party's soul-searchers will include the politics of Jeane Kirkpatrick in their meditations, which merely demonstrates again the disingenuousness and futility of their exertions. They hoot derisorily at Ronald Reagan when he claims an affinity for the policies of past Democratic statesmen; but they validate his claim by shunning the legitimate heir to HST and JFK, Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

They ignore her because, unlike yesteryear's successful Democratic party that favored internationalism and growth, the New Age Democratic party shies from such burdens. Behind all its rumble bumble about caring and compassion it is the party of isolationism and no-growth. More and more voters understand this. At the local level, where these large national issues are irrelevant, they still frequently vote for the party of splendid years gone by. At the national level they increasingly vote for the party that promises to preserve the splendors. They do as Jeane Kirkpatrick does, and her support among traditionally Democratic voters, such as Jews, Hispanics, and blue collar workers, should suggest to New Age Democrats the extent of their problems. That the New Age Democrats fail to recognize her significance is obvious. That some in the White House remain ignorant is amazing. □



PEKING MARX

Oh unhappy day! Henceforth a question to be asked many times on college campuses, in think tanks, and wherever else our *soi-disant* Marxists gather will be: "Where were you when you received word that China's Communist Party newspaper, *People's Daily*, had abjured Marxist principles?" The horrible news was revealed in a December 7 unsigned editorial arguing that it would be "naive and stupid" to rely on Marxist principles to modernize China. "We cannot use Marxist and Leninist works to solve our present-day problems," the iconoclastic editorial concluded. "Times are changing. . . . "

As with such similar questions as "Where were you when Pearl Harbor was bombed?" or when John Lennon was murdered, one's ardor for the question will tell us much about he who answers it. I know of an art prof on a college campus dear to me who laments that so few of his colleagues teach art history from a "Marxist perspective." When word reaches him of Peking's historic tergiversation I expect he will become quite emotional. Possibly there will be calls for a physician or, worse, a mortician.

Red China, as we used to call it, was for Yank Marxists of the 1960s and 1970s an exemplary plot of land; at least it was for Marxists who felt the need to point to an earthly plot where their abstract hooey could be boomed

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as successful and wholesome. China was so peaceful—as peaceful as the grave. It was so egalitarian—as egalitarian as the penitentiary. And affluence's crapulent face was not seen. But now the *People's Daily* has blurted out its apprehensions that unless China departs from rigid Marxist dogma it might "lose touch with reality and be left behind." How will the news be received here? Marxism remains quite popular on our campuses along with dozens of other archaic enthusiasms. In fact, as the world hustles along on its busy course, taking up all the ever-changing problems that history presents to us, academe's radical profs are increasingly in danger of, as the *People's Daily* puts it, being "left behind." Many campuses are now dominated by junior faculty members whose student years in the 1960s were spent in Marxist reveries. Will the word from Peking snap them out of their ideological dream world? My guess is no, and under them their campuses will become living museums, somewhat like colonial Williamsburg. Adults will visit them as tourists wishing to see for themselves the fauna of the 1960s.

Imagine, teaching art from a "Marxist perspective." Why not a Baptist perspective or an engineering perspective or the perspective of a militant in the animal rights movement? I can well imagine the seminars of this last fanatic. There the bewildered students sit as the ideologue probes the "critical questions" regarding Henri Rousseau's jungle animals: Were they placed in dignified settings? Were the jungles progressive, were the beasts merely presented as nutritional objects? The life of the mind in our time is often intensely ideological, and as ideology botches more and more political issues the ideologues grow ever more bizarre.

Marx, of course, was bizarre from the start. That his writings ever gained purchase on Western minds is evidence of how effectively a gifted haranguer can play on our baser impulses, for instance, envy and jealousy. He held almost no accurate ideas about life, and his greatest contribution to knowledge came not in the realm of economics, politics, or history, but in the realm of warfare. He provided men with a compelling new rationale for killing each other off. Since his expiry more people around the globe have been slaughtered in his name than in the name of any religious messiah or prophet ever heard of.

I am pleased by this editorial in *People's Daily*, and I shall long remember where I was when I heard of it. With colleagues, I was laying plans for establishing a sperm bank for conservative geniuses. I suppose the thing can only get me into hot water. So many conservatives will be expecting my solicitation. But now the news from Peking emphasizes the need for new leadership in the world, and I say conservatives must answer history's call. □

CAPITOL IDEAS



DUCKS AND BEES

by Tom Bethell

For conservatives, the weeks following President Reagan's re-election were not at all auspicious. Reagan himself seemed to go into a protracted hibernation, but by the latter half of January somebody will presumably have aroused him, so that he may emerge in time to read the Inaugural Address. Soon thereafter he will be expected not merely to stand outside the Capitol building, but to go inside it, there to read a second speech, entitled the State of the Union Address. At that point I imagine that Mr. Reagan will be free to return to California, if he so wishes, where he may chop wood and ride horses to his heart's content. But by then there may well be a big row developing in Washington requiring his attention.

Tom Bethell is The American Spectator*'s Washington correspondent.*

As I see it, the bad news for conservatives is that Reagan no longer has to face the electorate, and therefore worry about what they think. Some conservatives, I'm afraid, have deluded themselves into thinking that this is to their advantage: No longer is it necessary for the Administration to appease all those special interest groups—senior-citizen lobbies and so on—who are responsible for our fattened government. But this is one of those false analyses that has been quietly encouraged all along by the shapers of the liberal consensus.

Gentlemen, the liberals want us to believe that the extensiveness of government is mere response to the will of the people. Indeed, the liberals would like to believe it themselves. But deep down they know it isn't true. They know that the real reason we have so much government is that they have worked tirelessly for fifty years to attain that goal, and that the popular will, insofar as it has to be taken into account (and alas it does, because the Constitution mandates elections), has been and remains the principal obstacle to further expansions of government power and liberal (meaning illiberal) influence.

Thus the liberals sense, probably correctly, that the present moment is an opportunity for them, notwithstanding their earlier bogus alarums to the effect that a re-elected Reagan, free at last from the moderating influence of the voters, would proceed full speed ahead to implement his right-wing ideology. But the minute Reagan was re-elected they were singing a different and more triumphant tune. There was a scarcely disguised gloating, for example, in a recent article by Robert G. Kaiser, an associate editor of the *Washington Post* whose job it is to furnish left-of-center policy analysis for the Within-the-Beltway crowd.

"Republicans," he wrote, "have a landslide winner at the helm, but they also have something Washington hasn't seen (except in the unrevealing special case of Richard M. Nixon) in a quarter century: a lame duck President."

For lame duck President read lame duck electorate.

That's what Within-the-Beltway advocates really mean by lame duck, and alas there is ample justification for their relishing this state of affairs, even if their analyses are not forthrightly expressed. The precedents Kaiser alludes to—Nixon's and Eisenhower's second terms—are also the only periods in U.S. history when we have experienced a

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lame duck electorate. The 22nd Amendment, limiting presidential terms, was ratified in 1951 and specifically did not apply to Truman. (Neither the Nixon nor the Eisenhower second term offers much by way of encouragement to conservatives, as Kaiser suggests. Incidentally, it is probably just as well for America that the country has not yet experienced the combination of a lame duck electorate and an incumbent Democrat.)

The truth is that the electorate exerts a conservative or restraining influence on the ambitions of practically every enthusiast who came to Washington with a gleam in his eye and a plan in his pocket. This becomes clear when you realize that someone who runs for President cannot be harmed by being clearly labeled a conservative. Liberals by contrast, are famous for *rejecting* labels. (Three years ago I checked with the Nexis computerized word-retrieval system and at the time all label rejecters were liberals. Jimmy Carter, the only Democrat elected President in twenty years, succeeded in blurring his identity in the '76 campaign. Possibly in his case he really did not know himself what it was that he stood for or believed in, and in this of course he resembled many liberals, who are quite sincere when they say they "reject labels.")

The dirty secret of those on the left is that they are profoundly antagonistic to elections. Leftists know that their preferred policies involve above all an assault on individual liberty, and they know also that this is not popular with even the lowest income voters; perhaps one should say especially the lowest income. This explains the liberals' constant attempts to disguise not only their identity, even from themselves (the word "liberal" is itself such a disguise of course), but also to disguise their agenda, which they represent as procedure (fairness) rather than substance (equality).

For a while after World War II the left could entertain the hope that its programs enjoyed popular support. In Europe, Britain especially, there was a sizable working class, so at least for a time the socialist elites could enjoy leading troops who followed voluntarily. But this has weakened as capitalism has slowly spread. Since then, socialism's dependence on brute force has become more and more apparent. Today the political future looks bleak for explicitly socialist parties in Europe.

At least some liberals in the U.S. are well aware that their agenda is congruent with socialism, and as long as the electorate knows it too liberalism will get little encouragement in the voting booth. That is one reason why domestic liberals have invested so much effort and hope and political capital in the judicial, or unelected, branch of government.

After five years, the Sandinistas were sufficiently in control in Nicaragua to stage an election. But notice that in El Salvador the left boycotted elections; they must have known that the people knew only too well what they had to offer. In fully Communist countries, of course, there are no elections. There the policy analysts with gleams in their eyes and plans in their pockets also have dachas in the countryside, and—what a relief!—they can go about their business without having to worry about the voters. Is it surprising then that our liberal analogues find it so difficult to criticize the Soviet system?

As far as the present Administration is concerned, President Reagan for reasons that remain obscure has chosen to insulate himself with a senior layer of advisers—I am thinking of the pragmatic firm of Shultz, McFarlane, Baker, Darman & Deaver—who are more in sympathy with Inner Beltway analysis than they are with the electorate. And they surely find it easier to press Beltway opinion upon the President now that they know he doesn't have to bother too much about what

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

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the electorate thinks. As Lou Cannon put it in the *Washington Post*: "While some conservatives say they think Reagan, now that he can no longer run again, will be more ideological in his second term, others say the pressures of time and circumstance will make him more flexible." (Note the linguistic imprecision, with "conservatives" in apposition to "pressures of time and circumstance"; the hunt for new euphemisms is a never-ending business for the working bees of the Press, whose industriousness I salute.)

"'He will be more realistic and more pragmatic than he has been,' said Deaver [according to the Chronicles of Cannon], who is expected to leave for a major public relations job after directing next month's inauguration."

Why this Deaver has chosen to work at all for a man whom he evidently considers unrealistic, I don't know. But the point that I would like to make is that these people—Deaver & Co.—are going to get President Reagan into big trouble before very long, if they haven't already gone a long way in that direction, on the topic of arms control. Does Reagan have the slightest idea what he is getting into here? I think that he does not. What he should realize is quite simply this: Our negotiating partner in arms control talks will be the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union does not have the best interests of the United States at heart. Supporters of arms control agreements in this country, including State Department and White House officials, are, to the extent that they hunt for a formula that will yield "successful negotiations," promoting positions that harmonize with Soviet positions. From Reagan's point of view, no good can come of this. He will either have to trade away America's security—and I am sure he will do no such thing—or he will have to face a full-scale Hive assault for having permitted "the talks to fail."

According to the Chronicles of Cannon in the *Washington Post*, Reagan by no means appreciates the dilemma that now confronts him: "Now, say officials, Reagan has made arms control a high priority of his administration, reflecting the view urged by advisers that he could leave office as a 'peace president' if he succeeds." Robert McFarlane is then identified as opining that "the President's commitment to getting success goes back many years."

On the next day (December 9) Cannon chronicled: "Reagan is said to be entranced by the notion of being a 'peace president,' but he prefers the phrase 'arms reduction' to the more customary 'arms control.'" (All right Ronnie, the Hive will be glad to make that little concession on your behalf.)

As I say, someone should tell Reagan that he is walking into a trap. The only way he can get "success" in negotiations is by doing what the Soviets want. And the Soviet goal is to dominate the world. Can it be that McFarlane doesn't know this yet? But, according to Cannon's Chronicle, the very people who should be warning Reagan about what he is getting into are the ones who are pushing him into it.

How Reagan can have placed himself at the mercy of people of such poor political acumen is perhaps the major mystery of his Administration. It is true that the electorate is in one sense now reduced to lame duck status, but in others it will certainly be heard from. Someone should give Rip Van Reagan a shake and warn him (although I suspect it's already too late to change anything). He's either going to have to take on the Hive at full swarm; or he is going to have to take on the ducks who have been supporting him for twenty years. Lame ducks may not be able to walk to the polls but they sure can quack, as Reagan will soon hear. We are all set for a big uproar of buzzing or quacking or both, and I wouldn't be surprised if pragmatic heads roll in response. □

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Reagan II: Appraisal & Prognosis

INTRODUCTION

A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

by R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

Dear Mr. President,

Where's the Rest of Me? is an intriguing title for an autobiography, but it will make an even better title for your political memoirs. Since 1968, when I decided that you were the most likely candidate to reverse the steady politicization of areas theretofore off-limits to American politics, there has been something missing in the coverage of you. Cowboy boots, California sun, conservative principles, and a winning smile—to hear the pundits on either side of the Atlantic tell it, those are the constituent elements of your two gubernatorial campaigns, four presidential campaigns (two fruitless, two stupendously successful), eight years as governor of California, five years in the political wilderness, and what the pundits call the Reagan Revolution. All this you achieved in the last third of your life, yet the pundits see only banalities. Read for yourself the news stories of the past four years or turn to the scanty number of books and articles about you; something is missing. Where's the rest of you?

Well, according to the Keepers of American Orthodoxy there simply is not a lot more. Vast changes are transforming the American economy, society, and government. Of this the Keepers are vaguely aware, but how do they account for it? With anxious eyes darting furtively toward the ceiling they speak of accidents (the oil glut!), incredibly good weather, Paul Volcker, your overwhelming smile, sheer luck! There you have it. After decades of bawling magniloquently about the critical importance of leadership, about the mastery of FDR, about the galvanic charisma of JFK, when asked to explain your career of—shall we say—"sailing against the wind," its triumphs, its moments of heroism, of high good humor, of drama, of—and here is the word that so often sozzles them—*change*, the keepers can speak only of chance, Fortune, accidents. Imagine, your successes are to be explained by far-off stars banging into each other, by a drop in the barometer and the cow jumps over the moon. It is as though Einstein were to explain quantum theory as the will of leprechauns.

Let the Keepers remain secure in their touching belief in accidents and good luck. Let them speak portentously of the colossal narcotic effect of that smile of yours. I for one believe that once again the current wisdom is a dunce. In pursuit of their delusions the Keepers will inevitably believe in the palpably absurd. Recall if you will how in the 1950s they believed that Dwight Eisenhower, formerly the supreme commander of history's most powerful army, was, as President, merely the dumb tool of sharp pols. Now the historians are discovering the decisive role he played in his administration. Only the Keepers of a decaying orthodoxy would ever have believed the earlier fable.

By the time you entered the White House the orthodoxy had practically blown up. The political culture of Liberalism was demoralized. Its chief proponents and its chief ideas had been discredited by events. Significant numbers of thoughtful Liberals had for years been wandering from the Word, and America was clearly ready to move on to a new political culture, one more moderate, more concerned with liberty, reason, and the pursuit of excellence. A new political culture was indeed there, but only the audacious have participated in it. The new political culture, a political culture eminently compatible with the policies of the Reagan Revolution, has been very successfully resisted by the old orthodoxy. This new culture needs a boost, and if the Reagan Revolution is to endure that boost will have to come from you.

At the outset of the 1960s JFK encouraged writers and intellectuals who to this day serve as heralds of the New Frontier. Their values are no longer quite so robust as were their fallen leader's, but they endure and they have transformed into legend a very mediocre presidency. That is the kind of thing the intelligentsia can achieve. The rising political culture will surely be as effective. Its writers and intellectuals are very talented, and owing to the greater opposition they have had to overcome they are considerably tougher. In a modern world where politics is peculiarly caught up with ideas, the prudent statesman knows the value of ideas and consorts with those who manage ideas. You more than most American pols have dealt with ideas. It is time you attended to the business of cultural politics.

Your friends are up against an orthodoxy that has almost total control of the redoubts of culture and intellectual influence. The Liberal dominance of culture here is far more pervasive than in such countries as England and France. As long as it remains unchallenged it will make the politics of the Reagan Administration difficult. Of course adherents to the old orthodoxy no longer really believe in it. They know it has failed, but they do not want to be driven from their pulpits, and so they hang on desperately, intoning their pious piffles, and diverting their followers from the new political culture that might release us all of the grim obsessions that the Liberals bring down on us.

Let me make a suggestion. You have a board of informal economic advisers. You have similar groups advising you on other matters. Why not establish a group with which you could consult on a somewhat regular basis about developments in the political culture? Bring in those old Liberals and old Conservatives who now in the face of our radicalized Liberalism have so much in common. Bring in members of the New Right, the Religious Right, Libertarians, and populists. Affairs of a literary and patriotic nature have forced me to travel extensively this year. One of the developments I perceive is that all the aforementioned groups share a vast commonality. All have accommodated themselves surprisingly well to one another's quirks, for they seem to sense that the country is threatened by a critical loss of freedom and security if the old political culture, now so decadent and idiotic, is not radically reformed or overthrown. I suggest you bring the intelligentsia of this new political culture together. They need your support and you need them. Unlike the Keepers of the Old Orthodoxy they understand why things are changing in the land. Moreover, their commentaries will illuminate the rest of you for years to come.

Yours faithfully,

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

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White House Politics

THE DEVIL AND MR. REAGAN

by Fred Barnes

In a stretch of about three minutes in the first presidential debate last October, two different Ronald Reagans appeared on stage in Louisville and before a television audience of millions. The question was about taxes—not a bad question either, since I happen to have asked it—and Reagan uncorked a sweeping answer. "I'm not going to increase taxes," he declared flatly, absolutely, and without qualification. That was Reagan the conservative ideologue talking.

But quickly the ideologue exited, and Reagan the Washington, D.C. pragmatist rushed to the podium, arriving just in time to handle the follow-up question about whether he had really meant to rule out, once and for all, any tax hike in his second term in the White House. Well, not really, this Reagan said. Why, he could imagine a circumstance under which all the fat had been cut from the budget and all conceivable revenues collected from the economic recovery—and still a federal budget deficit was looming large. In that happenstance, maybe he'd raise taxes.

The appearance of two Reagans in Louisville fits nicely with the conventional wisdom about the man, namely that he is a committed ideologue surrounded by clever pragmatists. Thus, he was first expressing his own view and then that of his advisers. As an unswerving conservative, a rallying point of the American right for two decades, he has no intention of raising taxes, and that's just what he said. But his aides, many of them anyway, are not so ideological, and they whisper in his ear a lot. Be pragmatic. Never say never. Compromise. And sure enough, Reagan, reflecting their influence, backed off from any unqualified statement on taxes. At least that's the conventional way Reagan is regarded in Washington.

This is hogwash, of course. There aren't two Ronald Reagans. There is but one, and he happens to be a blend of ideologue and pragmatist. It is his genius as a politician. As an ideologue, he has an agenda, and he has been remarkably effective in imposing it on Washington. As a pragmatist, he is able to deal, to compromise, even to surrender if that suits him. By combining the two styles, Reagan has become the most successful President in four decades. And if his second term is not marred by a deep recession, major scandal, or foreign policy failure, he is likely to emerge alongside Roosevelt as one of the twin towers of twentieth-century politics.

Still Reagan is a frustrating figure, especially for conservatives. It is not easy to predict what he is going to do. Conservatives can never relax in the comfort of knowing that Reagan will automatically stick to the right line. This is the guy, remember, who pushed through the historic three-year, supply-side tax cut of 1981, then followed it with four tax increases over the next three years. That's right, four—the "tax reform" hike in 1982, the gas tax boost and the Social Security tax increase in 1983, and the deficit "downpayment" last year. Given that record, does anyone accept at face value Reagan's assurance that he won't raise taxes in 1985?

Under the fashionable two-Reagans approach, it will be easy to assess the blame if Reagan succumbs to pressure for a tax increase. Since Reagan doesn't want one, it will be his aides who are responsible. This is akin to saying the Devil made him do it. White House aides always make a convenient scapegoat, and you can almost gauge a President's success by the amount of blame that is heaped on them. The more the aides are pilloried, the more the President stays above the fray, looks statesmanlike, and is swimmingly successful. Roosevelt was the master of this tactic, allowing the slings and arrows of friends and enemies to be directed at his Brain Trust and Cabinet. Reagan lets the darts fly undeterred at James Baker, Michael Deaver, and Richard Darman, the triumvirate that runs the White House staff. He's the ideologue, they're the pragmatists.

But would Reagan's decisions be different should there be another cast of advisers strutting in and out of the Oval Office? Probably not. The pragmatist troika accedes when Reagan goes on an ideological binge. It was Baker, after all, who masterminded congressional passage of the 1981 tax cut. And it is now Darman who seems most eager to make what there is of a Reagan Revolution permanent through forcing the Federal Reserve to stop strangling economic growth and by bringing about historic tax reform with lower rates and fewer loopholes. True, both of these aides have sought to scale back the military buildup and to script Reagan's appearances with happy talk about arms control. However, this was prompted by constraints of the re-election campaign and the budget deficit; practically any White House aide would have given Reagan the same advice.

What is misunderstood about the Reagan Administration is where the tension lies. It's not between a saintly President who wants to do the conservative thing in all instances and perfidious aides who are closet liberals. It's between the two sides of Reagan, ideological and pragmatic. And this isn't going to change, no matter whom he staffs his Administration with. It's not that aides don't matter; it's that they don't matter much. Reagan, in fact, doesn't appear to give a hoot about who fills what job. When William Clark left as national security adviser in 1983 to become Interior Secretary, the President went along with a scheme that would have made Deaver the White House chief of staff, replacing Baker, and Baker the new national security chief. Reagan wasn't dragooned into it; he readily agreed and a press release announcing the changes was prepared. The scheme was undone only when Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, CIA Director William Casey, U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Clark got wind of it. They protested vigorously, and Reagan readily agreed with them.

A new personnel shift is brewing for the second term, one dependent largely on Baker's ability to fulfill his ambition to get a top Cabinet job. Three, four, and five cushion shots are talked about. Paul Volcker resigns as Fed chairman. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan or Secretary of State George Shultz replaces him at the Fed. Baker jumps in at either Treasury or State. Clark returns to the White House as chief of staff. Deaver and Darman, both Baker's boys, leave the White House, if they haven't already. A phalanx of conservative ideologues moves in, including Kirkpatrick as the new national security adviser. Believe me, there is more than mere idle chatter about this scheme. But would it really make any difference? The answer is not much, for Reagan would still be torn. Not between his instincts and his aides, but between the two sides of his political personality.

Let me hammer away at this point from another angle, namely the overrated philosophical split that ripples through the entire Administration. Once more, it's between the ideologues

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



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and the pragmatists. They disagree on nearly every major issue that confronts the second Reagan Administration: the economy, tax reform, Central America, arms control, social issues. The ideologues want to go with an undiluted conservative agenda, push it relentlessly and take no prisoners. The pragmatists want a sharply modified conservative agenda, one less likely to clash with the institutional arrangements and business-as-usual political culture of Washington. And what does this disagreement between the ideologues and pragmatists represent? Nothing more than the ambivalence of Reagan himself.

For some breathtakingly naive reason, a large number of conservatives believe that Reagan would dearly love to settle the disagreement in his second administration, embracing the ideologues as brethren and dismissing the pragmatists as interlopers. Fat chance. Reagan isn't given to grand gestures like that on either personnel or policy. Only when the split confronts him in the form of some specific unavoidable issue is Reagan willing to pick sides. And he doesn't always pick the same one. As he prepared for his second term, Reagan backed Weinberger, an ideologue, on protecting the military buildup while tacitly supporting Shultz, a pragmatist, in his replacement of conservative political appointees at the State Department with bureaucrats from the striped-pants set. If only Reagan knew what Shultz was up to, conservatives moan. But he does; he reads Evans & Novak and the *New York Times*. Reagan simply doesn't mind what Shultz is doing. He's not so flaccid that he wouldn't act were he upset about it.

Reagan's ambivalence, which he cherishes because it serves him so well politically, makes it hard to chart the course of his second term. It'll be conservative, but how conservative? Reagan doesn't know yet. And how hard is he willing to work, at 74 and counting, on behalf of his conservative agenda? The popular feeling in Washington is that he'll dog it for the next four years, spending so much time at his ranch in California that the term "Western White House" will regain respectability. Gag writer Robert Orben says Reagan will stay in Washington so little that he'll start showing slides of his precious moments at the White House to his California pals. Thomas DeFrank of *Newsweek* jokes that when Reagan gets whipped up about some issue he might even be spurred to spend a few sleepless afternoons in the Oval Office.



Funny, huh? You don't have to worry about Reagan's energy level, though. He's always willing to work hard if the goal is significant and achievable. Which is why you shouldn't expect to see Reagan breaking his back to push $40-odd billion in spending cuts every year. A package of cuts that large is illusory for two reasons. One, the numbers are inflated; the actual amount being cut is far less. And two, Congress won't go along anyway. Even if Congress were willing to knuckle under in a fight, what's in it for Reagan to expend a full measure of political capital to be remembered as the President who pared the deficit from $200 billion to $175 billion? So look for Reagan to compromise on this, getting what cuts he can without jeopardizing his political manhood.

There is but one Ronald Reagan, and he happens to be a blend of ideologue and pragmatist.

The tricky question involves a tax increase. There is enormous pressure from Republican pragmatists in the Senate to boost taxes as part of a deficit reduction package. Go for a tax hike and you'll be able to bargain for more spending cuts, the Republicans, including folks in the White House like budget director David Stockman, tell Reagan. Maybe he'll fall for it; he has before. But there is a counterpressure this time. This is the opportunity to enact a landmark reform of the tax code that lowers personal and corporate rates, tosses out uneconomic tax preferences, and invigorates the entire economy. Talk about an ornament for a second term. Compared to this, a package of spending cuts and a tax increase is a piffle, an achievement of Jimmy Carter proportions. It's the difference between something that is event-making and eventful.

Shortly after the Treasury Department issued an elegant, if improvable, tax reform plan, Irving Kristol declared in the *Wall Street Journal* that the whole issue was "dead" for 1985. He couldn't have been more wrong. Democrats who had jumped out front in opposition to the Treasury plan quickly figured which way the momentum is drifting; people like Governor Mario Cuomo and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York reversed themselves. And those in favor of tax reform, like Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey, proclaimed themselves ready to negotiate a bipartisan compromise. Some business lobbyists suggested a few changes in the Treasury bill might get them on board. Naturally, pragmatists in the Congress and the White House—but not Darman, whose influence was growing—complained that tax reform wouldn't help the deficit. Besides, it's difficult to achieve. Nonsense. All Reagan has to do is forge a compromise, which is no easy feat, and lead the tax reform army as it conquers Congress.

The vigor with which ideologues and pragmatists fight over economic issues pales next to the fury of the combatants in the two major foreign policy issues of Reagan's second term, Nicaragua and arms control. Here the disagreement is fundamental. The ideologues question whether treaties are worth the paper they are written on, whether they are reached with the Sandinistas or the Soviets. The pragmatists insist that treaties, if carefully crafted, can insure a secure peace. And guess who has played the issue both ways in his public comments over the years? Reagan.

Shultz and his minions are pursuing the treaty option, negotiating to see if a pact can be reached that would prevent Nicaragua from becoming another Cuba, exporting Communist revolution. In all likelihood, such a treaty is a figment of the imagination. The evidence is too strong that the Sandinistas are hell-bent on turning all of Central America into a swatch of near-totalitarian countries that would be the delight of visiting American clergymen. Reagan knows this. Besides, ideologues such as Casey and Weinberger are constantly reminding him that the Sandinistas are not agrarian reformers. And Reagan thinks of the contras as freedom fighters, which they are, and any treaty acceptable to Nicaragua would sell them out. Don't look for a treaty; look for encouragement of the contras. On this one, Reagan is likely to go with the ideologues.

The opposite may be true on a nuclear arms control agreement with the Soviets. At the outset of the second Reagan Administration, Shultz is clearly in charge on arms control, and he wants a treaty. To get one, he is willing to make some concessions, not big ones, to the Soviets to get them back to the bargaining table. To the ideologues, this is wrongheaded in the extreme. Four years of toughness have softened the Soviets, they argue, so let them crawl. It's their turn, not the Reagan Administration's, to come up with a concession or two. If only Reagan knew what Shultz is doing, you say. He does, he does. The simple truth is that Reagan wants an arms treaty with the Soviets of one kind or another; it's not lip service. And like the good pragmatist he often is, he's willing to let Shultz deal to get one. But the ideologues can probably count on the Soviets to save the day by demanding such a one-sided pact that Shultz and Reagan will have to balk.

Finally, there are social issues—abortion, school prayer, tuition tax credits, feminism. Reagan loves these issues, and he talks like a sincere ideologue about all of them. But there's a rub; he doesn't do much to see these issues through. Were he to fight as aggressively for an anti-abortion bill as he did for the tax increase of 1982, it might come close to passing. As a sheer political matter, Reagan uses social issues brilliantly, talking them up enough to win the cheers of New Right conservatives but not enough to alarm conservatives and moderates who abhor them. This helps Reagan and keeps the issues alive. It is an approach that is at once ideological and pragmatic. It is classic Reagan. Expect it to continue.

Come 1987 or thereabouts, things change. The great reconciler of the two factions will become something of a lame duck, the more so as the race for the 1988 Republican presidential nomination accelerates. And that's when fragmentation is threatened, the ideologues going one way, the pragmatists the other. Only Reagan is a strong enough force to overcome the centrifugal force that pulls them apart. He is one politician both factions agree on, the ideologues because they think he's one of them, the pragmatists because they admire his ability to sway voters and win elections. Would the ideologues settle for strong words but little action on social issues from George Bush? Nope. Would the pragmatists who want to raise taxes defer to Jack Kemp the way they have to Reagan? Don't count on it. Kemp is too ideological for the pragmatists, Bush too pragmatic for the ideologues. Reagan alone is both at once.

Think back when there was another political figure of this sort. He was on the left. His name was Roosevelt. □

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Environment

RECLAIMING CONSERVATIVE GROUND

by William Tucker

Last September, I was invited to Washington by the Heritage Foundation to join a group of people meeting with William Ruckelshaus, then director of the Environmental Protection Agency, to discuss second-term issues.

The group was generally drawn from that army of Washington lobbyists who spend their time buzzing around congressional committees and federal agencies, trying to get them to omit a comma here, or reinterpret a clause there, in a way that will ultimately mean millions of dollars to their clients.

After about an hour of complaining over recent EPA decisions from these people, I managed to pose "one last question." Why, I asked Mr. Ruckelshaus, did the Reagan Administration have to be so passive about environmentalism? Why sit back and accept the portrait foisted on them by the press and environmentalists that Republicans are the enemies of the environment, while Democrats are the knights in shining armor rushing to save Mother Nature from the clutches of Big Business. (The *New Republic,* for example, had just run a cover story called "The Reagan Chain-Saw Massacre," which debated whether the Administration's policy toward the environment has been a "seduction" or a "rape.")

Why not, I asked, put forth a Republican environmental agenda—featuring, among other things, some of the "market mechanisms" that have been proposed by economists in recent years for dealing with pollution problems? Then let the Democrats and environmentalists respond to the *Republican* agenda, instead of always leaving the Administration on the defensive.

Ruckelshaus's answer was short. "I guess we should have quit before this last question," he said. Then he reminisced a bit about the day in 1972 when he and Senator Edmund Muskie went down to the Internal Revenue Service and tried to get them to accept a "pollution tax" as a way of dealing with sulfur emissions into the atmosphere. ("No way," said the IRS, "the tax system shouldn't be used as a vehicle for dealing with pollution.") "We tried that under Nixon and it didn't work," he concluded. That was it.

This dispirited performance amazed me. Why is it that the Republicans continue to squander one of their best opportunities of the decade to rid themselves of a false issue, and instead continue to hand over the diadem of environmental purity to the Democrats? For the life of me, I can't understand it.

Environmentalism has always been a conservative issue. By all odds, it should be a Republican issue. In fact, it once was. Around California, right through the early 1960s, being in the Sierra Club was almost the equivalent of membership in the state's Old Republican Guard. When Sierra Club Director David Brower took sides in the 1956 election, he ran considerable risk by announcing himself a "Republican for Stevenson."

Theodore Roosevelt was a Republican, as was his fellow Conservation leader, Gifford Pinchot. On Earth Day in 1970, Barry Goldwater was the featured speaker at one liberal Long Island University. James Buckley has always been an enthusiastic environmentalist, and still writes indignant editorials about endangered species. In Europe, environmentalists have nearly always been members of the "activist" aristocracy. Britain's most publicly outspoken advocate for wildlife preservation is Prince Philip.

The question of what happened in the United States during the 1970s to make environmentalism a "liberal" issue is one worth long pondering. In my book, *Progress and Privilege: America in the Age of Environmentalism,* I spent considerable time trying to explore how this process occurred.

In the 1960s, I believe, a lot of upper-middle-class people reached unprecedented levels of material comfort. At first, they used their new security to patronize black radicalism and the "youth rebellion." But these movements soon became much more violent than even the radicalized upper-middle-class people of that era were willing to tolerate.

Instead, upper-middle-class people needed something that was at once "anti-establishment," but not so obviously dangerous. What they soon discovered was another kind of "anti-establishmentarianism"—the old, aristocratic, anti-business attitudes that have been lying around among the "old rich" since the early days of the Industrial Revolution. Upper-middle-class liberals took their new-found political activism and fused it with this old, aristocratic condescension toward nouveau-riche business classes. The result was what I called the "conservatism of the liberals"—modern environmentalism.

When 1960s liberals became 1970s environmentalists, they brought with them their entire set of intellectual baggage. Environmentalism, for example, has always been a huge growth industry in academia. If you want to solve an environmental problem, the first thing to do is to hire an academic consultant to write a 3,000-page environmental impact statement. Private motivation—"greed," as it is called—is always the cause of environmental problems. Benign government intervention is always the solution.

Republicans have been helpless against this onslaught. The Democrats present them with an agenda—"trees or factories"—and the Republicans can only hang their heads and mutter "factories." Democrats grandly announce that government will clean up every toxic waste dump in the country, and when Republicans try to enlist the financial support of business to undertake this monumental task, they are "taking polluters to lunch."

When confronted with an environmental issue, Republicans automatically cede the high ground to the purists. Democrats and environmentalists propose, while Republicans prevaricate. Democrats consort with the angels, while Republicans wallow in the industrial mire. Every environmental debate begins with this inevitable format. All the Republicans can do is hold their breath and hope the public won't judge them too harshly on the issue.

Yet this picture is completely false. A clean environment and a healthy economy is not an either/or proposition. Pollution is not a matter of "big corporations versus the public interest." It is a question of the public's desire for industrial prosperity versus its countervailing desire to minimize pollution.

Everyone is in favor of clean air. There is no point in debating that subject. The real questions are: 1) What kind of standards of purity are we going to try to achieve? 2) How are we going to do it? and 3) Who is going to pay for it? To these questions, everyone has different answers.

In this kind of situation, the responsibility of government should be to construct a mechanism by which people can choose the kind of environment they want. Yet this is exactly what we don't have now. Instead, we have a system where Washington bureaucrats are given blanket authority to carry out

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vague mandates that Congress never really bothered to understand in the first place. The federal agencies go their own way, creating monumental, unknown costs to be borne anonymously by the entire economy.

What we need is a new understanding of environmentalism—an understanding that tells us why environmentalism is always such a universally popular issue in the abstract, but difficult to implement in practice. We need a sensible, Republican agenda for environmentalism.

Perhaps the best way to begin to understand the situation is to realize that environmentalism is basically the politics of landlords.

Landlords are the forgotten players in modern industrial economies. To the extent that they are still acknowledged, landlords are perceived only as enemies, both by the business community, and by the great mass of consumers.

Yet landlords have a crucial role to play in modern capitalism. It is their responsibility to *protect resources*. Why do they do it? Because they *own* the resources themselves. Environmentalism is the occupational disease of landlords. It comes with the job. That is why everybody—from hard-nosed industrialist to ethereal bird-watcher—is usually an environmentalist in his own neighborhood.

As an owner of resources, you want to *conserve* them. You want to keep them in the best condition, holding up their value, and—if they must be sold—putting them on the market for only the highest possible price.

With an irreplaceable resource—priceless scenery, for example—you don't want to sell it at all. You simply want to *preserve* it, keeping it in its pristine state.

With natural resources that are not unique—renewable or non-renewable energy resources, for instance—you want to *conserve* them. This means you dole the resource onto the market as abstemiously as possible, always weighing possible future worth against present potential value.

How does a landlord do this? With the "priceless" resource, he doesn't let anybody disturb anything, but perhaps charges people to view it, in order to offset the costs of maintaining it in perfect condition.

With the renewable or non-renewable natural resources, his strategy is to market the resource as slowly as possible, at the *highest possible price*. Thus, the landlord maximizes his own profit and conserves the resources, all at the same time. This is the normal way in which the market achieves "environmental protection."

Landlords are the world's true environmentalists. They conserve resources by pursuing their own private interest. Environmental protection comes about through the operation of the invisible hand in an unfettered economy.

OPEC, for example, has always claimed it was only "conserving" oil by charging the highest possible price. That is absolutely correct. In fact, OPEC has encouraged so much technical improvement in consuming oil that it is now conserving more oil than it might otherwise have desired.

In England nearly all the trout streams are privately owned. They run across the old baronial estates that have been in some families since the Middle Ages. A few years ago, when power plants started dumping pollutants into these streams, the landowners formed the Anglers' Association, which promptly sued the power companies on the basis that the power plants were destroying private property. The Anglers won, and the power companies were quickly forced to clean up their technology.

The responsibility of government should be to construct a mechanism by which people can choose the kind of environment they want.

In America, however, there has always been one great problem. *We have no landed aristocracy.* Almost all larger resources—lakes and streams, deserts and mountains—belong to the government. Therefore environmentalism in the United States has become a public issue.

The solution we have come up with in the United States is to let the government retain most of the resources, and practice conservation out of good will—rather than economic incentives. This is what the Conservation Movement tried to do in the early 1900s, and what many environmental groups would like to do even more of today. (The Sierra Club has just come up with its own blueprint for a government-controlled economy.)

Government, however, does not make a very good landlord. It is usually under too much pressure from the great mass of consumers to *overexploit* its own resources, turning them over to consumers at artificially low prices.

This has been the fate of all the old Conservation agencies—the Reclamation Bureau, the Bureau of Land Management, and the National Forest Service—that were set up or revitalized under Theodore Roosevelt. All have ended up captives of their consumer clientele. They *overutilize* the resources under their jurisdiction, selling them at subsidized prices and using tax revenues to make up for their losses. Federally owned water in the West, for example, often sells to farmers at only one one-hundredth its potential market value.

Environmentalists have always been outraged by these practices, charging that they overexploit natural resources. David Stockman and the Grace Commission criticize the same projects because they squander government money. Both are right. Why doesn't the Administration call a press conference and announce it is seeking the help of environmental groups in trying to cut the waste of tax dollars on federal water projects? Don't ask me.

What the government *can* do well, on the other hand, is to set up property-rights systems, and let private people play the game of environmental protection. This way, everyone's *private* interest can be turned to the cause of improving the environment. Once the proper system is designed, all that is necessary is to "let the market do the work."

Take, for example, the problem of air pollution. Dozens of economists have studied it, and all have come to the same conclusion. The best way to deal with air pollution is to have the government sell "marketable rights" to dump waste into the atmosphere. Industries would then have to buy the rights to pollute—instead of doing it for free, as they do now.

Once these rights are on the market, industries will buy and sell them among each other, until each company reaches the point where it is cheaper to clean up its remaining pollution, rather than to buy more rights to pollute. This way, we would get the same reductions in pollution, but at the cheapest possible cost. (As it is today, the EPA and state pollution agencies make all the decisions themselves. They go around telling each industry what kind of equipment to put on every smokestack. The result is endless court fights, with very little movement toward actual cleanup.)

The marketable-rights approach has already been tried on a small scale with the EPA's "bubble" concept, which was introduced in the late 1970s. The EPA puts an imaginary bubble over a large factory, and assumes that all the emissions are coming out of a single smokestack. The factory owner is then left free to decide where he will clean up in order to meet the emissions standard. It is, in effect, a marketable-rights policy applied to a single plant. (The pollution tax, which the Nixon Administration toyed with in 1972, is markedly inferior because it involves endless government guesswork about where to set the tax.)

The first Reaganauts to arrive at EPA were suspicious of the bubble policy, because it had originated under the Carter Administration. They finally realized its virtues, however, and began promoting it. At this point, the professional environmentalists decided that if the Reagan Administration was for the bubble, they must be against it. The Natural Resources Defense Council fought the case all the way to the Supreme Court, before the bubble policy was finally upheld in a unanimous decision last spring.

The EPA now has thriving "pollution markets" operating in Louisville, Seattle, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco. There is no reason that the marketable-rights concept can't be quickly elevated to a national policy and applied to all kinds of environmental problems. There is no reason why the Administration can't begin publicizing its efforts, either.

Economic mechanisms have unlimited potential in dealing with the nation's environmental issues. Take, for example, the issue of acid rain—an admittedly thorny subject, which Ruckelshaus has called the biggest environmental problem facing the nation today.

There is no question that sulfur emissions from Midwestern power plants are increasing the acidity of rain that falls in New England and Canada. There is considerable damage being done. Again the questions are: 1) How bad is it? 2) How much are people willing to pay to remedy the situation? and 3) Who should bear the costs?

As it stands now, the situation is in the hands of the "experts"—which is to say at the lowest rung of the political ladder. Scientific studies on one side show that forests in the Northeast may soon be wiped out. Scientific studies on the other say that power plants may not even be involved—or that the damage has been exaggerated. They argue that "we need more information before we can do anything." The resolution of these conflicts is determined by who has the political muscle to make his "expert opinion" stick. Right now the "we-need-more-information" advocates have the upper hand.

Yet there are obviously better ways to resolve the problem. What the federal government should do is to put an imaginary bubble over the entire

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Midwest and *sell* the rights to dump sulfur into the atmosphere over Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan. This would give all sides of the controversy the means to settle the issue among themselves, without waiting four, eight, twelve, or sixteen years to see what kind of policy emerges out of Washington.

How would it work? First, Midwestern utility companies would have to buy up some of the rights, in order to continue operating. The costs they incurred would be passed on to users of electricity—who would thus start paying the "external costs" of their consumption. These people would start conserving electricity—which is the exact, appropriate response needed to improve the situation.

Second, the people in Canada and New England would have the option to *buy up* some of the marginal rights and "retire" them, forcing polluters to cut back on their sulfur emissions. The marginal price of these rights would reflect two things: 1) the amount that Midwestern electrical consumers are willing to pay to go on polluting New England and Canada; and 2) the amount that pollution-conscious people in New England and Canada (or anywhere in the country, for that matter) are willing to pay to reduce acid rain.

As a consequence of all this, scientific studies would no longer be political footballs that experts throw back and forth at one another. Instead, accurate information would become crucial in making the right decisions. Since people on both ends would be paying the cost of their choices, there will be a premium on getting the best information possible, rather than parading out wild exaggerations for the benefit of "policymakers" and the press.

Thus, all the right incentives would be in place. Power companies would look for the cheapest way to take sulfur out of the air—instead of stonewalling, as they do now. Consumers would conserve electricity, since they would now be paying the long-hidden external costs of their consumption. And the victimized states would be able to make realistic evaluations of how much pollution reduction they really want—instead of asking for the moon and getting almost nothing, as they do now. Costs would be shared, and people would get what they pay for.

The great virtue of such a system would be that all the parties would get to make their own choices in the matter—instead of having everything depend on who can put the most political pressure on the bureaucracy. It would get results—and efficiently, too—rather than continuing the endless rounds of scientific evaluations and court cases that are always grinding on in Washington, never leading anywhere. It would put the environmental decision-making back in the hands of the people.

The groundwork for these new approaches to environmental policy has long been laid. John Baden, Richard Stroup, and the young economists at the Center for Natural Resources and Political Economy in Bozeman, Montana, have written dozens of monographs and books dealing with government policies on Western lands. Paul Portney and Henry Peskin at Resources for the Future, and Robert Crandall at the Brookings Institution, both in Washington, have long elucidated the case for applying economic reasoning to environmental problems.

Even the major environmental organizations are becoming far more receptive. When I made a tour among the leading environmental groups a year ago, I found many of them had just put economists on their staff for the first time in history.

Environmental groups are obviously looking for compromise. They know the halcyon days of the early Carter Administration are gone forever. On many issues—like subsidized Western water projects—enlisting their support would probably mean nothing more than scheduling a joint press conference between the environmental groups and members of the Grace Commission to announce their common objectives.

In fact, on many of these constructive proposals, it is probably business groups that will be the most likely to drag their feet. It's not that corporations don't like market mechanisms for pollution control. What they fear—quite rightly—is that these mechanisms will not replace existing regulation, but will only become another layer of bureaucracy superimposed on the current morass.

In fact, it is probably fair to say that—as with all market solutions—these policies have no real "natural" constituency. Market solutions are usually only acceptable as compromises of last resort. All parties will come to them only after each has abandoned the idea of winning the game entirely through outright control of the bureaucracy.

Yet it is precisely in these situations that *political* leadership becomes most important. Politicians can divest themselves of special interest groups, and play a truly constructive role in mediating between parties and setting up a system that works in everybody's interest. This is the kind of leadership opportunity awaiting the Reagan Administration in its second term. If environmentalism really is "everybody's issue," there is no reason it can't be a big item on the agenda of the new Republican majority. □

Economy

FOCUS ON GROWTH

by Paul Craig Roberts

Despite the magnitude of his reelection victory, it will be difficult for President Reagan to put his economic policy back on track. Several important factors work against a return of his pro-economic growth program of 1981. One is the Federal Reserve Board's belief that economic growth causes inflation, a belief that makes the Fed reluctant to support an economic growth policy. Another is the failure of President Reagan to appoint senior officials who believe in his policy enough to fight for it. Yet another is the fight within the Republican party over control of the agenda and the 1988 nomination. The combination of these factors leaves President Reagan in a weakened and isolated position.

Indeed, despite his own supply-side rhetoric, Reagan's toleration of public displays of disloyalty to his policy on the part of his budget director, Council of Economic Advisers chairman, and chief of staff has resulted in the office of the presidency being used to discredit the President's policy. The President's men have succeeded in replacing economic growth with deficit reduction as the focus of policy. There is nothing wrong with deficit reduction. But it is being approached in a mechanical way that stresses tax increases and spending cuts and neglects the overriding importance of the economy's performance.

Part of the problem is the belief held by many Republicans that the deficit determines the level of interest rates and, therefore, the economy's performance. This view is more political than economic and is based on many political campaigns against deficit spending. Republicans have opposed deficits for so long that they have forgotten that the problem is spending, and many are prepared to "fight deficits" by raising taxes. This is an unfortunate loss of vision, because spending should be cut even if the budget were balanced. It is government spending that "crowds out" the private sector regardless of whether the spending is financed by taxing or borrowing. Yet, many Republicans believe that only borrowing crowds out the private sector and that raising taxes prevents crowding out by balancing the budget.

Faced with this ingrained and inflexible Republican point of view, supply-side economists in the Reagan Administration have found it difficult to get a hearing for empirical evidence. The evidence shows that deficits do not principally determine interest rates and that interest rates are not the main factor in the cost of capital. The impact of interest rates can be easily swamped by changes in taxation. These empirical and analytical facts are critically important for sound economic policy, but they have been lost in the general hysteria over the budget deficit. The supply-side argument has been cavalierly misrepresented by opponents as a claim that "deficits don't matter." By crowding out evidence and sound thinking, the deficit hysteria is crowding out Reagan's economic program.

The deficit hysteria provides a convenient cover for Republicans who are determined to defeat the supply-side

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policy in order to boost their chances for the 1988 Republican presidential nomination. Their goal is to raise taxes as a way of discrediting the tax-cutting policies of Rep. Jack Kemp, an obvious and attractive candidate for the nomination. If Reagan's supply-side policy is perceived as a success, much of the credit will accrue to Kemp, and he will be well positioned in the contest for the 1988 nomination. If, however, the policy can be presented as a failure that had to be reversed, Kemp's opponents can paint him as a purveyor of "crackpot theories," David Stockman's own charge with which William Greider ended the infamous article in the *Atlantic*.

The charge that the 1981 tax cuts are the source of dangerously large budget deficits is central to this strategy. The charge itself has the advantage of attracting powerful allies to the anti-Kemp political camp. For example, it pulls the Federal Reserve Board into the camp by obscuring the Fed's responsibility for the deficits due to its recessionary monetary policy. The charge also appeals to the largely liberal media and academic communities that prefer larger government. Many liberals view tax rate reduction as an immoral attack on the scope of government and as a restoration of private property rights that permits greater income inequality.

As long as Reagan is not prepared to take charge of his government, he cannot expect to achieve his goals. Large areas of policy have already reverted to the hands of the permanent government. The quixotic, Carteresque tax reform devised by the Treasury bureaucracy is a good example of the speed at which the permanent government has been able to reverse the direction of tax policy taken in 1981. With the main thrust of Reagan's policy so easily thwarted, it is not difficult to imagine what has happened elsewhere.

Without spokesmen and outmaneuvered by career-oriented Washington regulars who, in the words of *Washington Post* editorial page editor Meg Greenfield, "will sell or sell out almost anything, including their own self-respect, if any, and the well-being of thousands of others" in pursuit of their personal ambitions, Reagan has little chance of leaving a permanent mark. Most of the troops who were willing to bleed for his policies in the Washington trenches have either bled to death or given up in disgust at their commander-in-chief's appointment of traitorous generals. The list of people who have left the Administration is a Who's Who of Reaganauts.

What does all of this mean? It means that Paul Volcker and the Federal Reserve Board are the main arbiters of economic policy. It means that Republicans are prepared to discredit the supply-side economic policy that reinvigorated their party and restored it to political competition in order to knock Jack Kemp out of the box. It means that the pursuit of power in Washington rather than the country's real problems absorbs the energies of policymakers.

Even if Reagan were prepared to take charge of his government and conduct a major house-cleaning, it is not clear where he would find the human resources for a renewed assault. There is an endless supply of people who desire presidential appointments for career reasons, but only a tiny number who are willing to put themselves on the line when they get the job. The incentive is to join the establishment, not to make an enemy of it. Those who are willing to fight are rarely even backed up by their friends.

A grim situation, however, should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that some changes did occur. Ronald Reagan won election and re-election despite his aides. Taxes were cut in a supply-side manner despite the Administration's infighting and imperfect understanding of its own policy. Sometimes the few can catch the imagination of the public and prevail over the many. It happened in 1981, and it can happen again. Supply-side economics is based on the incentives inherent in private property. It is the economics of a free society, and it will prevail if freedom prevails.



The President's men have succeeded in replacing economic growth with deficit reduction as the focus of policy.

Therefore, the task remains what it has been—to fight for a free society. It would be a mistake to expect that any one President or administration can deliver this goal all neatly wrapped up in a pretty package. It would be a mistake to expect too much from a second Reagan term and an even bigger mistake to supply it with no people of character and principle. The establishment's encroachments on the Reagan presidency are not likely to be rolled back, but it is now our ground that is being encroached upon. We are further ahead than we were.

A free society respects property rights and does not give power to government without accountability. There is an obvious economic agenda consistent with these requirements. The Federal Reserve needs to be made accountable on the basis of principle and well-defined law, and the tax system needs to be reformed in a way that reduces its adverse impact on economic growth.

Discretionary monetary policy has not been successful. In the absence of clear rules, the Fed can substitute its own judgment. Since discretionary behavior is not predictable, uncertainty has grown in the financial markets. The effect of discretionary behavior on interest rates is greater than the effect of budget deficits. More importantly, the Fed's ability to behave as it sees fit means that elected officials risk having their policies crowded out by those of unelected officials.

The Fed can be made more accountable without destroying its integrity. For example, secrecy could be reduced by requiring the Fed to announce all policy decisions when they are made. A reasonable measure of political accountability could be obtained by restoring the Secretary of the Treasury to membership on the Federal Open Market Committee and by making the Fed chairman's term of office concurrent with that of the President. These reforms would leave open for debate the method by which the Fed should conduct monetary policy, but better accountability could improve policy while the debate is being conducted.

The tax system needs to be reformed in a way that makes it more neutral in regard to the taxation of saving. The multiple taxation of saving in the current code reduces the investment rate below what would be the case in a neutral tax system. A slower rate of investment means slower growth in the capital-labor ratio and labor productivity. In other words, a tax system that is not neutral with respect to saving retards the growth in real living standards. Neutral tax treatment of saving would reduce poverty far more effectively than government poverty programs.

Tax reform must be careful not to raise the cost of capital. This rules out the simple-minded approach taken by the lawyers and accountants in the Treasury's Office of Tax Policy (over the opposition of the Office of Economic Policy). The tax policy bureaucracy apparently thought it could strike a populist blow by reducing the average tax rate on personal income and shifting the burden to corporations by raising the marginal tax rate on new capital investment. On the surface this can be dressed up in the rhetoric of fairness and helping the little guy by making fat cats pay. However, when the dynamic effects are considered, it is obvious that it is no help to a worker to reduce his taxes in a way that hurts the growth of his living standard.

A wider issue is at stake. The future of the Western alliance depends on the free-trade posture that allows Europe and Japan access to U.S. markets. This posture is threatened by the sharp decline in U.S. productivity growth that occurred during the 1970s. The products of high-wage U.S. labor can compete in markets only if U.S. labor is more productive than its foreign counterparts. This has proved to be less and less the case. The basic reason for tax reform is to restore the competitiveness of U.S. labor in order that the Western alliance can be maintained.

Prospects for controlling the growth of government depend fundamentally on the performance of the private economy. The slower the economy grows, the more government spending must be cut back in order to reduce it as a percentage of GNP. But the slower

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the economy grows, the harder it is to restrain government spending. This is why the key to budget control is a pro-economic growth policy.

The Reagan Administration seems to be gearing up for a massive assault on federal spending in 1985. The intention might be laudatory, but the strategy and tactics of budget-cutting are more complicated than many realize and the outcome could be disastrous. If economic weakness persists due to Federal Reserve policy and the Treasury's anti-capital investment tax reform proposal, any gains from budget-cutting would be offset by the rise in the deficit due to economic weakness. Congress is not anxious to cut spending programs and will be even less anxious if spending cuts make no impact on the deficit projection (however much they might reduce the so-called structural component of the deficit).

The main effect of the assault on spending, then, might simply be headlines that budget director David Stockman and others can claim created expectations of deficit reduction in the financial markets. The President will be advised, as he was in 1982, that the failure of the government to meet these expectations will result in financial panic and a rise in interest rates. If the economy is weak at the time, this argument will be particularly effective. Therefore, the main result of an assault on spending could be a tax increase to "make good on the expectations of deficit reduction that have been factored into the financial markets."

As the chart on page 200 of the 1984 Economic Report of the President shows, a significant portion of the multi-year deficit projections is due to an economic forecast that holds the economy below its growth trend for a decade. Obviously, the first step toward a sensible budget policy is an economic policy that returns the economy to its growth trend as rapidly as possible and provides incentives to capital and labor that increase the economy's growth potential. With this approach many things can be accomplished; in its absence frustration and disillusionment await. □

Constitution

STANDING TALL ON REALIGNMENT

by William Kristol

Three strategies will compete to guide the Reagan Administration in its second term in the area of civil rights and constitutional issues. These might be called the strategies of benign neglect, incremental rollback, and cutting the Gordian knot. Each can be supported by a plausible argument; each has distinct policy implications. Which strategy ought the President to choose?

Benign Neglect

Benign neglect must be judged the odds-on candidate to prevail. It for the most part guided the Administration during the first term, because it is the strategy that follows the course of least resistance, and therefore demands little in the way of political courage or daring. But beyond its natural appeal to the timid, there is a respectable strategic case for benign neglect.

That case is based on the judgment that the civil rights/constitutional area (that complex of issues ranging from affirmative action and busing to abortion and school prayer) is a minefield that conservatives cannot successfully navigate—at least for now; that advances on other fronts are far more likely; and that those victories, combined with a policy of hunkering down and holding the line in the civil rights/constitutional area, can set the stage for eventual success here as well. What is more, as we can see from the first term, precipitate and foolhardy sallies in this area actually endanger the prospects for an eventual breakthrough.

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Examples of such counterproductive efforts abound. In 1982, the attempt to resist virtual proportional representation by race during the re-authorization of the Voting Rights Act made the Administration the target of bitter criticism and the object of little gratitude—and failed. The judgment that nothing in the Internal Revenue Code prohibits tax exemptions for schools with distasteful racial policies called forth a firestorm of attack—and resulted in a humiliating 8-1 defeat in the Supreme Court in the *Bob Jones* case. And when the Administration did prevail in court, with its argument for a (somewhat) limited reach for the nondiscrimination provisions of Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, Congress came within a hair's breadth of overturning that decision, and indeed of broadening the scope of affirmative action regulations, through the Civil Rights Act of 1984. Such a bill is likely to pass in 1985. As for issues like abortion, school prayer, and tuition tax credits, it became clear early on that the votes were not there in Congress; there will be even fewer votes this session. Why expend political capital on fights that cannot be won?

Constitutional realignment cannot be brought about solely by the courts.

Indeed—the case for benign neglect continues—it is not simply that these fights cannot be won. More important, they could alienate just those parts of the electorate that would be crucial to a lasting political realignment. This is clear from the 1984 campaign. Only the muting of the early emphasis on religion and politics made success among Yuppies possible—just as the muting of differences on women's issues enabled Reagan to minimize the effect of the gender gap. And surely the Republicans' strength among young voters rests upon the promise of economic growth and peace through strength, not on opposition to abortion, the ERA, or affirmative action.

Now, recognition of this fact doesn't mean that nothing can be done on constitutional issues; and the strategists of benign neglect do expect to make long-term progress on this front. Above all, there are the courts. By the end of his second term, President Reagan should have been able to appoint not only three or more Supreme Court justices, but something like one-third of all federal judges. These judges can begin to check liberal excesses and restore sound constitutional principles without endangering the prospects for a Republican successor to Reagan—who would then be able to appoint more judges. That these judicial appointments need to be respectable, and to include a decent number of women and minorities so as to minimize opposition, is no real problem: Conservative ideologues should recall how foolish they now look over their bitter complaints about Sandra Day O'Connor. Similarly, conservatives complained when, during the election campaign, the White House refused to allow the Justice Department to intervene on behalf of the State of Washington in its appeal of a federal judge's "comparable worth" decision. But it now looks as if the State will win on appeal anyway. The Administration thus avoided a politically damaging symbolic action; and, in fact, by refraining from making opposition to comparable worth a "Reaganite" position, the Administration may have made it easier for liberals (e.g., the *Washington Post*) to start raising serious questions about it.

The larger point this analysis suggests is that many of these issues can be bypassed rather than confronted, because history is passing them by. Judges are no longer imposing many new busing orders, and blacks are increasingly joining whites in requesting that existing ones be dropped; the sound conservative strategy is to focus the debate on quality education, and to allow busing gradually to fade away. Similarly, since the Court is going to allow states to chip away at the "wall of separation" preventing prayer in schools and aid to parochial schools, there is no need to make this a major national issue. And as blacks and women move into the employment mainstream, the whole problem of affirmative action will begin to solve itself. There is no point in picking bitter and divisive fights in order to make—and most likely fail to make—abstract points. Sound strategy is to focus on the winning issues of the future, not to refocus attention on symbolic issues of the past which only carry negative connotations for conservatives. This is the case for benign neglect.

It is a plausible case, if not an especially edifying one. But ultimately it is not convincing. For one thing, the

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effort to foster a general neglect of civil rights and constitutional issues will fail: If conservatives do not move ahead with their agenda, the left will still move forward with its, and conservatives will face the choice of giving in or fighting from a weak, defensive position. There will thus be an overwhelming temptation to pre-empt; and benign neglect will become malign pandering, as in the case of President Reagan's major expansion, by executive orders, of "set-asides" for minority businesses, or the case of the President's designation, during the campaign, of Hasidic Jews as a "disadvantaged" group, making them eligible for special federal aid and for the minority set-aside program. Leaving aside the ignobility of it all, I doubt that conservatives can be long-term winners at this game of doling out government favors.

More important, perhaps, is that the effort to bring about a realignment on the basis of economic well-being and peace will fall victim to the first badly timed downswing of the business cycle, or the first messy international crisis. And even the attempt to find a more fundamental basis for realignment in a vision of an opportunity society will fail unless it is based on a commitment to certain constitutional principles. Enterprise zones are undoubtedly better than CETA programs; but when the first study comes out showing that women and blacks are underrepresented in one or another of these zones, proponents need to be able to appeal to the principles of a colorblind Constitution and limited government to explain why this does not require corrective action by government. And when some student claims psychological harm from a school prayer, proponents have to be able to explain why local self-government and community mores deserve some constitutional support. The strategists of benign neglect, in other words, fail to see that political realignment has to be accompanied by, and to some degree based on, a constitutional realignment.

And a constitutional realignment cannot be brought about solely by the courts. For one thing, many of the constitutional or quasi-constitutional practices to which conservatives object are embodied in legislation and executive orders that have to be corrected by legislative or executive action. Furthermore, when the Court has tried to provide relatively sound interpretations of legislation such as the Voting Rights Act or Title IX, Congress has moved to overturn the Court's interpretation; without the energetic support of a constitutionalist party in Congress and the executive branch, the courts will be unable to accomplish much. Finally, given the character of our law schools and Bar, and considering how entrenched certain assumptions have now become in our constitutional law, it would be unreasonable to expect much boldness from most of President Reagan's judicial appointments. The courts can participate in and follow through on a constitutional realignment; it is wishful thinking to believe that they can shoulder the burden themselves.

Incremental Rollback

The second contender in the civil rights/constitutional field is a strategy of incremental rollback. During the first Reagan term this approach found a home in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, under the leadership of William Bradford Reynolds. If Edwin Meese as Attorney General were to embrace such a strategy, and have success in fighting for it within the Administration, incremental rollback could become far more prominent in the second term.

Advocates of incremental rollback acknowledge the constraints that so preoccupy the proponents of benign neglect. They understand that immediate nullification of a decade or two of constitutional and legislative history is impossible. However, they do not believe this should preclude attempts to reverse course. And they hope that even a few small steps in the right direction will build momentum and lead to further progress. Thus one can start with modifications of enforcement policy, and use changes in litigation strategy to secure some helpful court decisions. On the basis of these one can move to reform executive orders and regulations, eventually laying the groundwork for legislative proposals. These elements can be mixed and pyramided in such a way as to build support without giving the opposition a very clear target to shoot at.

This, to a large degree, was the strategy of the civil rights movement both before 1964, in securing civil rights, and after, in constructing on the back of the Civil Rights Act the whole edifice of regulations, executive orders, and court decisions that sustain quotas, busing, and the like. At a conference last year of Americans United for Life, Professor John Noonan urged the right to life movement to do much the same thing by, say, pushing for state laws to prohibit late-term abortions. Then such statutes would be defended in test cases that would legally establish the "humanness" of the unborn child—at least in the latter stages of pregnancy. From there the movement could proceed with lawsuits, regulations, and legislation that would further protect life and further undermine the reasoning of *Roe* v. *Wade*, eventually leading to its reversal.

Reynolds has followed a version of this strategy. Take busing, for example. From the beginning the Reagan Justice Department has refused to ask for busing as a remedy in lawsuits it has brought, and it has told Congress that it does not believe busing is necessary to vindicate the right to nondiscriminatory public education. More recently the Justice Department intervened for the first time in behalf of a local school board (Norfolk, Virginia), asking an appellate court to uphold a decision bringing a court-ordered busing plan to an end, now that the district had achieved a "unitary" school system. If this decision is upheld, the Justice Department will be in a position to encourage many more of the 500 or so school districts laboring under federal court decree to bring suit asking that they now be freed from court supervision. And the way may then be prepared for an attempt to secure congressional action to establish some sort of statute of limitations on federal court control over school districts. Thus it might be possible to do away with busing without having to fight out the contentious question of the propriety of this judicial remedy in the first place.

Similarly, in the field of employment, the Civil Rights Division has adopted the view in its enforcement proceedings under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act that compensatory preference be limited to the individual victims of discrimination, and not casually extended to others who happen to share the same race or sex. The Justice Department has also argued this view in amicus briefs filed in private lawsuits. In the Memphis firefighters decision last spring, the Supreme Court overturned a district court order that had restricted layoffs to white firemen in order to preserve the jobs of black firefighters hired under a previous quota. Although the decision could be understood to rest merely on the fact that seniority rights are explicitly protected in Title VII, and although the Supreme Court said nothing about the impropriety of the original hiring quota, Reynolds quickly seized on language in Justice White's opinion that seemed to suggest a broader principle of no preference except for individual victims of discrimination. He announced the Civil Rights Division would begin to move to modify many existing lower court decrees that did impose quotas benefitting those who were not direct victims of discrimination. This might in turn set the stage for some modification of the executive orders that establish goals and timetables throughout the federal bureaucracy and for those who do business with or receive money from the government.

The strategy of incremental rollback has much to be said for it—and one can only admire the patience and fortitude of public servants, like Reynolds, who have been willing to sign on for the long march. But it has certain drawbacks. To the degree that incremental rollback depends on a step-by-step approach, and requires relative silence about its destination, it is difficult to rally support for the strategy. The Administration can be accused of arbitrarily pulling back here, or of making false distinctions there. Why, for instance, has the Justice Department been so exercised about Dade County's program of minority business set-asides but not about the Commerce Department's—especially when the Supreme Court has upheld congressional set-aside legislation? On the other hand, to the extent that the Administration does lay out its principles and goals—as with Reynolds's proclamation of an "overarching philosophy" that the Constitution must be colorblind—then the fact that it continues to operate internally under race-conscious goals and timetables, or that only 2 out of 109 agencies followed the Justice Department's lead

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in refusing to provide the EEOC with goals and timetables, suggests that the Administration does not take its own statements seriously. In that case, why should congressmen or judges—or the public—do so? In these circumstances, a strategy of incremental rollback runs the risk of failing to build momentum, and becomes a series of episodic and isolated sallies launched against entrenched forces supported by conventional wisdom and institutional inertia.

In sum, it is not clear that a strategy of incremental rollback is sufficient, given the fundamentally misguided and incoherent state of our constitutional and civil rights law. For every victory in one court there may well be a defeat in another: Shortly after the Memphis firefighters case, a federal judge ordered the city of Detroit, under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to rehire 630 black police officers originally hired under a quota system and then laid off because they lacked seniority. Given the difficulty of rallying support for a policy of incremental rollback, and given its questionable prospects for making an appreciable difference, it may be time to stop trying to unravel the unravellable and instead to take a deep breath and try cutting the Gordian knot.

Cutting the Gordian Knot

There are various ways to go about cutting the knot, ranging from executive orders to legislation to constitutional amendments. One could imagine, for example, an executive order doing away with goals and timetables in the federal government; one could imagine an executive order forbidding any federal agency to keep statistics on the race or sex of its employees. (The three agencies that refused to submit goals and timetables to the EEOC did submit current employment statistics broken down by race and sex.) One could imagine proposing legislation to clarify the meaning of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, to the effect that the purpose of the Act was—and is—to insure the colorblind treatment of individuals by public entities (and private employers engaged in interstate commerce), thereby overturning the Supreme Court's interpretation in *Weber* and most of affirmative action. One could imagine legislation repudiating the use of effects tests in judging discrimination. One could imagine legislation to test existing Court decisions, or constitutional amendments to overturn them, for the sake of restoring state or local self-government in areas such as school prayer, pornography, and abortion. And one could imagine legislative measures limiting court-ordered remedies, curbing class actions, tightening standing regulations, and more, in order to return the courts to their proper judicial role.

None of this legislation would be likely to pass, at least in the near future. Indeed in many of these areas Congress is still moving in the opposite direction. But across the board tax rate cuts, and tax simplification, seemed quixotic a few years ago too. Galloping bracket creep and the ever-increasing accumulation of complications in the tax code eventually made radical reform seem plausible. So the mounting irrationality of our constitutional law and practice may open the door for a reconsideration of alternative (in fact, traditional) constitutional principles. As civil rights becomes affirmative action, which is then applied not merely to jobs but to salaries (comparable worth); as the right to privacy comes to mean the right not to have to wait 24 hours before killing a potential human being; as the First Amendment is interpreted to forbid the posting of the Ten Commandments in a classroom—all of these make more evident how questionable were the first steps down the slippery slopes. But if dissatisfaction is to become constructive action, an alternative vision needs to be put forth coherently and boldly, a vision that begins to redefine the terms of debate and to offer principles to which good men can repair. The best way to advance such a vision is through proposed legislation, well thought-out and forcefully defended; and though congressmen and senators can do their part, such proposals will have incomparably greater authority if they come from the President.

Of course, trying to cut constitutional Gordian knots does not preclude an interim strategy of incremental rollback. In fact, incremental rollback can probably work only if it is guided by explicit statements of constitutional principle that begin to dislodge the opposition from the moral high ground. Whatever might have been possible had a strategy other than benign neglect been pursued beginning in 1981, it is now clear that in its remaining four years the Reagan Administration will not bring about a constitutional realignment. But if it stands tall on constitutional issues, it may still lay the groundwork for one. □

Defense

STRATEGIES MONEY CAN'T BUY

by Eliot A. Cohen

Ronald Reagan was elected President in November 1980 primarily because of defense and foreign policy issues. The humiliating Iranian hostage episode and the dispiriting shambles of the Iranian rescue mission epitomized for many Americans the failure of the Carter Administration to cope with America's national security dilemmas. Alarmed by the unremitting buildup of Soviet military power, and by the ruthless use of that power in the invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979, the American public repudiated a seemingly timid and ineffectual President and his policies.

From the very beginning of his presidency, Reagan made a substantial increase in defense expenditure the centerpiece of his foreign and security policy. Only the Department of Defense escaped the eye of zealous budget cutters; and, remarkably enough in view of the decade that had just ended, the President met minimal congressional resistance to his plans. Critics and partisans alike agreed that never before had the country seemed so united in support of a stronger defense.

Of what precisely did this effort consist? The curious fact is that the magnitude of Reagan's defense budget increases did not depart sharply from the trends of the last two years of the Carter Administration. Each year since 1979 the defense budget has grown by slightly more than .2 percent of gross national product, with the sole exception of 1982, when spending jumped by .6 percent of GNP. The cumulative effect was, to be sure, considerable. Whereas the defense budget increased in real terms by merely 5 percent between 1976 and 1980, between 1980 and 1984 it grew by 40 percent. The result was a budget that totalled some $270 billion in 1984, but which was modest by post-1950 standards—barely 6.5 percent of GNP as opposed to 8-10 percent under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy.

Thus the Reagan defense budget increase has been substantial, but by no means as massive as either its critics or partisans have claimed. Conversely, there has not been (and in view of the rising deficit, will not be) the kind of quantum leaps that Reagan in 1980 seemed to argue would be necessary. This fiscal reality, among other factors, suggests that some of the critical security problems this country faces will remain unsolved, increases or no increases.

Where did the money go? The Defense Department did increase expenditure across the board, but the most notable increases were in procurement (as opposed to, say, research and development, manpower, or operations and training) which grew by fully 86 percent in four years. Acquisition of long-desired items (e.g., the M-1 tank) was speeded up, and new items (the B-1B strategic bomber) were ordered, as a number of Carter Administration decisions were reversed. Money poured into other areas as well, bringing a new vigor to the badly underfunded forces of the Carter period. Pay increases improved recruiting and retention, war stocks grew, spending for most kinds of training went up, and the services were able to engage in programs of refitting or modest expansion which had been deferred during and after the Vietnam war. The first defense achievement of the Reagan Administration, then, was a minor increase in the size and a major improvement in the quality of the American arsenal and armed forces.

The Administration's second defense achievement was more subtle: the healing of many of the scars of the Vietnam war. Time, of course, and the failure of détente had softened many of the antagonisms of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The sight of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese—fishermen and ex-bankers, peasants as

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well as intellectuals—taking to pirate-infested seas in fragile boats demonstrated to all but the most doctrinaire or obtuse opponents of the war that, the prudence of our efforts aside, the justice of the cause was not in doubt. Still, when Ronald Reagan assumed the Presidency the resentment of the Vietnam veterans—a minority in their generation of young men, and indeed, a minority of those who saw military service in those years—had not been assuaged. For them and their families, and for the families of those who had fallen, the mourning and remembrance were painfully incomplete.

Without manipulating veterans' benefits—in other words, without resorting to the welfare state equivalent of conscience money—Reagan brought about a profound and insufficiently appreciated reconciliation between the embittered veterans of a dirty and obscure war, and their fellow citizens. In a score of ceremonies and speeches, parades and presentations, he managed to settle emotional accounts; to allow a nation to honor men who had returned home to neither parade nor memorial.

In so doing, Reagan undoubtedly desired to do justice to brave men, and so he did. But he also restored a bond between the American military and American society which had been ruptured by the war, and by this enhanced the strength of America's defenses. Recruiting statistics improved not only because of the greater monetary incentives a flush recruiting bureaucracy could offer, but also because military service was again respectable. Cadet uniforms sprouted on campuses where only eight or nine years before rioters had goaded weak faculties and deans to evict ROTC; recruiters found themselves welcome again in high schools.

Thirdly, the Reagan Administration demonstrated a willingness to use force abroad, and in one case—Grenada—did so with great success. That operation (ostensibly aimed at the liberation of American medical students) had a host of beneficial effects, not least the removal of a brutal dictatorship and its replacement by a moderate democratic regime. The *coup de main* also intimidated local Marxist-Leninists, reassured pro-Western forces in the Caribbean and Central America, enhanced the reputation for toughness of the American President, and further increased the domestic popularity of the American armed forces.

These three achievements—the refurbishment of America's weaponry and improvement in the quality of her servicemen, the resolution of Vietnam-era resentments and shame, and the first successful use of American force in over a decade—were indeed substantial. Regrettably, however, all three had their darker, counterproductive sides. Even more regrettably, the first Reagan term left uncured—in some cases exacerbated—deeper problems which will surface in the second term.

The increase in the defense budget was, on the whole, indiscriminate. Secretary of Defense Weinberger is probably the most laissez faire administrator the Pentagon has seen since the Eisenhower years. Under him, the armed services have indulged their parochial appetites and proclivities, free from the discipline of a civilian master forcing choices or, indeed, simple cooperation. As a result, a defense buildup that was initially quite popular, and that remained rather modest, has lost the unquestioned backing it enjoyed four years ago.

By exaggerating the magnitude of change under the new administration, Reagan's men fostered the impression that American foreign and defense policies oscillate wildly from administration to administration.

The absence of central direction—bemoaned particularly by those of a hawkish bent—has also fostered the growth of disparate bands of military reformers. This reform movement consists of a loose coalition—genuine military intellectuals, disgruntled middle-level officers, quasi-repentant anti-Vietnam war activists, and fanatical systems analysts—that hammers away on a few themes: Our weapons are too costly, too complicated, and ineffective; our armed forces are too managerial and unwarlike; our strategy is ill-conceived and unworkable. The Weinberger Defense Department simply brushes these criticisms aside, and indeed, they are often poorly thought-out and rudely put. Nonetheless, there is an element of truth in each strand of discontent, and it must be expected that a belligerent and unreasoned military reform movement will gain strength—may even come to dominate major political factions—unless the Defense Department can find and express some coherent strategy, and can demonstrate more self-awareness and capacity for self-criticism than its leader's speeches indicate.

Moreover, by exaggerating the magnitude of change under the new administration, Reagan's men fostered the impression abroad and at home that American foreign and defense policies oscillate wildly from administration to administration. This notion, as inaccurate as it is widespread, does little but hurt American prestige and power. Worse yet, by ballyhooing the defense buildup as a cure for America's strategic problems they grossly understated, distorted, or even (unwittingly) concealed America's real strategic dilemmas. Valuable as the larger Reagan defense budgets were, they could not hope to reverse in four, or even eight, years two decades of remorseless Soviet military investment, and they could not change the fact that American power has been in decline since 1964. Indeed, it had to shrink, relative to the challenges it faced. The post-World War II plenitude of strength and absence of serious rivals could not last and did not. By pretending that mere expenditure could restore America to its golden years of nuclear and conventional security the Reagan Administration did not simply make promises it could not fulfill: It paved the way for disappointment with, if not rejection of, the moderate defense increases it had planned.

It is painful to cavil at the second achievement of the Reagan Administration, the healing of the wounds of Vietnam. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the way the Administration, and particularly the Secretary of Defense, did so pandered to the understandable yet unacceptable and pernicious desires of the senior officer corps never to fight *any* limited war again. Consider Secretary Weinberger's recent speech at the National Press Club, in which he set out six tests for use of force. The derision with which the speech was received shows how far Weinberger—and those he speaks for in the Pentagon—have departed from the realm of strategic, or indeed, common sense. By insisting that any use of force be *guaranteed* public support, come *only* as a last resort, be used solely to protect *vital* interests, and have *total* victory as its aim, Weinberger subverted the rationale for the Reagan buildup (as William Safire shrewdly pointed out in the *New York Times*). Indeed, as many have observed, even Grenada would fail to meet Weinberger's exacting standards.

Although at a public or mass level the Administration has salved the wounds of Vietnam, such pandering has only caused them to fester all the more at the elite level. As a visit to any of the nation's war colleges will reveal, America's senior officers are perilously close to believing that they fought the Vietnam war with one and perhaps two hands tied behind their backs; that they were stabbed in the back by a treacherous press and intellectual elite; and that virtually any arrangement is acceptable to ensure that next time the military will fight to win, without limits and without civilian interference. It is a view as dangerous and extreme as that once expressed by the justly-relieved General Douglas MacArthur. Combined with the military reformers' distrust, this Vietnam syndrome represents a profound yet hidden crisis in civil-military relations. The next time American statesmen attempt to use force abroad, the crisis could erupt with possibly catastrophic consequences.

Finally, even where the Reagan Administration has used force—in Grenada and Lebanon most notably—unresolved problems remain. The difficulties of quadri-service cooperation in Grenada have yet to be publicly acknowledged, although all well-read students of defense affairs know about them. In the case of Lebanon, the President's well-intentioned desire to shoulder the blame for his military subordinates prevented a salutary set of dismissals of general officers following the atrocious lapses in security at the Marine barracks in Beirut. (A similar reluctance to make senior generals and admirals pay for their mistakes followed the calamitous Iran rescue mission.)

All of this is not to say that defense would have been better off in a second Carter Administration. Far from it. Even if the Reagan Administration simply delivered on late-Carter promises (which is about what it did), it is by no means clear that its predecessor would have done so. On the other hand, the Reagan Administration will delude itself if it thinks it has done anything more than plug a few gaping holes, shore up a few crumbling walls, and put a fresh coat of paint on the edifice of America's national defense.

What should be on the agenda for the second term? By far the most important item is organizational reform, including a drastic overhaul of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The current system fosters procurement—and worse, strategic and operational—compromises among all the services. The problem is not that agreement is stalemated by bickering, although that occasionally happens, but just the reverse—an accumulation of ad hoc "treaties" negotiated by the services

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that leaves gaps in our defenses, precludes serious analysis of alternatives, and worst of all creates unwieldy and even incompetent military organizations and strategy.[1]

Item: The Soviet Union has for years now deployed medium range bombers—the so-called Backfire bomber—as part of its long-range naval aviation forces. The U.S. armed forces, by contrast, have been unable to devise an adequate comparable arrangement. In World War II, British coordination of land-based long-range aviation with the Royal Navy was essential for maintaining control of the seas. There is no reason to think that long-range naval aviation has lost any of its utility since World War II. In fact, just the reverse may be true.

Item: The Grenada rescue/invasion was conducted by units from all four services, with the result that the Joint Chiefs divided this tiny island in half between Navy and Marine Corps on the one hand, and Army and Air Force on the other. Throughout the operation, the various forces had difficulty communicating with one another, for reasons both technical and human. This occurred despite years of talk about inoperable communications systems.

Item: The Marine Corps has begun—slowly but steadily—to acquire a suit of weapons different from those used by the Army. For a variety of reasons, including Army delay and the Marines' own search for organizational independence, the Corps will acquire its own light tanks, mortars, and assault rockets. Meanwhile, the Army avoids amphibious operations training (although it conducted more amphibious assaults in World War II than did the Marines) and the Marines shy away from the creation of paratroop units (although such outfits were shown to be necessary in World War II) because neither organization may infringe on the other's autonomy.

Two distinguished recent members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Chairman General David Jones and former Army Chief of Staff "Shy" Meyer, have denounced the current system and called for major changes. Yet even their recommendations fall short of the kind of drastic overhaul that would create a true national defense staff manned by the cream of America's officer corps. For the most part, today's ambitious officer avoids assignment to the Joint Staff of the JCS. Those who serve there do not alternate for the remainder of their careers between work on the staff and service in the field. Rather, JSC duty is but one more "ticket" to be punched. There is no central, intensive war college to train the small elite of officers a genuine defense staff would need. Instead, the country has four war colleges of varying quality, which offer one-year courses to hundreds upon hundreds of officers.

The creation of a genuine general staff, made up of a tiny corps of several hundred strategic experts, trained at a single, rigorous three-year war college, and led by a single, powerful chief of defense (i.e., a bureaucratically stronger figure than the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) would help to remedy the second major deficiency in our defense policy—the lack of a coherent strategy. An examination of where American forces are now deployed, how they are constituted and equipped, and how all has changed over time, reveals that our defenses are the product of a sedimentary piling up of past commitments and marginal decisions. In the past two decades, for example, the United States has increased in minor but cumulatively significant ways its commitment of military resources to the forward defense of Germany. Whereas in 1964 a quarter of the Army's main battle tanks were stationed in Europe, today well over two-fifths are; whereas in 1964, 58 percent of our forces stationed overseas were in Europe, now 68 percent are—and an increasing proportion of *those* forces are stationed in Germany. In and of itself, this may not be a bad thing; yet never have America's leaders explained publicly (nor, to my knowledge, privately) why such a tilt has occurred, what purposes it serves, or the rationale for the form which it has taken.

In the absence of a real strategic policy, drift and wishful thinking are the most likely alternatives. The ultimate result could be the kind of catastrophe that overtook the nation in 1941, when the Army and Navy had two very different war plans for dealing with Japan in the Pacific—the Army proposing to defend the Philippines, the Navy to abandon them. Another possibility is the return, in an administration or two, to McNamarism: that is, a civilian attempt (by the President or Secretary of Defense) to take over strategic planning and operational handling with the aid of a small band of junior civilian or military aides. History tells us that such efforts to circumvent the main military organization will produce poor strategy; yet history also tells us that this is the characteristic response when that organization fails to function properly.

As things now stand, force planning (in reality, budget tinkering and minor organizational reforms) substitutes for strategic planning. Indeed, in the minds of some participants and observers, force planning *is* strategic planning, which is hardly the case. In theory, strategy—the matching of military means to political objectives and the politico-military environment—should dominate force planning. In the absence of strategic thinking marginal changes in force structure provide a kind of military analgesic, seeming to alleviate the symptoms but leaving the root causes of the disease untouched.

The following are merely a few of the outstanding questions of American strategy:

•How should the United States cope with the strategic decline of Europe? Demographic trends (a shrinking pool of manpower available for military service) and the economic stagnation which has bedeviled Europe for a decade or more will likely set the stage for further European inward-turning, if not appeasement, and certainly weaken Europe's ability to defend itself. American strategists must ask: How much of a military commitment should the United States make to Europe, and what kind?

•How should the United States react to the increasing fragility of its basing structure? One long-term trend in the postwar period has been the erosion of our global basing system, inherited from American and British efforts in World War II and before. In a number of areas (e.g., the Philippines) sociopolitical upheaval could deprive the United States of vital air and sea facilities. In other parts of the world (e.g., the Middle East) use of bases except for very narrow purposes is impossible, because of host country restrictions. In almost all cases (including Europe), host countries have become increasingly sensitive to issues of sovereignty, and cannier about the price they can exact from the American foreign aid budget for use of their territory. In the Pacific during World War II, the U.S. Navy and Marines (unlike their British counterparts) developed forces capable of operating with only minimal land-basing: What would be the equivalent today?

•How can the United States exploit the material and organizational weaknesses of Soviet defenses, and thereby offset some of the advantages that accrue to the Soviets because of their totalitarian political structure, long-term investment in defense, covert operations capabilities, and geographical location? The B-1 bomber makes sense (and made sense when the Carter Administration killed it) because the very existence of such a weapon, whether or not it is necessary in the narrowest sense, forces the Soviet Union to invest heavily in air defenses. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that it was this consideration that led the Reagan Administration to resurrect the program. Even so, one can reasonably ask whether other possibilities exist for similar kinds of "cost-imposing" strategies.

•How will the United States organize its forces for small wars? There has been no effort to learn the lessons of Vietnam in the matter of command or organizational structure (e.g., in the urgency of unity of command in even a small theater of war, or in the use of one dominant service in a given theater). Given the increasing likelihood that American forces will see action in Central America, the Caribbean, or the Persian Gulf, it is important that the mistakes and failures of both Korea and Vietnam be assessed while there is still time.

A third and final area which needs attention in the second Reagan Administration concerns defense



[1]In his forthcoming book, *The Pentagon and the Art of War* (to be published this winter by Simon and Schuster) Edward Luttwak is, as usual, brilliant and biting on this point. It will be a great misfortune if the author's wit and formidable reputation for repartee keep those who should read the book from doing so.

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inputs—manpower, industrial base, and acquisition policy. In the first category, the Administration has temporarily eased pressure for a resumption of the draft by raising wages for soldiers. At the same time, it has not stemmed the increasing (and ill thought-out) use of women in almost all branches; has not reconsidered the wisdom of active forces that are heavily dependent on reserve mobilization to be effective; and has not considered the long-term impact of having an armed forces in which the college-educated have not served. Our own demographic and fiscal trends point to increasing pressure on the manpower system: The cohort of available young men is shrinking, the budget will get tighter, and all the while increases in overall force structure are being planned. Moreover, the long-term consequences of higher salaries and pension benefits (including rising manpower costs in the future and erosion of traditional patterns of barracks life in the present) have yet to be adequately addressed. The Administration has been content to take refuge in short-term trends while neglecting the larger problems.

The industrial mobilization base remains deficient, in part because of the kinds of weapons we buy, which are not suitable for surge production in the event of war. One sound idea which has been rejected time and again is that the United States buy higher technology weapons for the active forces and cheaper, lower technology for the reserves and draft-based mobilization forces. In some areas the gap between civil and military technologies has grown (e.g., mercantile shipping, where the military requires old-style break-bulk freighters, but where the civilian world has moved to containerized shipping); in other cases it has shrunk (e.g., simulator technology). Ways and means must be found to enable the United States to expand military industrial production quickly in both areas.

The military weapons acquisition system, although perhaps less inefficient than often described, also needs to be changed. Some progress has been made on multi-year funding that would make production cheaper and defense business more predictable. But ways must also be found to reduce service temptations to make military specifications excessively demanding. We must narrow the widening gap between the moment of invention and the day on which a new weapon is issued to the troops. Despite a generally inferior technological base, the Soviet Union has often been able to deploy materiel faster than the United States, thereby creating a technological gap where none should exist. Above all, we must recognize that when the basic hardware of the United States Army—its new light anti-tank rocket, its light machine gun, and its light infantry mortar—has to be bought abroad, or when a country that once pioneered the use of unmanned, remotely piloted vehicles has to buy such devices from one of the world's smallest states, something is profoundly wrong.

None of the problems or challenges described here began under the Reagan Administration, and in a number of cases (e.g., that of the mobilization base) some efforts have been made to overcome them. Nor can we assume that any other administration, Democratic or Republican, would have done much better. Nonetheless, these facts cannot detract from the reality that our difficulties are far greater than the Administration would seem to believe, and that its solutions are partial at best, radically flawed at worst.

Ronald Reagan still retains, in many ways, the mandate to rehabilitate this country's defenses: His prestige among the military remains high, as does his ability to explain to the American public the whys and wherefores of military policy. All the more reason, then, to hope (if not, alas, to expect) that the defense policies of the second Reagan term will depart from many themes of the first. □

Central America

MORE OF THE SAME

by Howard J. Wiarda

Ronald Reagan's overwhelming re-election in November was more than just a personal victory for the President. It was also a mandate for his program and for a continuation of that agenda during the second term. At the same time, the results of the congressional, gubernatorial, and state and local elections indicate that it was not an unqualified mandate and that the American public still prefers gradualism, incrementalism, and the historic system of checks and balances. The President has been told to steer a middle course between going forward with his program and the unrestrained new directions urged by some of his erstwhile and excessively enthusiastic supporters.

The election turned not so much on foreign policy issues as on domestic considerations: the economic recovery, declining inflation and unemployment, renewed self-confidence, national pride, strong presidential leadership, America on-the-move again. Nevertheless these aspirations can easily be applied in foreign affairs. In Central America that means standing firm, defending our interests, refusing to be pushed around, and—in a context that Americans know is difficult and complex—maintaining a posture of strength, continuity, and living up to our ideals. The American public wants no "second Cuba" in the Caribbean; at the same time it clearly does not want to get involved in a ground war on the Central American mainland using American troops. That is the public sentiment Mr. Reagan will carry with him into the second term and which his policies will likely reflect.

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In this day and age, avoiding mistakes in foreign policy can be viewed as every bit as much of a major accomplishment as any bold new initiatives. In its first four years the Reagan Administration distinguished itself on a number of occasions precisely because it did not act, because it steered clear of invitations to disaster.

First, we did not "go to the source" as former Secretary of State Alexander Haig once seemed to be urging. By this he meant, presumably, taking strong actions against the source of our difficulties in Central America (to say nothing of the Horn of Africa, the Yemens, Southern Africa, etc.): the Cubans. Cuba is a thorn in the American side, a kind of panic button (rather like Berlin in decades past) that the Soviets can push from time to time and get a predictable American response.

But military action against Cuba would have involved such a wrenching, bloody battle as to tear America apart again, it would have diverted attention from other important agendas such as the President's economic recovery plans and the defense buildup, and it quite conceivably might have destroyed the Reagan presidency and his prospects for a second term. A more restrained policy prevailed and a Cuba invasion or quarantine, never seriously considered (except perhaps as a bluff to frighten the Cubans), was put on the back burner where it remains.

Second, we have not sent ground combat troops into Central America. Rather our response has been gradual, measured, controlled. We sent trainers to El Salvador, beefed up the Caribbean fleet, built up a large military presence in Honduras, sent a strong message in the Grenada intervention, and put immense pressure—military, political, economic, diplomatic—on the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. But—so far—we have not involved U.S. ground forces. Invading Nicaragua would be a bloody mess, the Sandinistas would eventually fade across their borders, we would then have to bomb their sanctuaries in Honduras and Costa Rica, and at that stage we would really have a "second Vietnam" on our hands. That prospect does not excite the Pentagon, nor is Mr. Reagan eager to play into the hands of his foes and jeopardize his presidency.

Actually, there has been at least as much foreign policy continuity under Mr. Reagan as change. It depends on the measure. The President returned to the historic bedrocks of U.S. policy toward Central America, without abandoning what is useful in the newer approaches. That is, he restored U.S. leadership in the Caribbean/Central American region, he reasserted the primacy of U.S. strategic interests in the region, and he renewed the emphasis on having safe, stable, friendly nations to the south. At the same time he emphasized democratic developmentalism and the protection of human rights as

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effective means to help accomplish these ends. In that sense Mr. Reagan sought to combine both strength and noble purpose as the twin pillars of his policy, thereby reconstituting the bases of successful American foreign policy in the past. And in this he stood in marked contrast to Jimmy Carter who, at least during the first two years of his presidency, severely neglected one side of the equation.

A learning process has been under way in the Reagan presidency which can be expected to bear fruit in the second term. During the 1980 campaign, in the transition team papers, and in the early weeks of the new Administration, there was a lot of talk about abandoning human rights concerns, abandoning the agrarian reform initiatives in El Salvador, and focusing exclusively on the military/strategic aspects of the Central American crisis. Only gradually did the Administration come to recognize that to retain public support, ensure congressional votes, and gain the help of our allies it would have to follow a more comprehensive policy. It needed to combine its military/strategic interests with a broader program of socioeconomic assistance, support of human rights, and aid to democracy. Only in that way could the President secure the higher road and still carry out the plans he and his advisers had formulated. Of such considerations was born the far more sophisticated, mature, nuanced, and multi-pronged strategy that we have now and that has been so successful in the region.

In part, this more sophisticated policy grew out of the protracted—and continuing—tension between the White House on the one hand and the foreign affairs bureaucracies, principally the State Department, on the other. Every new administration seems to go through this process, and Mr. Reagan's was no exception. That is, during the first months and even years of a new administration, the policy debate and the headlines tend to be dominated by the President's political advisers, those who helped articulate his positions during the campaign, accompanied him into office, and who have new and often controversial ideas. Eventually, these ideas are tempered in the bureaucratic arena by long-time professionals, who generally have greater functional or area-specific expertise than the President's political advisers, and who eventually regain lost ground in the making of policy.

The result is a kind of constant interplay between the more ideological and political of the President's advisers and the foreign policy professionals at State and elsewhere, a situation which no doubt will continue in the second term. This battle is reflected in part in the debate over whether the United States can or cannot live with the Sandinistas. It is reflected also in the debate over human rights policy, the precise parameters and thrusts of the President's democracy initiative, and over a variety of other policies. It is reflected finally in rivalries over personnel appointments to high foreign policy-making positions.

The debate has sometimes been unseemly, the stuff of which *Washington Post* and *New York Times* headlines are gleefully made. But it has also been salutary, helping produce the more sophisticated and multifaceted policy we have now and enabling us to ensure that the expertise found in the professional bureaucracies is combined with the overwhelming popular mandate that Mr. Reagan has now twice received.

Quite apart from the mistakes the United States did not make in the first term are certain positive accomplishments. The list is rather impressive.

First, there is Grenada. The U.S. invasion demonstrated, to the Cubans, the Nicaraguans, the Surinamese (who the same day Grenada was invaded expelled virtually the entire Cuban delegation), the Salvadoran guerrillas, and above all to the Soviets, that the U.S. was again a serious power that would defend its interests vigorously. Our allies (including those in Latin America), despite some public fulminations to the contrary, were also pleased to see the U.S. act decisively. In governing circles in the region, there is always a sigh of relief when the "Colossus of the North" takes decisive action to defend its interests *and* those of Latin America.

The documents captured in Grenada, after all, prove that its revolution was a much more serious affair than many had thought. This was a Marxist-Leninist revolution and not just a merry bunch of Robin Hoods; there were Cubans everywhere, and the Grenadans did almost nothing without consulting their Cuban mentors; the Soviets were trying to use Grenada as a stepping stone to revolution in Suriname and Belize. By moving decisively, the United States sent a message to friend and foe alike that it is not a paper tiger.

Second, there is the democracy agenda. When President Reagan first broached this subject in his speech before the British Parliament, it was greeted with skepticism on various fronts. The Democratic opposition was appalled that the President was stealing its agenda, and many Democrats could not believe in any case that *this* President was genuinely serious about democracy. Many scholars were likewise skeptical because they believed the democracy agenda, if pursued too enthusiastically in Latin America, would result in a Woodrow Wilson- or Jimmy Carter-style campaign to export North American institutions to a region where they could not work and might even undermine the feeble institutions already in existence there. The early statements of some of the "true believers" in the program lent credence to these fears.

As actually written into the legislation that created the National Endowment for Democracy, however, the democracy program seems on a sounder footing. In Carl Gershman the Democracy endowment has a calm, level-headed, politically savvy president. Many of the early congressional fears have abated. Rather than a large-

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

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scale missionary campaign to bring the benefits of democracy to, in the words of some of the original proposals, "our little brown and black brothers" in Latin America, the democracy program is appropriately modest. It provides limited funds for research on where democracy works and how. It serves as a conduit for the building of democratic trade unionism in Latin America and for assisting private commerce and entrepreneurship. It provides for a greatly expanded and long-needed student exchange program. It recognizes limits on what the United States can do in this arena while also suggesting that a nudge and push in favor of democratic groups in Latin America can in appropriate circumstances make a decisive difference. It recognizes elections and human rights as crucial to democracy. It is a serious program that merits the support of serious people.

Third, the debt issue. There should be no false optimism on this fundamental matter. The full debt will never be paid—though it is important to keep alive the illusion that it will be. The big debtor nations—Argentina, Brazil, Mexico—are incapable of fully paying back their debts without wreaking havoc on themselves domestically. This they obviously will not do. In addition, there is strong nationalistic sentiment within these countries to consider the debt as part of the North-South "dialogue"—part of the "massive transfer of wealth from North to South" that has long been part of the Third World agenda.

Nevertheless the fig leaf must be kept in place. The debtor nations cannot formally default without irrevocably losing whatever standing they still have in international financial circles. Nor can the banks entirely write off these loans without causing serious international repercussions, to say nothing of what would happen within their own ranks were they to declare these staggering amounts to be "bad loans." Any such move would also rob them of the interest that *is* still trickling in, as distinct from the principal that will never be repaid.

The debt issue is one of the most elaborate "smoke and mirrors" operations that the fertile minds of economists and politicians have ever concocted. The Reagan Administration has handled the whole matter adroitly, sounding tough here, caving in there, stretching out the loan period, renegotiating the interest charges, so as to maintain all the fictitious parts in place. The whole strategy hangs by a thread, but as an exercise in crisis management with multiple dimensions it is a fascinating show to watch. The strategy will be continued in the second term.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative and the recommendations of the National Bipartisan (Kissinger) Commission on Central America constitute further major accomplishments of the Administration. Here again illusion and reality must be separated. We should not be deceived that such initiatives can do much to create democracy where it does not now exist, that we can reform the Central American militaries to make them honest and professional by our lights, or that we can create in the region thriving, just, middle-class societies like our own. These are merely devices a clever administration uses to build support for its policies, to pry assistance funds from a reluctant Congress, to defuse the criticism of other Western allies (who now, on balance, are supportive of Mr. Reagan's strong but tempered policy), and to satisfy "world public opinion."

But the aid funds are important in getting the devastated economies of the Caribbean and Central America moving again. Not all of this aid will find its way to Miami or Geneva. Some reforms will be enacted and a few may actually be implemented. Some of the money may even "trickle down." Even if as much as 30 percent of the aid finds its way into private pockets—something that can never be said publicly for fear of the public, the Congress, and the General Accounting Office—the remaining 70 percent may still do some modest good. In the current circumstances that is about all we can expect. It requires a clever foreign policy to maintain the required fictions while recognizing realistically what the U.S. can—and cannot—do in this part of the world.

With regard to specific countries, again major accomplishments can be cited. Perhaps the most important is that El Salvador did not, to use the vernacular, go down the tubes. During the first three years of the Administration the political/strategic situation in that unfortunate country was far grimmer than any spokesman ever officially admitted. The Salvadoran government and the armed forces were several times on the verge of collapse or disintegration; a guerrilla triumph appeared imminent.

Today the situation has turned around: The armed forces are stronger than before, we now have a legitimately elected government in power in San Salvador, and it is the guerrillas who are on the defensive. They are having trouble getting recruits, were too weak to launch their expected fall offensive, and are now confined to remote but specific areas of the country. The guerrilla movement may well atrophy, which is about all one can expect in these kinds of wars. The weakness of the guerrillas and the strength and legitimacy of the government were in fact what enabled President Duarte to take his dramatic initiative to begin discussions with the guerrillas last October.

In Nicaragua the Administration's policy has produced more ambiguous results. One cannot, finally, be sure whether the immense pressure put on the Sandinista regime will make it more moderate or only solidify its hold and push it further into the Soviet camp. On balance I believe U.S. pressure has helped retain the vestiges of pluralism that still exist in Nicaragua. By maintaining pressure the U.S. has also compelled the paranoid Sandinistas, convinced an American invasion could come at any minute, to the bargaining table. This has kept open the possibility for future moderation of the regime.

Ultimately, U.S. policy in the Caribbean and Central America must be judged by its impact on Cuba and the Soviet Union. There is now abundant evidence that the Soviets are having second thoughts about their circum-Caribbean adventurism. The Cubans have begun to conclude that Central America may not be as ripe for revolution as it appeared in 1979 when the Sandinistas came to power; and in this part of the world the Soviets pay attention to Cuba's expertise. Also, the Russians have told the Nicaraguans they should not expect Soviet help if they are attacked by the United States. The U.S. invasion of Grenada and the buildup of our military forces in Central America and the Caribbean have demonstrated to the Soviets that it risks confrontation with the United States if its mischief-making goes too far. All indications suggest that the Soviets do not want a showdown now with the United States, and certainly not in the Caribbean region where the U.S. has overwhelming local advantage and the Soviets only limited interests and political leverage. We may well see a certain turning away from the Caribbean by the Soviet Union and, likely, an attempt to exploit other regions where it has the advantage and the U.S. commitment is not so strong.

Hence if we ask about the prospects for U.S. policy in Central America during the second term, the answer is probably: more of the same. After many false starts, the Administration tends to feel that it now has a solid handle on a viable U.S. policy for the region, and that its policy has begun to pay off. For this reason, the alarmist predictions we've been hearing about Administration second-term plans for the region do not seem plausible. There will be some shuffling of personnel in the foreign affairs bureaucracies but not the wholesale changeover at the Cabinet and White House levels that once was expected. Nor are the main lines of policy likely to change much: Mr. Reagan will not feel "unleashed" during his second term to do irreparable harm to the world, nor will he return to being the "true" (presumably more conservative) Reagan. Mr. Reagan has been masterful at keeping separate his declared views, which are aimed at a domestic political audience, from his real policies, which have been much more prudent and traditional. The fusing of the declared and the real did not happen in the first term and is also unlikely in the second. Thus look for continuity during the second term, not only because the Administration now has a firmer handle on policy, but because, once established, a policy consensus in Washington is awfully difficult to change.

With regard to Nicaragua, the Administration is likely to continue (and perhaps increase) its pressure on the Sandinista regime while also keeping open the negotiating process, through

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Contadora and in other forums. In part, this "two track" policy stems from the fact the Administration has been unable to decide whether in the final analysis it wants to overthrow or live with the Sandinista government. Certainly the Pentagon's case is clear. It makes a sharp distinction between the two major interventions of the 1960s: the Dominican Republic ("successful") and Vietnam ("unsuccessful"). Grenada was patterned after the Dominican intervention: Go in quickly, accomplish your objectives, and get out. But Defense Department planners feel Nicaragua would be more like Vietnam or perhaps Lebanon: a messy, bloody imbroglio in pursuit of ambiguous aims, which would only invite constant political sniping and criticism, and ultimately leave the military blamed for whatever setbacks might ensue. Hence an invasion there seems unlikely.

The presence of MIGs in Nicaragua would obviously change the President's thinking. The Administration has said very clearly that it would not stand by and allow MIGs in Nicaragua, and it has unambiguously conveyed. that message to Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. Should there really be MIGs in those crates or should they materialize at a later date, strong action from the U.S. can be expected, probably in the form of an ultimatum. Short of the MIGs, however, an equally tough question remains about what to do in response to Nicaragua's buildup of ever more sophisticated weaponry.

In El Salvador the Administration also feels it is on the right track. Now that the country has stabilized, the introduction of U.S. ground forces is unlikely. However, one shudders to think what would happen if President Duarte were to be assassinated or thrown out of office. There are traps in pursuing the democracy agenda too enthusiastically, and in El Salvador this would mean we would still have to support the succeeding regime should democracy be overthrown.

If we are to see light at the end of the tunnel in Central America, we will have to move in long-range terms to put our relationship with the region on a more mature basis. We have done that with the larger countries of South America, but in Central America U.S. policy has for too long been crisis-oriented and almost exclusively reactive. We have begun to resolve some of the region's pressing and immediate problems. Now we need to go forward and carry through with the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the recommendations of the Kissinger Commission. Failure to do this will be the greatest disservice to the people of the region—dashing their hopes after having raised them with such fanfare. This is the stuff of which revolutions are made.

The present danger is complacency. El Salvador may be out of the headlines for the moment, but this is no time to turn our attention to other issues. Benign neglect of Central America will no longer do: It may have been appropriate in an earlier and sleepier age, but it was precisely the benign neglect of earlier American administrations that allowed smaller problems in the region to fester until they became major trouble spots. We need to carry through on our aid commitments, continue to finesse the debt situation, maintain our strategic and political presence, implement those student exchanges, support the Duarte government, and walk a fine line in Nicaragua between applying pressure and keeping negotiations going. As in the past, the President may personally have to involve himself in the process to keep the Congress more or less in line, the legislation moving along, and the foreign affairs bureaucracies on course. Otherwise, a prudent and sensible Latin America policy that has taken years to fashion may again be sidetracked by indifference and lethargy. □

Hollywood

IN A WORD, COMMUNISTIC

by Joseph Sobran

Dirty Harry, made in 1971, should have been a turning point in American popular culture. It was the first movie that talked back to liberalism.

At the time it seemed daring, and it probably was. There had been non-liberal movies before—John Wayne's, of course—but they acted as if liberalism didn't exist. *Dirty Harry* not only acknowledged liberalism's presence but spat on it.

As if you didn't know: Clint Eastwood plays Harry Callahan, a tough San Francisco cop who always gets his man, even if it means bringing him back in several pieces. Harry cares nothing for Supreme Court guidelines on the proper care and feeding of suspects. He shoots a kidnapper in the leg and stands on the maimed limb to make the writhing evildoer (who screams about his right to a lawyer) disclose the whereabouts of his victim. She turns out to be dead, and Harry's modus operandi means the killer has to be released. Naturally, he kills again. Forbidden to pursue him, Harry does so on his own and kills him with contemptuous fury.

Harry's San Francisco is a locale of seedy, phantasmagoric evil that makes Raymond Chandler's Los Angeles seem like *Our Town.* It doesn't answer to liberal conceptions of man as rational creature, subject of rights, or victim of socioeconomic circumstance. It crawls with night monsters; it isn't eligible for Utopian planning. Harry has what Edward Banfield would call limited time horizons: the future beyond the present nightmare is unforeseeable. Evil can't be eliminated; it can only be staved off for the moment with a will and cunning equal to its own. Liberalism appears only as a hypocritical encumbrance to the hero on whom liberal society, without gratitude, depends; the liberals inhabit city hall, they are cowards, and they are indifferent to the victims of the evil they abet.

Harry's style reaches its apotheosis in the fourth movie of the series, *Sudden Impact,* in a shootout in a cheap diner. Harry kills all the holdup men but one, who grabs a waitress and threatens to kill her unless Harry drops the Smith & Wesson aimed at the punk's face. A good liberal, of course, would yield. Instead, Harry snarls quietly: "Go ahead—make my day." It is outrageously funny, a trademark moment for Eastwood.

None of the three sequels has been nearly as good as the original *Dirty Harry,* but all four movies have been big hits. You might think a movie industry as profit-hungry as Hollywood's would take the hint: There is a huge market out there for right-wing movies. This has been proved again and again by blockbuster vigilante hits like *Walking Tall, Death Wish,* and *Red Dawn,* all of which succeeded without the usual apparatus of heavy promotion and distribution, to say nothing of the critical scorn they received. (Eastwood's films have elicited only one fervent word from the critics: "fascist.")

You might think a movie industry as profit-hungry as Hollywood's would take the hint: There is a huge market out there for right-wing movies.

Dirty Harry appeared during Nixon's first term, and it spoke powerfully to the Silent Majority that usually expresses itself only at four-year intervals. Now that Ronald Reagan has definitively proved that audience is there to stay, you would expect the crass producers to cash in on it. Don't hold your breath.

Hollywood may be driven largely by the profit-motive, but it is also animated—or at least inhibited—by ideology. Eastwood is nearly as much a lone wolf in the film industry as Harry Callahan is in his movies, and most of the people who count there are the sort of folk Harry has to work around to catch evildoers. While Eastwood and Charles Bronson have had the Silent Majority almost all to themselves, Hollywood has doggedly produced films with liberal themes: *All the President's Men, Marathon Man, Three Days of the Condor, Executive Action, The Front, Julia, The Wilby Conspiracy, The China Syndrome, Reds, Ragtime, Missing, An Unmarried Woman, Daniel, Silkwood, Gandhi.* The villains have been Nixon, Nazis, the CIA, South Africa, oil companies, nuclear power, the government of Chile, the House Un-American Activities Committee.

In the left-liberal ideology these are

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not all evil but all somehow connected. They are all "fascist," even if the word isn't used. The movies mentioned (and others I haven't mentioned) avoid overt ideologizing, but they are intended as consciousness-raisers to usher the giddy multitude to Political Awareness. If Eastwood belongs to the Silent Majority, many of Hollywood's big names belong to the left: Jane Fonda, Shirley MacLaine, Warren Beatty, Ed Asner, Norman Lear, Francis Ford Coppola, Jack Nicholson, Robert Altman, Paul Newman, Robert Redford, Woody Allen, Jeff Bridges, Jill Clayburgh, Dustin Hoffman, Marlon Brando, Arthur Penn, Donald Sutherland, Burt Lancaster, Michael Douglas, even Mary Tyler Moore. They vary in how far they are willing to go, but they are all headed in the same direction. The Hollywood Ten are now Hollywood culture heroes, honored by people who wish they had the courage to take such risks for convictions most of them share but don't dare put up front.

Hollywood is, in a word, communistic. The word is unfortunately associated nowadays with the John Birch Society, but its first use in English occurs in the authorized translation (supervised by Friedrich Engels himself) of *The Communist Manifesto*. It is a useful, even indispensable word for forces naturally allied with Communism but not formally attached to the Party, though Communists themselves now prefer to speak of "progressive forces" and the like.

Communism, of course, isn't mass-market stuff in America, so "liberals" are forever edging toward it (and attacking those who resist leftward movement) without admitting that this is what they are doing. Even to take note of the consistent patterns of their behavior is to incur the inevitable charge of "McCarthyism," a word that used to purport to refer to naming non-Communists as Communists but now means naming Communists themselves as Communists. (See Victor Navasky's *Naming Names*, soon, for all I know, to be a major motion picture.)

Hollywood goes to fantastic lengths to sustain the bogey of fascism as the generic villain. Conspiracies by aging Nazis are the looming menaces in *Marathon Man* and *The Boys from Brazil*. If a handful of German octogenarians hiding out in South American bungalows could take over the world on short notice, maybe they really are the Master Race. *All the President's Men*, one of the few movies ever to put me to sleep, works on the premise that Watergate was an epitome of evil, though the nature of the evil is never defined.

There is one source of evil in the modern world that Hollywood carefully avoids showing in a bad light: the Soviet Union. *The Killing Fields*, a current film about a refugee from Cambodia, never identifies the Khmer Rouge as Communists; Anthony Lewis, who seldom writes about movies, devoted a column to the film without using the word "Communist." (When he was giving the Khmer Rouge the benefit of doubt in a 1975 column on the forced march of three million people out of Phnom Penh, he didn't call them "Communists" either. Some things never change.)

Many of the left-wing movies, like *Daniel*, have been predictable flops, but this hasn't caused many ideological conversions in Hollywood. The market limits but doesn't dictate what may be produced. The ideological consensus of the moviemaking community is far more stubborn than is generally realized. It exerts peer pressures that forbid the making of overtly conservative movies; an Eastwood or a John Milius (*Red Dawn*) may be independent enough to make them, but if so he is definitely striking out on his own.

Pretty clearly there exists in Hollywood a functional equivalent of blacklisting and censorship by the left. This is hard for most people to understand, since movies always seem to be breaking taboos. But the broken taboos are those of traditional, Christian America, whose legal power over movies has been broken; the informal taboos of the Hollywood community itself have quietly replaced them.

Not that the movie industry doesn't do plenty of pimping; nudity and even simulated intercourse are standard features of today's films. But the ideology permits and even encourages these assaults on traditional morals. There is almost no such thing as a family film any more; there are rather few films about families. *Rocky* and *The Deer Hunter* are among the few that actually celebrate marriage. The decorum of the progressive forces dictates affairs that can hardly be called love affairs.

All in the name of "honesty," of course: Though "honesty" doesn't require that normal life be depicted, or that middle-aged married couples be shown naked, or that people pay a price in pregnancy, disease, or even heartache for their swinging behavior.

Almost nobody prays in today's films. If they do, they are usually butts of ridicule. An almost daring exception occurs at the end of *Places in the Heart*, though that film pays its respects to the Hollywood orthodoxy by including a banker and some Klansmen as villains. The great exception, of course, is *The Exorcist*, where Christ is pitted against the devil; but the director, William Friedkin, will do anything for shock effect, including a sordid depiction of homosexual life (in *Cruising*).

The casual sex scenes are of more than commercial significance. They constitute loyalty oaths to liberalism by the filmmakers. They are not imitations of life, but models proffered for it. The New York critics, who deserve to be considered part of the peripatetic Hollywood community (which is no longer confined to studios and back lots), haven't seen fit to criticize the fast-sex culture: an interesting fact, since the liberal argument for the lifting of censorship was not that there should be no restraints, but that they should be private. Criticism was supposed to take up the moral role formerly left to the censors. It hasn't done so.

Or has it? The critics share the ideology of the film industry, and they generally criticize it from shared values, rather than from the perspective of Middle America. Pauline Kael likes feminist movies; Jack Kroll of *Newsweek* gave his hard-breathing approval to the rape scene in Hitchcock's *Frenzy*. These responses may not sit well together, but they both belong to the gentlemen's agreement by which the liberal critics department pretends that Hollywood is not encouraging a moral revolution against the moral understandings of Western civilization.

If there is anything corrupt and hypocritical about the liberal culturati whose main point of contact with Middle America is the film business, it is their constant pretense that nothing important is going on when mass entertainment subverts traditional morality. Liberals pretend that the structure of values they promote is a casual, haphazard thing, and that they aren't exerting pressures for conformity with their views even as they talk of freedom of expression. Jamie Lee Curtis says she was only able to graduate from horror flicks to mainstream movies by consenting to do nude scenes, though it makes her sick to do them; one wonders how many young women are deterred from acting because they prefer not to double as strippers. If any of them are talented, ideology is exacting tributes from art, though in a way that is impossible to measure. At any rate, big stars don't have to peel before the cameras, and most of them don't.

Conservatism in the film industry exists, but it has to be furtive. Some films with conservative themes even have been big hits, apart from the Eastwood genre. But most of them have been low-budget sleepers like *Rocky*, *Breaking Away*, and *American Graffiti*; and a foreign film like *Chariots of Fire* can get away with a lot (even religiosity) that would be taboo in Hollywood. Still, very few films have defied the Hollywood orthodoxy.

It isn't easy to give this deliberately vague orthodoxy a name that sticks, though in essence it is a very definite thing. Communism? Socialism? Liberalism? None is quite right. But something important is going on, even if its promoters aren't candid about it. It was inevitable that there should be a reaction in the form of, say, Moral Majority, but that reaction has a hard time catching hold of the phantom ideology whose works are everywhere. Secular humanism? A clumsy name, although it was coined by avowed secular humanists themselves and it fits lots of people who mock it as a redneck expression. As James Hitchcock observes, secular humanism is unusual in being a phenomenon whose existence is denied by the very people who personify it. It has room for Communism, socialism, and liberalism, but

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it imposes its sanctions against nonconformists (fundamentalists, for instance).

Actually, the adherents of this ideology have found a name for themselves: People for the American Way. It is not some left-wing cabal that Norman Lear represents, but the American way itself! Not, of course, the false "American Way" of Archie Bunker, Joe McCarthy, and Ronald Reagan, but the true American way of the Meathead and the Hollywood Ten. Well, you can't be arrested for impersonating a mainstream.

It says a lot that Lear can get away with this act—just as it says a lot that the "McCarthy" era is named for a man who, at worst, slandered dozens rather than for a man who killed and enslaved millions. Naturally, about the only anti-Communist movies of recent years have been *Red Dawn* and Eastwood's *Firefox*. Even Charles Bronson starred in a détente flick, *Telefon*, in which he cooperated with the Soviets to frustrate a plot to start a war between the two superpowers. The list of villains in liberal films could double, come to think of it, as villains in the Soviet film industry. The films themselves, if exported to the Soviet Union, would have only to be pruned of a few sex scenes offensive to traditional Russian morality. After all, no society that means to survive can countenance such profligacy.

Will all this change during the Reagan era? Ronald Reagan himself is held in contempt in Hollywood. He represents another era, when the film industry was with (if not quite of) Middle America; when the movies celebrated patriotism, expunged subversives, and made epics on Biblical subjects, including Christ and Our Lady of Fatima. Movie stars in those days smiled, in publicity stills, for the public.

Reagan's election and re-election are expressions of popular sentiment, which John Lukacs urges us to distinguish from "public opinion"—the more utopian stuff that issues from the media. The President is a vehicle, not a simple cause, of something deeper. Americans, like Harry Callahan himself, are learning to talk back to liberalism, uncowed by charges of fascism, racism, and sexism. But they—the great mass of patriotic Americans—have little institutional leverage against the great organs of public opinion. You can always turn off your set or stay away from a movie; but organizing resistance is another matter.

In the realm of public opinion (in Lukacs's sense), Moral Majority has a bad name. The Catholic Church offers none of the serious resistance to moral decay it mounted in the days of the Legion of Decency—a private, voluntary organization that liberalism equates with state censorship and repression. The rating system, of course, has made a joke of the idea that the film industry will regulate itself; the real regulation is done by the left.

The free market exerts only a residual influence, rewarding a certain amount of obscenity but not tolerating too much. Most people who are uneasy about nudity on the screen are resigned to putting up with a minute or two of it as the price of seeing a movie at all. The Invisible Hand thus sets limiting conditions; it in no way guarantees that people will get what they would really prefer, let alone what they need. What is produced itself shapes the market to a great extent. People who stay away from movies altogether cease to influence them at all. And of course the American Civil Liberties Union—a mainstay of the "American Way"—stands vigilant to prevent communities from defending their ways of life, insisting that the neighborhood effects of art don't matter. The judiciary can be relied on to see things the ACLU's way.

Hollywood hates America, as liberalism hates America. It seeks not to please the public as a whole, but to engage the public it wants, even, in good supply-side fashion, to *produce* the public it wants. It encounters frustrations, as all of us do in our pursuits, but it is a community with a will of its own that seeks more than just to entertain and to be rewarded for doing so. It is part of a larger community, the community of progressive "public opinion," whose nerve and power centers are in New York, Washington, and Los Angeles.

The United States is deeply divided culturally, but at the moment the left holds all the trumps. In any war it is essential to establish your lines of communication and to cut the enemy's. The left controls the media, the judiciary, the universities that count; it can magnify its own signals and muffle the right's. It has even succeeded in making its own vocabulary the rhetoric of public discourse (what Richard Weaver called a culture's "uncontested terms"); and what is even more important, it has discredited alternative rhetorics. Consider words like "communistic," "secular humanism," and "godless"—words of perfectly rational meaning and useful reference that have been ridiculed to death. How is the right, as a system of communication, supposed to coalesce? Its lines of communication are in disrepair, under constant threat of sabotage.

True, there are the New Right, Moral Majority, and other groups that have outflanked the major media. The point is that these aren't major media. Worst of all, the mainstream churches have been cowed and even converted by the left. Listen, if you can bear to, to the emanations of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, which has plenty of views on war and poverty but none, apparently, on pornography. And even if the bishops were to express themselves on porn, it is doubtful that their message would be carried by the self-regulating media.

Imagine a society divided into two classes of people, one of which had telephones while the other didn't. Ask yourself which class would rule. Then you will begin to get the picture: Conservatives lack telephones in today's culture. We have to rely on post cards. □

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

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FREE TRADE'S COSTS

by Anthony Harrigan

In 1843, on the eve of England's repeal of the Corn Laws, the great conservative Benjamin Disraeli reminded his countrymen that "Free trade is not a rule; it is an expedient. . . . Protection is not a rule; it is an expedient." Today in America, as our most recent debate over imported steel quotas made abundantly clear, that truth has been long forgotten. Readers in the nation's capital should have been struck last September 20 at how both the normally conservative *Washington Times* and its liberal counterpart the *Washington Post* angrily denounced President Reagan's tentative moves toward protectionism. For these liberals and conservatives and many others, free trade is no longer a matter of dispute. It has risen above the partisan fray and taken on the aura of a gospel truth that cannot be refuted even in the face of overwhelming evidence that the avalanche of unrestricted foreign imports is burying America's industrial sector.

Sixteen years ago we had a $5 billion trade *surplus*. In 1983 we had a trade *deficit* of $69.5 billion, up almost 100 percent from 1982 and, according to Economic Data Resources, expected to hit $170 billion by 1990. America has lost half a million jobs in the smokestack industries. Sixty percent of the domestic market for computerized machine tools, and 38.7 percent of the home market for semi-conductors have disappeared. Imports account for 70 percent of footwear sales in the United States. Textile and apparel imports have more than doubled since 1980. Last year's increase represents 180,000 job opportunities lost for American workers. Japanese numerically controlled machining centers gained a 70 percent market share in 1983. And so it goes in every industry. For Stephen Cohen of the University of California, the situation is "terrifying":

> I am an alarmist, and not in just a small handful of industries—the losers—it covers the whole range, high tech, middle tech, low tech, no tech, ordinary products, exotic products, consumer goods, producer goods; we are running a trade deficit now of over $100 billion a year. Translate that into jobs and say roughly $50,000 in sales per job, that is two million direct jobs and another million, actually two million indirect jobs. . . .

But inside the cloisters of the free trade thinkers, these developments cause not a stir. The purists deny the need for action by slipping into the cliché's and stock responses of economic theory, and claiming that vigorous American action to block foreign trade offensives would prompt terrible retaliation by Japan and other countries. Writing in the *New Republic,* Bob Kuttner summed up the typical free-trader response as reading:

> "Recession has prompted a spate of jingoistic and self-defeating demands to fence out superior foreign goods. These demands emanate from overpaid workers, loser industries, and their political toadies. Protectionism will breed stagnation, retaliation, and worldwide depression. Remember Smoot-Hawley!"



Is this fair? Is this justified? The fact is that on just about every ground the charges of those opposed to protection ring false. Typical is the invocation of the lessons of Smoot-Hawley. True, Hoover's 1930 decision to boost duties to an all-time high crippled American international trade and deepened the Depression, but that was the effect of distorting a fair, open, and truly competitive market. That free-traders would seek to apply that lesson to today demonstrates just how naive their conception of modern-day international trade is.

In today's world, many foreign productive enterprises that seek to trade with the United States are owned by their governments. Steel production in Italy, Britain, and France is wholly state-owned or controlled. The same is true of South Korea, Taiwan, and Mexico. Brazil's steel industry is 77 percent government-owned. Meanwhile, the British Steel Corporation has run up losses of $4 billion since 1979. The reality is that nonmarket or socialized enterprises are the rule in much of the world. These enterprises draw on state resources that aren't available to American firms, and so they have a comparative advantage in the production of their goods.

The Japanese, for instance, protect their home markets while working on a national level to penetrate America's. They exempted their machine tool makers from anti-monopoly laws, imposed tariffs against the American petro-chemical, aluminum, and fertilizer industries, prohibited procurement of advanced American products such as satellites, and created both development and recession cartels. Other countries have set up tariffs, quotas, administrative barriers, and testing requirements for American imports, while using state subsidiaries, targeting of U.S. companies and industries, American sub-free trade zones, government guidance, preferential purchasing, access to bank credit on special terms, and cartels to maximize their own advantage—all while calling for free trade on the part of the United States.

American companies, for their part, have only the most limited protection in a few industries and special areas such as defense production. Indeed our barriers are so insignificant that our country is the most attractive market in the world, the primary target of global trade offensives. It's strictly a no-win situation for the United States, as the trade deficit figures attest.

Given the inequity of international trade conditions, the cruelest cut of all from free-traders is that those industries seeking protection are made up of loser companies or government toadies. In fact, in many instances the opposite is true, and by denying any kind of aid free traders have crippled otherwise healthy and competitive companies. A case in point is America's copper-mining industry. Despite workers among the most productive in the world, and huge investments in the latest mining technology, 18 of America's largest 25 mines are idle, victim, in the words of Sen. Pete

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Domenici of New Mexico, "of the surge in imports." Why? Foreign producers are government-owned. The governments involved continue production in order to maintain employment—even when the market price falls below their costs. The chairman of the Phelps Dodge Corporation recently noted that "these governments are sheltered from the adverse impact of those low prices by concessionary loans from the IMF and other multinational financial institutions, such as the World Bank—institutions whose largest source of funding is the American taxpayer," which suggests that erecting some sort of trade barrier to protect the copper industry would have very little to do with distortion of the free market and a lot to do with fairness and our own national interest. It also suggests that the measures that are taken need not be absolute, such as a total ban on imports or an old-style tariff system. All that is needed are limits on foreign goods produced under conditions of nationalization, subsidization, or state guidance. In short, an alternative trade policy would be based on bilateral agreements with other nations, with the national interest as the yardstick for negotiation. Such a policy would not hinder America's ability to sell goods abroad; it would simply serve notice to trading partners that the United States intends to be hard-nosed about its economic interests.

Free traders like to think that they have the best interests of Americans at heart, and their claim is that consumers can only benefit from the availability of cheaper, foreign goods. But how true is that if the hidden price of such a dependency on subsidized imports is the destruction of American factories and the loss of industrial jobs? Americans are producers as well as consumers. The atrophying of American industry certainly isn't of benefit to them. Indeed, rising living standards are dependent on our industrial health, for the United States can't live on service industries and high tech alone, as some people foolishly believe. Service industries often offer only low-paying jobs, such as those in fast-food operations. High-tech companies, by their nature, aren't employers of large numbers of workers.

The fact is that when it comes to considering the consequences of the "post-industrial" society, free traders haven't gone beyond their simple-minded economic calculus. They have glibly assured us, for example, that workers displaced by de-industrialization can be "retrained." But retrained for what? Is a Pittsburgh steelworker suitable human capital for a Silicon Valley computer plant?

"Retraining," in truth, is a euphemism for a massive shift to lower-paying jobs in the service economy, and the social costs of that move are evident. The *Wall Street Journal* has written of the "widening polarization" between lunchpail and briefcase classes in Pittsburgh, the former steel capital where thousands of steelworkers have lost their jobs in the past five years. There, post-industrialism has meant the rise of a service economy supporting a "boutique-style culture." The ugly mood spawned by these changes has resulted in street protests against the institutions of the affluent, confirming what Philip Caldwell has said about the implications for America "if its work force does nothing more than get up each morning to ply another's ego or press another's pants." It's fine to have a prosperous class of "yuppies," but Americans can't live by boutiques alone. If the problem of unfair foreign trade is not addressed so that the displacement of industrial workers is ended, the United States could experience bitter political and social clashes by the 1988 elections.

Ultimately, however, the protectionist impulse arises from a very firm perception of what America's role and status in the world should be. William Hawkins of Radford University has said that "free traders seem quite content for the U.S. to lose a major part of its industrial base as a natural result of a new global division of labor." This is strange indeed, for many free traders are devoted to a strong America and are among our most patriotic citizens. They seem blinded by economic dogma to the fact that the U.S. industrial base is the foundation of America's military strength and authority in the world. Speaking to the CEO Forum last April, B.E. Bidwell, executive vice-president of Chrysler, put the case very clearly when he dismissed the notion of America as "a country of people who serve hamburgers to each other and silicon chips to the world." Then, warning of Japanese economic encroachment, he asked:

> Do we want to become a colony—again? A colony is a place that ships out raw goods to a mother country, which ships back finished products. Currently, America's five leading exports to Japan are corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, and coal. Japan's five leading exports to the United States are autos, trucks, video recorders, oil-well casings and motorcycles. . . . At what point do we become, officially, a colony of the Far East? . . . We were a colony once before, and we threw the tea in the harbor. Is it time to throw some cameras in the harbor?

With our trade deficit soaring, and the prospect of a truly de-industrialized America looming, these are questions we should all be asking. □

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SONS OF FRANKENSTEIN

by David Evanier

It was an emotional evening for a few, but not many, present at Columbia University's Wollman Auditorium in mid-November. The savant of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement of the sixties, Mario Savio, made his first "major speech" in seventeen years. The subject, "Beyond the Big Chill: Resistance and Survival." He was brought to Columbia for this comeback by Abbie Hoffman after it was reported in the press that Savio turned up at the 20th anniversary of the Free Speech Movement and wept on the steps of the University of California's Sproul Hall at the rousing reception he received. Savio's whereabouts for seventeen years were a mystery, although Hoffman explained that "as often happens in a non-elitist movement like ours, you become famous and you don't know how to deal with it. Mario Savio disappeared."

Students around me were telling their dates who Savio and Hoffman were. A young lady asked about Savio: "Who is he? Sorry, I'm so out of touch. I'm a freshman." In addition to many of these uninitiated who had heard that the two speakers had been celebrities in the past, the audience consisted of various segments of the scraggly left: some old-time Communists with red apple cheeks from Morningside Heights and the ultra-left grouplets with names like the Sparticists who preface their praises of the Soviet Union with the phrase "despite a bureaucratic deformation in that country" and talk about their plan for the United States as "putting a stake through the monster."

But who was the old man on the stage, the fellow who was bald on top with big clumps of gray hair sticking out from both sides and the back of his head? He looked like a faculty member eager to make it with the coeds. But it was Mario himself. And the graying pudgy man with a melancholy air, wearing a red sweater over his swelling stomach, a tweed jacket, tie, and white shirt—could that be Abbie, the wild man I saw strip naked at Fillmore East in the sacred sixties?

Hoffman and Savio represent one of the two directions the early leaders of the New Left have gone: electing to work within the system like Jane Fonda's assemblyman husband, Tom Hayden, or hardening their view of capitalism, as Hoffman and Savio have done. As far back as 1968, Hoffman idealized Fidel Castro (who was standing beside a tank) as looking "like a mighty penis coming to life."

Savio first reminisces about the Free Speech Movement. It was okay, he says, but it lacked something: language. "Our language had been taken from us." By this he means the language of the "progressive" left, which he now mechanically employs, along with the rhetorical devices of the sixties (sentences end in "okay," and "all right"). There was "a vicious attack on progressives":

> They used that Communist angle. And why did they do that? Because, friends, the Soviet Union was the first country where an anti-capitalist revolution succeeded and it wasn't fun to be there. . . .

Halfway into his speech, Savio brings down the house talking about Nicaragua:

> Why can't we just ignore it? The Big Chill. Why can't *I* just ignore it. My field is physics. I enjoy physics. I have family responsibilities . . . my country is responsible for murdering innocent human beings in Central America. There's probably not been a meaner government in all the history of this country. That government steals from the lunch money of little black schoolchildren in the USA in order to murder little brown schoolchildren in Nicaragua. I cannot, I cannot watch that on the tube. I cannot, I cannot, and that is the only reason I am here tonight.

"Whoo!" a member of the audience responds, and then wild applause breaks loose. Even Abbie looks serious.

Savio and Hoffman see Nicaragua as the anti-Vietnam movement of the eighties that can rejuvenate the left. Savio calls for a broad movement of protest going beyond "anti-intervention" to "anti-capitalism":

> They want to have a war? Okay, but boy, they're gonna pay here on the streets of America. There are not as many of us now, but you know, there weren't that many at the beginning of the war in Vietnam. . . . You only get the majority when you win. . . . The reason we have a cold war and therefore have these weapons is because our leaders are defending capitalism. . . . So you have to begin to show people they don't have to fight anti-capitalism, they don't have to protect capitalism in the purest form possible, it's not worth protecting.

They are now full-fledged progressives, whatever they may have been in the sixties. Hoffman conducts tours to Nicaragua. He says things blithely that could almost go over on the "Tonight" show. He is a stand-up comic:

> I get lost in capitalism and communism and isms and isms. I'm an American; I don't understand any of this. The isms to me are all wasms. They came 200 years ago invented by some European parlor intellectuals; we're moving into the 21st century.

This can probably be charming in small doses but he takes simplicity where it shouldn't go. Hoffman is a dangerous clown:

> We're talking about people that have power; people that don't have power. Now in Nicaragua; they call it a mixed economy.

David Evanier is author of the novel, The One-Star Jew *(North Point Press).*

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That's what they got. I believe the world is moving toward a mixed economy. I'd just like to see it mix a little in this country. Take the socialism we have for the rich and mix it up with the capitalism, the rat race we have for the poor. That's all.

The audience rocks with laughter.

Savio hints there may have been doubts on his part in the past. He says that in the sixties he read all of Orwell and even mentions *Homage to Catalonia*, a book whose meaning he has surely forgotten, but Orwell is okay even with this audience now. Savio is asked by a student with a beard and a duffel bag: "You mentioned Nicaragua being a shining example, but how about Cuba, my friend? A shining example for twenty years!"

Savio ponders this one, and replies:

I used to be very, very critical toward Cuba, very critical, okay? I still am. I'm not *as* critical. And I'll tell you what changed my mind about that. Chile. Chile played by the numbers. . . . They got machine-gunned. And then I started thinking about Cuba. . . . We did not choose what happened in Russia, nor did they. They did the best they could. I respect what they did. When I see people like Gromyko—coming back, seems like he never dies—has to talk to people like Reagan and Shultz [laughter]. We need to judge people by the circumstances they found themselves in. We need to consider the shoes they had to walk in so many miles. I have respect for what's happened, but I don't have to be uncritical in order to have respect.

Savio expresses the belief that "I could not give this speech, not this speech, at the University of Moscow." He flatters himself. He could give *this* speech at the University of Moscow any time he wanted to. Would they censor these remarks about the USSR? "If you look you'll find they have used their troops exclusively on their own borders. That's a fact. A fact. A fact. They have been slandered. . . . "

Like all progressive true believers before him, Savio murmurs wisps of sorrow about lapses in countries that have lost a little of their glow in the face of innumerable testimonies about the way they torture their own citizens. "There is not enough democracy to suit me," he says of the Soviet Union. But the *newest* progressive place—and this year it is Nicaragua—is without flaws: "This is the real shining city on the hill—this is irresistible!" He reads from his favorite book, *What Difference Could a Revolution Make?*, the one that tells the "truth" about Nicaragua, and it is an old refrain: Illiteracy rate—down. Adult education: up. Infant mortality: down. Who can dispute such figures? He concludes triumphantly: "Okay! That's what the revolution did! All right? That's what it did!" Rhapsodic applause from some.

Savio takes questions from the audience. They file to the microphone: a Lennie lifted from *Of Mice and Men*—orange knit cap, huge stomach sticking out of a Che Guevera T-shirt, darting eyes. An elegant young black man, glowering, steaming visage, black beard, black raincoat, black shoes with pointed toes, red shirt, black tie. A girl at the head of the line removes her coat, her scarf, combs her hair, looks hastily around the audience, and departs down the aisle, shouting, "Oh, I hate you all." "What's the matter with her?" murmur people in the audience. "She's afraid of missing 'Dynasty'!" They are all received by Savio with deference and seeming moderation. After all, their premises and conclusions are not really different from his. And they make him look good by contrast.

They are the underbelly of the speaker's vision—the future members of neighborhood surveillance committees after the revolution, the overseers in labor and "re-education" camps, the guards in psychiatric prisons. As the older Tyrone brother, Jamie, says to the younger, Edmund, in *Long Day's Journey Into Night*: "Hell, you're more than my brother. I made you: You're my Frankenstein!" These could be Savio's thoughts watching this procession of humanity at the microphone, and perhaps will be, in retrospect, in the years to come. He is not a stupid man.

"Lennie" curves his hand around the microphone. He twists shyly as he mumbles, his T-shirt rises gradually and exposes his tummy. As he gets chuckles, he gets happier and more excited:

All these people think the system's hot stuff, maybe it will work one more time. They don't know the game is over. The time has come we gotta take these Reagandroits on one by one, we gotta kick a little bit of ass. Here's the story, here's the story. . . .

A young man with a scarf flung around his neck grabs the microphone next:

. . . They wiped out eight million Indians to make this country free and democratic; it's built on blood. And we should not do anything but burn the flag and not do anything but put this country down for what it is and the way most of the people of the world look at it. Which is why they burn the flag and call America by its real name: imperialist monster.

Then Mr. Pointy Shoes takes the mike and thanks Savio for his "moderate, sensible, humane, and optimistic" remarks. It's clear he isn't going to keep that tone for long, and off he zooms:

My fellow Latin Americans cannot be belabored with complex theoretical questions. I say to them as follows: I say, comrades, if Mr. Reagan invades Nicaragua, it will become a large wasting ground; it will sufficiently accelerate the extinction of the Yankee race . . . make revolution against the rapacious bloodthirsty homicidal gangsters. . . .

Soon it is over. There are announcements of Abbie's slide show of his tour to Nicaragua. He is taking names for next summer's tour.

The words that stay in the memory are Savio's: "I hope it's democratic, that's what I'm going for, but let me say it's very different from what Reagan is going for, by a long shot." That *but* is a giveaway: How casually the totalitarian left has been willing, again and again, to experiment with people's lives.

Two days after seeing Savio and Hoffman, I sat facing an elderly Russian who had survived the Gulag. His beanstalk face and body were those of a Holocaust survivor, and his heroism, humor, and wit defied my understanding. He spoke to me of 1937, a time when the American progressive left, whose decline Savio laments, was in its heyday, inspired by the example of the Soviet Union. He had been a Communist, a true believer, snatched in the night from his family in Moscow and placed in a labor camp in the subarctic. He was so thin, he said, that the winds would constantly knock him down and he would fall into the snow. A friend would unwrap the scarf that was protecting his own head, tie it around the waist of his thin comrade, and walk forward so that the man could be kept upright.

During those years of imprisonment, World War II began. For many years he was not allowed any communication with the outside world. He received no news about the progress of the war. He felt that the Nazis must have won the war and were running the camp. What other explanation could there be for the tortures he was enduring? □

"...One of the people it's been most useful to and used by is me."

Ronald Reagan

on Mandate for Leadership I

The election is over but not the revolution



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BOOK REVIEWS

THE KENNEDYS: AN AMERICAN DRAMA

Peter Collier and David Horowitz/Summit Books/$20.95

P.J. O'Rourke

The Kennedys: An American Drama by Peter Collier and David Horowitz is a wonderful hater-of-Kennedys guide, an assemblage of ugly facts and rude anecdotes about this large and dirty family. It is not, of course, a complete collection. Deforestation of North America would be needed to print a book that size. But it will suffice.

Here, for those who have forgotten or just love to hear it all again, is the fulsome scurvy truth: Old Joseph P. Kennedy was a liar and a greedy thief, an ignoramus, adulterer, vile anti-Semite, coward, and pompous ass. His wife Rose was a frigid martinet, unashamed to suckle at the teat of shabby lucre, awash in pietism and tartuffery, filled with the letter of Catholicism and empty of its spirit. They raised their nine whelps in an atmosphere of brutal pride and stupid competition. When the hapless Rosemary turned out to be retarded, they had her lobotomized and parked her with the nuns. The remaining eight turned out foolhardy, arrogant, unprincipled, and wholly lacking in sense of consequences. This last trait caused Joe Jr. and Kathleen to die in airplane crashes and allowed Jack to get his PT boat T-boned by a Japanese destroyer. (A tale of heroism was manufactured from that incident. The family wasn't so lucky with Teddy's Chappaquiddick skin-diving efforts three decades later.)

The Kennedys, however, continued to wax. Elections, intellectuals, and press adulation were purchased. One family member rose, briefly, to great political power and almost unlimited sexual excess. Some others nearly achieved the same results. Two were shot but under the most romantic circumstances and not, as might have been hoped, after due process of law. A third remains a fat dog in a Senate manger that's overdue for mucking out. Thus the Kennedys excelled in every Irish vice and learned others strange to the sons of Erin such as simony and lust.

Then comes the morally satisfying third act when the last generation of Kennedys reaps the trust fund dividends of sin. They wallow in drugs and indolence, perform wild acts of self-destruction, and roll in social manure. At Studio 54, Xenon, and Danceteria, they fritter away the advantage and wealth gained by their loathsome ancestors. They overdose and get arrested and, best of all, disappear from public eye. Just deserts! Just hors d'oeuvres! A just main course of crow!

What fun this book is, what a storehouse of chortles and gloatings. It satisfies the streak of mean self-righteousness in us all. But that is just the problem. After reading *The Kennedys* one feels a little guilty for wasting the time and even a bit embarrassed at watching such manful thwacks being given to this dead equine. Why bother? The Kennedy pitch-men have folded their tents. The bog-trotters' circus has left town. Everywhere, except perhaps in benighted Massachusetts, the Kennedys are defeated and gone. What's the point of hating them anymore? Well, there are several points, none of them ascertained by Collier and Horowitz.

The Kennedys were more than a rich, bad family that gained temporary political power. They were demagogues of oligarchy. Disguised as populists, they championed the definitely privileged and supposedly enlightened few. These few, when ensconced in the offices of government, would decide what was best for the many. The Kennedys saw political office as the source, rather than the result, of social order. They held government to be the fountainhead of privilege, responsibility, benefit, and constraint. They did not know and probably couldn't understand the idea of a free people chartering a government for the sake of convenience and paved roads. It never occurred to a Kennedy that the proper role of federal administration might be to guard the coasts and deliver the mail. And only in the vaguest, election-fixing way did any Kennedy realize public officials serve at the people's sufferance.

What's worse, the Kennedys not only believed in the primacy of government but believed it to be good. With the exception of the disgusting Joe Sr., there was genuine idealism in the tribe. The rotting leftovers can still be whiffed in Teddy Kennedy's speeches. There is something more horrible than hoodlums, churls, and vipers, and this is knaves with moral justification for their cause. The Kennedys thought the world would be a better place for having them run our half of it. And thus their every excess and corruption could be excused as contributing to a larger good.

Collier and Horowitz, former editors of *Ramparts*, are oblivious to this because they are social activists, proponents of vast and interfering authority. They think the Kennedys had a tragic flaw. With the usual leftist heavy breathing over money and power, Collier and Horowitz view the Kennedys as doomed figures who failed to accomplish noble objectives because of moral shortcomings. But the Kennedys didn't have a tragic flaw. The Kennedys were themselves a tragic flaw of ours. And, in fact, they accomplished lots. They changed the nature of electioneering forever with thespian talents and piles of cash. They expanded executive power to do things like make war without congressional permission or even public knowledge. They helped bring on the age of truly elephantine government programs. And they nearly established America's first hereditary political dynasty. To the extent the Kennedys succeeded they did so precisely because of their unscrupulousness, never in spite of it. By having us hate the sinners rather than the sins, Collier and Horowitz distract us from the proper vein of bile.

Collier and Horowitz also fail to explain how these sewer trout managed to swim upstream into our body politic. The authors, typical pundits, attribute the Kennedy rise to the family's pet intellectuals. This is giving the American public too little credit. We may be dumb, but we're not so dumb that we ever spent a minute listening to Theodore Sorensen. Neither were lickspittle journalists at fault (though not through lack of trying by the likes of Joe Alsop). We have no one to blame for the Kennedys but ourselves. We took the Kennedys to heart of our own accord. And it is my opinion that we did it, not because we respected them or thought what they proposed was good, but because they were pretty. We, the electorate, were smitten with this handsome, vivacious family.

It's always tempting to impute
Unlikely virtues to the cute.

P.J. O'Rourke is former editor in chief of National Lampoon *and author of* Modern Manners: Etiquette for Very Rude People *(Dell).*

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We got a mad crush on the lot of them. They were so stylish, so charming, and—at least in their public moments—so gracefully behaved. We wanted to hug their golden tossled heads to our dumpy breasts.

This may be the stupidest thing that has ever happened in a democracy. And certainly it shows an emptiness at the center of our lives. A desire to adore a head of state is a grim transgression against republicanism. It is worse than having a head of state who demands to be adored. It is worse even than forced adoration of the state itself. And this puts the Collier/Horowitz book in another light. It's ourselves we should be flailing. Trust *hubris* to bring such trash as Kennedys to their knees. They are but few and a passing evil. We are another matter. There are 230 some million of us, and we'd better start talking sense to ourselves soon. The President of the United States is our employee. The services he and his legislative cohorts contract for us are not gifts or benefices. We have to pay for every one of them, sometimes with our money, sometimes with our skins.

If we can remember this we'll get a good, dull Cincinnatus like Eisenhower or Coolidge. Our governance will be managed with quiet and economy. We'll have no need to go looking for Kennedys to love. And no need to boil over with hatred for them later. □

THE QUALITY OF MERCY: CAMBODIA, HOLOCAUST AND MODERN CONSCIENCE
William Shawcross/Simon and Schuster/$19.95

Mark Falcoff

In April 1975 the Communist Khmer Rouge took power in Cambodia, and unleashed a sustained campaign of terror which concluded in the physical elimination of at least one-quarter of that tiny country's population. Four years later, British journalist William Shawcross published a book whose sole purpose was to place the blame for this horrendous event squarely at the door of the United States government. Entitled *Sideshow: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Destruction of Cambodia*, it quickly became an international best-seller, and its central thesis—that the United States had "destabilized" the neutral government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk; that the U.S.-Vietnamese military incursion into Cambodia in 1970 had unleashed a reaction whose ultimate consequence was the Khmer Rouge; and finally, that the latter's subsequent genocidal conduct was somehow a logical and inevitable consequence of earlier U.S. policy—became the current wisdom of several editorial seasons, finding endorsement, among other places, between the expensive whiskey advertisements of the *New Yorker* magazine.

The Quality of Mercy deals with events in Indochina since the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime by a North Vietnamese invasion in 1978, with particular attention to attempts by international relief organizations to stave off famine and the final extinction of the Cambodian people. It is a very different sort of book. Whereas *Sideshow* was intended as a bill of indictment, *The Quality of Mercy* is a study in the multiple complexities of international politics. In a writer whose entire history until now has been one of relentless special pleading this should, I suppose, be welcomed as a sign of progress. In this particular case, however, the effect is to diffuse blame for recent events in Cambodia along a very wide front of responsibility. So wide, in fact, that a superficial reader might conclude that *The Quality of Mercy* is really an exercise in damage limitation. If everyone is guilty, as the saying goes, then no one really is.

It would be unfair, however, not to credit this new Shawcross with some very significant improvements. He now recognizes that ideology has something to do with politics: He even admits some connection between Marxism-Leninism and the conduct of Pol Pot's exterminators. He squarely takes on Khmer Rouge apologists like Noam Chomsky, the Indochina Resource Center, and the American Friends Service Committee. His anti-Americanism has now been largely reduced to the person of Zbigniew Brzezinski (for his allegedly anti-Soviet, pro-Chinese views) and the Reagan Administration (for purportedly exploiting the Indochina aftermath for its own ideological purposes, for its anti-Communism, but above all for its assertion that the United States is basically a just and decent world power). The Americans he likes best, of course, are those diplomats, relief workers, and international civil servants who implicitly accept his own thesis of guilt for the Cambodian holocaust and work to ameliorate its consequences. Nonetheless, in his treatment of international relief activities, he is not slow to blame the Vietnamese for placing most of the obstacles in the way of those in the West who would have alleviated the agony of the Khmer people.

The Quality of Mercy is really three

Mark Falcoff is resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

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books in one. The first is a study of the local conflicts in Indochina which feed on ancient rivalries, but also have implications for present-day great power alignments. The second is an exploration of the role of international relief organizations, with particular attention to the bureaucratic and political snags which prevent them from achieving maximum effectiveness; there are also some interesting asides (not sufficiently piquant for my taste) on the deficiencies of UN organizations and bodies, particularly its Human Rights Commission. And the third is a philosophical treatise on the role of modern conscience in dealing with catastrophes in far-off countries. Shawcross does not integrate the three themes very systematically, so that—although his style is lucid enough—the strands tend to become hopelessly entangled. To put it bluntly, *The Quality of Mercy* is a very boring book. As such, one may even be permitted to doubt that some of the reviewers who have showered it with such excessive praise have actually read it from start to finish.

Nonetheless, the issues it raises are not insignificant. The collapse of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia and its replacement by a cabal of genocidal Marxists (mostly French-trained) offered the North Vietnamese a historic opportunity to reassert hegemony over a region long regarded (by them) as within their own cultural and political sphere of influence. Almost instantly the United Nations was faced with two Cambodian governments, one supported by China, the other by Vietnam and the Soviet Union. When representatives of both appeared in New York, each to claim its legitimacy from the Security Council, U.S. representative Andrew Young could only exclaim, "I dare say this is as interesting a session as we have had for some time."

For the Carter Administration, of course, almost everything that had happened in Cambodia after 1975 was an unpleasant surprise. The Americans had withdrawn, and the blood bath long predicted by the Nixon Administration proceeded to occur without delay. The Vietnamese, who supposedly were not even interested in the early reunification of their own country, immediately revealed the startling extent of their territorial ambitions. And normalization of relations with China, which President Carter regarded as one of his most important foreign policy tasks, tended to temper the administration's indignation over Peking's continued support for remnants of the Pol Pot regime, who persisted in redoubts along the Thai border. Small wonder that Cambodian issues remained on the back burner in Washington until 1978, when it was no longer possible to ignore what was happening there.

The United States was not the only party immobilized by conflicting agendas. The Thais were not anxious to see Vietnamese influence increase in Cambodia, since they had long regarded the Khmers as a political and cultural buffer between them and their stronger neighbors. As such, they naturally had mixed feelings about the puppet regime that Hanoi had installed in Phnom Penh. At the same time, they were disturbed by the prospect of Cambodian refugees spilling over into their own country, making a claim upon resources which they did not have—or did not wish to give. The Soviets and their allies naturally wanted to strengthen the government in Phnom Penh, and this put them in the enviable position of being able to denounce Pol Pot and the United States—all in the same breath.

These were the harsh realities with which international relief organizations had to deal. In Shawcross's telling, the story is one which reflects little credit on most of the actors. The Thai government is depicted as corrupt and self-seeking, determined to obtain a proper rake-off of the resources intended for the Cambodians. UN

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

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Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim is shown to be mainly concerned with his re-election, studiously avoiding any decision which could offend either the Soviets or the Chinese. Doctors and technicians from the Eastern bloc and some from Western Europe were self-indulgent and insensitive to the plight of the Cambodians, and some saw their expedition as an opportunity to feather their own nests. Most of the UN subsidiaries which dealt with the issue were obsessed with the notion that the United States would be the chief ideological and political beneficiary of the Cambodian holocaust, an eventuality (to them) so awful as to render almost everything else—including helping its victims—a matter of secondary concern. But the prize for moral corruption should really go to the Cambodian leaders themselves. As Hung Sen, foreign minister of the pro-Vietnamese regime in Phnom Penh, repeatedly claimed, "Our people would prefer to eat grass or to die rather than to share aid with Pol Pot. . . . It is preferable to die from famine rather than to receive poisoned assistance."

The independent relief organizations had to wend their way in this thicket of private agendas, and some did so with greater success than others. These people are the real heroes of the book—always keeping the needs of famine victims uppermost in their minds, but forced to recompute the moral calculus of their operations on a daily basis. Some of these organizations were American, particularly those which were most munificently financed and most doggedly effective. One was even—horror of horrors—anti-Communist. But they achieved much more than the UN agencies to which sanctimonious Western liberals prefer to consign most nasty tasks in the Third World.

This leads directly to Shawcross's third and final theme, which is that in spite of elaborate structures intended to deal with famine around the world, Westerners are actually becoming less sensitive to the human plight of people they have never seen. He admits that the problem may be one of "compassion fatigue"—too many Biafras or Cambodias a bit too often. He suggests as well that attention tends to shift too rapidly from one area to the other, so that the institutional energies needed to see a crisis to satisfactory conclusion are shifted before they can make their fullest impact. He wishes that politics could be removed altogether from the practice of international humanitarian relief.

Don't we all. The problem, however, is really the twentieth century, which cannot at this late date be repealed. Its characteristic features are media overload and cognitive confusion, an international political system in which ideology is the most important (indeed, for some countries, the only) product, and a decolonization process which has left approximately two-thirds of the countries of the world in hands of elites self-evidently more selfish, evil, and incompetent than the European colonizers they replaced—more than that: than the Westernized "conservatives" who ruled them during their initial period of independence. This is the conclusion which Shawcross does not reach, though his book positively overflows with data to support it. The task is not how to arouse the *Western* conscience, but to reverse the process which has reduced its influence around the world. One can't have it both ways: Between Shawcross's earlier enthusiasm for Marxist revolutionaries, and the holocaust whose existence he now deplores, there lies a straight and narrow line. Since he has learned so much since *Sideshow*, one dares hope his next book will address this issue in a more direct and useful fashion. □

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

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STAYING ON TOP: THE BUSINESS CASE FOR A NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY

Kevin P. Phillips/Random House/$15.95

Roger Martin

We have always been told by the promoters of industrial strategy that in responding to new realities they have risen above traditional ideological labels. Robert Reich was rewarded for his efforts on behalf of new approaches to industrial strategy with the title *neo*liberal—which apparently was to mean that he had the advantage both of being a liberal and not being one. In his new book *Staying On Top* Kevin Phillips does Reich one better, imagining for himself an intellectual free agency not seen in America since the days of Jerry Brown. He is, in his own words, a "careful, restrained, pro-industrial strategist"—a state that is above conventional (and even neoliberal) ideological configurations. Reich and his fellow "Atari Democrats" and "high tech futurists," according to Phillips, are unrealistic; and the rest of the Democratic party, "the neo-New Dealers" and the "tired, old-style interventionists," is simply proposing a return to the policies that failed in the past.

Phillips is even sterner with those in power, the Republicans, whom he denounces as "right wing ideologists" wedded to "market oriented and thus uncoordinated economic approaches" at home, and a deluded defense of the "free global marketplace" abroad. What must be done, Phillips announces, is to "woo conservatives away from their absolute commitment to the old free-market system." The old ideas, Phillips insists, just won't do when it comes to the unique problems facing the American economy in the eighties.

That is the basis of Phillips's justification for "new" approaches, but his criticisms have the feel of straw men. The whereabouts, for instance, of the Republican tradition of free market *and* free trade from which Phillips so noisily removes himself is a mystery, especially since Republican administrations over the years have been responsible for the Morrill and War Tariffs of 1861-64, the Wool and Woolens Act of 1867, the Repeal of the 1872 Tariff Act in 1875, the McKinley Tariff of 1890, the Dingley Tariff of 1896, the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909, the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, and the New Economic Policy of 1971. Indeed, the only bursts of free-trade and tariff reduction over the past fifty years have been under Democratic administrations relatively inimical to free market concepts: The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 under Roosevelt; GATT in 1947 under Truman; and the Kennedy Rounds of 1962-67 under the Kennedy-Johnson administrations.

Roger Martin is an economic consultant in Toronto.

a word to the wise

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What is the substance of Phillips's careful, restrained, pro-industrial strategy? It is, on balance, what may be termed the Rona Barrett approach to economic thinking. Phillips admits that he has not "plumbed the various legal, economic and technological issues at stake." Instead, he chose to focus on "questions of political strategy, the receptivity of public opinion, and a general sense of what approach may have a constituency and what probably does not" by interviewing anyone who is anyone in the Industrial Strategy Social Register and dutifully reporting the latest gossip. (You should have heard what Bill Brock said! Well, I never . . .)

In pursuing this non-economic, non-directed approach, Phillips is predictably co-opted by the mainstream industrial strategists, the self-interested businessmen and the embittered (primarily liberal) politicians with whom he speaks. The result is a muddled *potpourri* of recommendations which reflect a combination of the typical industrial strategist biases, misunderstanding of American economic history, and superficial treatment of what are complex economic issues. There is no indication that Phillips is able to evaluate what he hears. Often, the empirical basis for his measures is confined to a quote from a disgruntled C.E.O. or the result of a simplistic opinion poll.

For example, his recommendation to amend the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is supported by a 65 percent positive response to the decidedly one-sided question: "Would you support amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to allow payment to foreign officials to speed up or unblock routine government action?" One wonders what the poll result would have been had the question read: "Would you support amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to once again allow such practices as the bribery of foreign government officials in order to enhance sales?"

It comes as no surprise that in the end Phillips is led to making perfectly ridiculous recommendations, such as the one he got from the Labor-Industry Coalition about rendering foreign industrial policies effectively illegal. "In other words, foreign industrial policies that target specific sectors for export growth in order to capture larger world market shares would be *per se* violations of U.S. unfair trade practices law." And what would we do with countries found to be in *per se* violation? Say nasty things about them at the UN?

Despite his unique (and some would say bizarre) approach, Phillips reverts quickly to the careless, unrestrained thinking he claimed to have eschewed. The centerpiece of his book, which he calls his fifteen point "market-oriented competitiveness strategy," reads like any other industrial strategy package. It points to lagging performance indicators, proclaims them to be "problems," and establishes institutional structures (departments, agencies) to solve these "problems" without ever carefully exploring the root causes of what are really only symptoms.

For example, Phillips's number one performance preoccupation is America's growing merchandise trade deficit, which he blames on incoherent trade policy and foreign industrial strategies. His recommendations include creating a Department of International Trade and Industry as well as an agency to monitor foreign industrial policies.

Now it is not inconceivable that a large merchandise trade deficit is a serious problem even for an economy that is primarily involved in the production of services. Further, it is not inconceivable that the lack of a coherent trade policy and the existence of foreign industrial policies contribute to the problem so defined. But superficial and lightly considered institutional structures are simply not the answer. Our economic history is littered with examples of institutional "solutions" which have had savagely pernicious effects on the functioning of our most important markets and have led to calls for more Phillips-like solutions.

It is now fashionable, for example, to look with envy on the cooperative spirit which characterizes the relationship between Japanese banks and corporations. It enables Japanese corporations to utilize much higher debt-equity ratios than American corporations, and thereby enjoy a lower cost of capital (because debt capital is less expensive than equity capital). But in fact, the Japanese advantage has less

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to do with their cooperative spirit than our Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 which prohibited banks from making equity investments in corporations. This had the effect of setting the interests of the debt-providers (the banks) in opposition to the interests of the equity investors. Having no incentive to do so, the banks will not tolerate leverage as high as the equity investors would prefer.

The Glass-Steagall Act may have appeared at first blush to have been an appropriate measure in the wake of the great stock market crash. But it did not prevent the domination of the equity markets by huge institutions (i.e., the insurance companies and the pension funds). It only managed to raise permanently the cost of capital for American business. And did those responsible for the Act consider its capital market effect before enacting it? Not so, according to business historian Thomas K. McCraw (in his new book *Prophets of Regulation*[1]): "The Glass-Steagall Act and the Securities Act sailed through during Roosevelt's first Hundred Days. They occasioned little open debate or challenge, despite their extraordinary significance."

It is also fashionable to marvel over the high Japanese savings rate and the resultant high rate of capital formation, and to compare them to America's meager savings and capital formation rates. Is it the inherently thrifty nature of those Japanese citizens? Not quite. America has chosen to punish personal saving and investment by heavily taxing capital gains, dividend income, and interest income. At the same time, America rewards consumption by allowing deductions for mortgage interest and consumer credit interest.

This incentive system provides a large scale subversion of the capital markets by providing a huge disincentive to investment, except in housing. The huge growth in venture capital funding following the halving of the maximum capital gains tax in 1978 provides a vivid example of the power of irrational tax policies to subvert the capital markets.

The Japanese savers and investors? They pay no capital gains tax, can avoid paying tax on interest income through use of employer savings plans and multiple post office savings accounts, and pay much lower taxes on dividend income. They are allowed no deductions for interest expenses. The Japanese policies rémain neutral, allowing the natural incentives of savings and investment to fuel the investment process. Again it is unclear whether those responsible for the legislation required to build the complex and perverse capital market subversion in America gave any consideration to the adverse effects they were producing.

A final example of capital market subversion relates to the "paper entrepreneurialism" of the 1970s and 1980s about which industrial strategists whine incessantly. Paper entrepreneurialism, according to Robert Reich, involves "dextrous tax and accounting manipulations which extract paper profits from economically senseless acquisitions." Instead of thinking about a Senate Committee on Paper Entrepreneurialism, we may wish to understand how we have mucked-up the capital markets, so as strongly to encourage "paper entrepreneurialism."

When President Taft, in all his wisdom, decided to tax corporations (beginning in 1909) he set the stage for paper entrepreneurialism seventy years later. Corporate income taxation begot corporate tax accounting which provided an allowance for depreciation on plant and equipment. Depreciation allowance reflected the corporation's need to set aside earnings to replace capital assets as they wore out. For example, a corporation purchasing a machine worth $1,000,000 would be allowed to deduct $100,000 from taxable income in each of the next ten years. At a 50 percent corporate tax rate it would therefore save $50,000 in taxes over each of the next ten years, earning $500,000 extra in after-tax dollars over the period.

This mechanism was appropriate until the explosive inflation of the late 1970s. Under the double-digit inflation, the ten-year stream of tax savings was no longer worth the $500,000 at investment decision time, but $300,000 (assuming 10 percent inflation) because as inflation raged on, the size of the depreciation allowance shrank in real dollars.

Naturally corporations became reticent to make new capital investments. Not so with acquisitions. Publicly traded companies which had made investments assuming continued low inflation traded at low market prices that reflected the drop in value of those investments. And so publicly traded assets could be bought at an already-discounted price, whereas new equipment bought at full-price would then suffer discounting by the market.

Though companies responded rationally to the tax-system bias, cutting down on net capital expenditures and gearing up on the acquisition front, we heard shrieks of "paper entrepreneurialism" from Reich and accusations of "complacent, stodgy, short-term oriented management" from Mr. Phillips. Again short-sighted government set the wheels in motion by accidentally subverting the capital market.

Distortions have not been limited to capital markets. In 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Laws were enacted to protect the competitiveness of American industry. Though arguably noble in intent, under the influence of visionary—or more accurately, imaginative—justices such as Louis Brandeis, they have become a major perverse influence on important American product markets such as computers, telecommunications, steel, aluminum, automobiles, and groceries. Further, the 1914 Clayton Act and the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act explicitly exempted labor unions from antitrust provisions, establishing the double standard that it was acceptable for unions to monopolize and endanger

[1]Harvard University Press, $20.00.

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

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

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the functioning of markets, but not for business to do so. As a result America has industry-wide unions that have contributed to demolishing the competitiveness of entire industries (e.g., steel, textiles, large appliances), while Japan has company-wide unions that have a strong incentive to work with management to ensure competitiveness.

Industrial strategists largely ignore such market fundamentals and instead attack the Reagan Administration for its "uncoordinated" approaches. In fact, Reagan's response to the subversion of America's markets has been anything but "uncoordinated": He has lowered average and marginal personal tax rates so as to alleviate some of the disincentives to personal investment; reduced disincentives to corporate investment by accelerating depreciation schedules and reducing inflation; and brought about the most dramatic change in antitrust enforcement over the past fifty years through the appointments of William Baxter (and Paul McGrath) to head the Justice Antitrust Division, and William Miller to head the Federal Trade Commission. Reagan has even talked, at his extreme peril, about eliminating the senseless double-taxation of corporations (whereby corporations pay income tax and then their shareholders pay tax on dividends and capital gains) by putting an end to the corporate income tax.

It just may be that this type of approach bores industrial strategists more dedicated to mega-concepts like tripartite cooperation and Japanese culture, and to the proposition that new ideas are necessarily better. It may also be that the problems of America's markets are simply beyond the ken of these critics. Certainly, what distinguishes *Staying on Top*, in the end, is its confusion, and the sense that what passes for reasoned objectivity is in fact a glib superficiality about how economies work and what has sapped America's vitality. When Phillips sums up his ideas as "part high-tech optimism, part traditional liberal interventionism, part conservative nationalism and inclination to maximize free-market reliance, and part business-community moderation, synthesis, pragmatism and sheer commercial expertise," it is clear that far from carving out a new policy area between left and right, Phillips has simply become lost somewhere in between. □

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George Sim Johnston

In the last decade many skeletons have been loosed from the literary closet and made to dance obscenely. Did the good Doctor Johnson have himself chained and whipped by Mrs. Thrale? In the darkest depths of the library stacks academic drudges are putting together the evidence. Was Henry James gay? Gore Vidal (confusing platonic affection with practicing homosexuality) assures us that it was so. Contemporary writers are routinely pilloried the moment their posthumous selves appear in galley. Frost, Lowell, Berryman, and Kerouac are all doing time in the stocks for bad behavior. And now, thanks to his daughter, they have been joined by the late John Cheever.

But why all the fuss because John Cheever took advantage of groupies, made passes at young men in the woods, and hid his empties all over the house in Ossining? Good writers put their best selves into their work, not their lives. Live? a French poet once asked, our servants will do that for us. Often when we meet a writer in the flesh, we are meeting the goose after enjoying the *pâté de foie gras.* The discrepancy is compounded when the writer has created an elaborate persona to accompany his work. A recent book about Hemingway demonstrated how "Papa's" public image was to a large degree one of his most carefully wrought fictions. Great humorists (Swift, Twain, Waugh) are often melancholics. Any writer, in fact, who comes on strong in public is probably faking it to a degree. Why else should Mailer write about himself in the third person?

John Cheever seems to have crafted a mask along the design of his fiction. "I'm trying to become subtle, melancholy, pallid, urbane and witty—all the things I'm famous for and that I, as you well know, have never been," he wrote to a friend. His aristocratic New England background was partly sham. There was ferocity beneath the patrician manners. The front was partly protective coloration and partly a matter of conviction. His daughter writes that "he taught us, perhaps without meaning to, that appearances are crucially important—not because one is judged by them so much, but because they represent some inner dignity, some statement about a way of meeting the world."

Despite (or perhaps because of) the acting, the charm which infuses Cheever's work also managed to surface in his life. Many of the anecdotes in this biographical memoir are like drafts for a Cheever story. When he and his family lived in Manhattan, in an apartment a few feet from the Queensboro Bridge, he put on his one good suit and grey felt hat every morning and rode the elevator to the lobby with the other men heading out to the office. From the lobby he would walk down to the basement, to a windowless storage bin, hang up his hat and suit, and sit down in his boxer shorts to his typewriter. Years later, in his big white suburban house, his favorite place to hide his empties was behind the New York Edition of Henry James. The extracts from his journals, moreover, have the same atmospherics as his stories. Perhaps style *is* the man.

The most impressive thing about Cheever, which his daughter does not discuss, is his amazing career of self-improvement as a writer. The earliest piece in *The Stories of John Cheever* (1978) was published in 1947. Cheever was a professional writer of stories for seventeen years before that date. He spent almost twenty years turning out slight apprentice fiction, and it was not until 1957 that he published his first novel, *The Wapshot Chronicle*, a wonderful book that has never been given its due. His style improved imperceptibly from story to story until he had one of the finest voices in contemporary American letters. Susan Cheever makes the interesting observation that her father's style was influenced by the cadences of Cramner's Book of Common Prayer. In a time when the styles of even the most accomplished novelists have an underlying journalistic slick, Cheever's later voice is like a benediction.

Admirers of Cheever's work may be permitted a double standard in approaching Susan Cheever's disclosures about her father. Revelations about a writer one admires *are* fascinating. Cheever, moreover, seems to have been an accessory to his own exposure. He did not light a literary bonfire when he knew he was dying. Nor did he secrete his intimate journals, from which most of his daughter's book derives, in an academic time capsule. Instead, he put them in order, showed them around, and left them with no stipulations. In these volumes, he recorded much that is unseemly—his bouts with drugs, alcoholism, literary groupies, and, near the end, homosexuality. He recorded much else, as well, in prose which is as good as any he wrote. I would give my word processor to be able to read all twelve volumes. But while I may be intrigued by the material Miss Cheever is retailing, I do not think she should be admired for taking it public. At least two reviewers have called her "courageous." Who would want such courage in his family? Her remark to the *New York Times* that "we could not suppress it, he was a public figure," is disingenuous. Flaubert's family sat on his literary remains for years. One admires them for it, while one is also grateful that they eventually let go. The best treatment of this ambivalent situation is Henry James's *The Aspern Papers.* James (who himself lit one of the great bonfires in literary history) comes out against the "publishing scoundrel" who, for the sake of posterity, tries to wrest a bushel of love letters from the aging mistress of a great poet.

After slapping Miss Cheever on the wrist for writing this book, I must say that she has produced a fine work. It is far better written and more adroitly conceived than her novels. The writing is expertly pitched in the key of her

George Sim Johnston is a writer living in New York.

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father's middle period, and she follows the haphazard, anecdotal strategy of Andrew Field's superb *Nabokov: A Life in Part* with great success. I think this small book will prove superior to any official biography, which will undoubtedly be the size of a cigar humidor and tell us how often Cheever cut his toenails. The book rings true; we seem to be getting the atmosphere of the man without excessive biographical luggage. And the revelations about boozing and sleeping around which have received so much attention are actually a small part of the book. *Home Before Dark* may prove profitable, and may keep alive a career that was not exactly lighting up the literary firmament, but it is not exploitative. And in his daughter's defense it must be said that John Cheever never hesitated in his own work to make the family skeletons dance for the public. □

THE COMMITTED OBSERVER

Conversations with Jean Louis Missika and Dominique Walton
Raymond Aron/Regnery Gateway/$17.00

Joseph Shattan

I am told that during the 1950s and '60s, analysts of the CIA were strongly discouraged from meeting with Washington policymakers. Such contact, it was feared, might well tempt the analysts into becoming servants of power, rather than truth. While these precautions seem exaggerated, the problem they were meant to address is a real one. Intelligence analysts must be close enough to policymakers to provide them with relevant information, yet not so close as to become advocates, or captives, of a particular point of view. Finding the proper balance between advocacy and "ivory towerism" is clearly a difficult task.

For thirty years, Raymond Aron confronted this problem on a daily basis. As chief editorial writer at *Le Figaro* from 1947 to 1977, Aron was a kind of *ex officio* "counselor to princes." Unlike the overwhelming majority of such counselors, however, Aron felt that he owed the rulers neither blind loyalty nor unyielding hostility—only the benefit of his independent judgment and political acumen. The result was that Aron become the rarest of all political animals, "*le spectateur engagé*," that is, someone at once within and without the political maelstrom.

The Committed Observer is the record of a series of interviews conducted on French television in 1980 between Aron and two rather leftish, but nonetheless intelligent young men. In going over the record of Aron's political life, his interlocutors follow two main lines of attack. They try to show that Aron's commitment was not, as he himself maintained, to truth and liberty, but rather to the status quo and the right; or, alternately, they attempt to demonstrate that Aron suffered from a lack of genuine commitment, that he was a hopeless bourgeois at heart. Needless to say, Aron succeeds in parrying these attacks quite nicely, but they do provide an element of drama, and even occasional flashes of comic relief, to an otherwise staid political dialogue.

The topics covered in these interviews are quite varied, and include the French Third Republic, the Popular Front, Léon Blum, Munich, Hitler, World War II, Pétain, Vichy France, the Fourth Republic, De Gaulle, Indochina, Algeria, Sartre, the Soviet Union, and the nature of nuclear war. I cannot imagine anyone reading these discussions and *not* being deeply impressed with the sparkling lucidity of Aron's mind, and the extraordinary range and depth of his knowledge. Only when discussing the Holocaust does the philosopher occasionally stammer.

Perhaps what comes across most clearly in the course of these interviews—aside from Aron's judgments on specific issues—is the nature of his approach to political questions in general. Like his great mentor, Max Weber, Aron distinguished between an "ethic of responsibility" and an "ethic of ultimate ends." "The Christian does rightly and leaves the results to the Lord," is the maxim of one who believes in an "ethic of ultimate ends." Such a person is not particularly concerned with the possible consequences of his actions. His main duty is seeing to it that the flame of pure intentions is not squelched, that social injustice does not go unopposed.

For Aron, as for Weber, such an approach may well suit saints and prophets, but it cannot serve politicians. "Politics as a vocation"—to borrow the title of one of Max Weber's greatest essays—demands an "ethic of responsibility," a concern with the consequences of one's actions, insofar as these can be foreseen. Because Aron believed that thinking politically meant accepting an ethic of responsibility, he faulted most French intellectuals of the left, including his old classmate, Jean-Paul Sartre, for their refusal to ask the right questions:

> They rarely ask, "What would I do if I were in place of the ministers?" They think that kind of question is for the experts, the technocrats. They are worried, anguished by the fact that there is evil in our system (evil exists in all systems); they thirst for the solution that would provide the "universalizable" society. They indeed have opinions on what should be done to fight inflation, or on the subject of German rearmament, but those are essentially opinions based on imperatives or assumptions, not on an analysis of the situation.

It was precisely Aron's insistence on the need for dispassionate analysis that led French commentators to refer, usually pejoratively, to his "icy intelligence." And it was Aron's refusal to tailor the analysis to the needs of the Elysée that led President Pompidou to remark, "One can never count on Raymond Aron."

If thinking politically requires an awareness of the consequences of one's actions, it also demands a recognition of the fragility of the political community, and an alertness to the dangers facing it both from within and without. Foremost among these dangers, to Aron, is civil war. During the 1930s, at a time when France existed, in Aron's words, "only in the hatred of the French for each other . . . I lived with a single obsession: to avoid civil war."

Joseph Shattan is Policy and Programs Officer at the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights.

Toward the Future:
Catholic Social Thought and the U.S. Economy

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

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As a result, Aron assigned himself a "modest mission": "I reacted to events, partly with my viewpoints, that were always categorical, and, intellectually, with the desire to make those who shared my convictions understand that the others, those on the other side of the controversy, were not necessarily traitors. I have done that all my life."

Because of his fear of civil war, Aron did not favor French intervention in 1936 on behalf of the Spanish democratic republic. In 1957, it was again a fear of civil war in France that prompted Aron to take a public stand in favor of an independent Algeria. The book he published on this subject, *Le Tragédie Algérienne*, had a great impact, in part because it was not a moral tract in favor of decolonization, but rather a political analysis of the options available and their likely consequences.

When Aron's interviewers take him to task for the lack of moral passion in *Le Tragédie Algérienne*, his reply is characteristic: "As far as moral positions are concerned, I left that mission to the self-righteous moralists, because, once and for all, let me make it clear that I am not one of them—*'die schöne Seele,'* as Hegel calls them.. I favored Algerian independence; I did not favor civil war in France."



When Aron turned to the external threats facing France and the West, he identified the Soviet Union as the primary danger. Yet Aron did not believe that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable. Rather, he continued to subscribe to the formula that he first coined in 1948: "Peace is impossible; war is improbable."

Aron traced both the impossibility of peace, and the unlikelihood of war, to the ideological character of the Soviet state: "I continue to believe that as long as the Soviet Union thinks as it does, as long as it is governed by men who are prisoners of the same ideology and the same ambitions, there will be a confrontation between the Communist world and the West; this confrontation will not necessarily take the form of a war in the traditional sense of the term because of the existence of nuclear weapons, and because the Soviet Union is not Nazi Germany. Communism is an important historical movement. It thinks of itself as the wave of the future and sees no purpose in rushing into dangerous military adventures."

Yet Aron's belief in the unlikelihood of a major war with the Soviet Union did not lead him to take a sanguine view of Western Europe's future. On the contrary, "as far as Western Europe is concerned, and France in particular, the question is whether we can remain France or whether we must become a Poland." For Aron, the possibility of a gradual Sovietization of Western Europe was frighteningly real.

The root cause of Western Europe's malaise, in Aron's view, is a loss of political will. "Europeans have fought too many wars. They are tired, and vaguely yearn for neutrality. They would like to have American protection, on the one hand, and good relations with the Soviet Union, on the other. This is not a very heroic posture; but it is probably the only one Europeans deem possible today."

The problem with this posture, however, is that politics in general, and foreign policy in particular, "is a game for thieves and gangsters." If history continues "as usual"—if it remains an arena of harsh, unrelenting competition—then it is not at all certain, in Aron's view, that peace-loving, unheroic Europe can maintain its independence over the long run.

Yet Aron was neither a historical determinist nor a Spenglerian pessimist. He believed that history's outcome is not foreordained, that governments and people retain a wide margin for maneuver. In March 1936, for example, when Hitler ordered the Bundeswehr into the Rhineland in violation of the Locarno Treaty,

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decisive French action could have stopped him. "We know that in March of 1936 the course of history could have been changed. That is part of my philosophy of history. That is a date, a fundamental one, when lucidity and a bit of courage would have sufficed to alter the future."

Lucidity and courage, however, are virtues which must be deliberately nurtured by society if they are to make a difference at the decisive moment. For this reason, Aron called for the rebirth of civic morality throughout the West. "Civic morality," he declared, "puts the survival, the security of the community, above all else." Aron advocated courses in citizenship to focus on the citizen's duties, and to recall that ours is a citizens' society, and not simply a consumers' society. No doubt Aron would have warmly applauded Sidney Hook's proposal, made in the course of his 1984 Jefferson Lecture, to establish a domestic National Endowment for Democracy, in order to "develop programs to study the basic elements of a free society" for every educational level. But on October 18, 1983, Raymond Aron died in Paris, at the age of 78.

When he was only 25 years old, Aron assigned himself the task of becoming a "committed observer" of history. He sought to combine the "dual role of actor and spectator." To that end, he studied economics, sociology, international relations, military affairs, and philosophy. He evidently saw his role as similar to that of a navigator. Just as a ship's pilot must know the techniques of navigation in order to steer his ship in the right direction, so Aron determined to master the various intellectual disciplines bearing on international affairs in order to help guide the ship of state. Through his editorials and his more scholarly writings, Aron realized his youthful ambition. His influence, though not always apparent, was profound. At the time of his death he was, quite simply, Europe's foremost political intellectual. □

WATCHERS AT THE STRAIT GATE
Russell Kirk/Arkham House Publishers/$14.95

T. John Jamieson

You can only go so far in praising the splendors of capitalism: Human beings sense that there is more to life than "enlightened self-interest." That's why captive audiences of students and employees become only mildly excited when shown propaganda films on free enterprise with men in chicken suits. Men have souls. A great civilization at once encourages the cultivation of the spirit and is the product of that cultivation. The better part of conservatism consists not of economic theories but of a philosophy of the soul. The world of the spirit, of the ideal, of the bonds connecting generations, is real; men perceive it through the imagination; you need symbols, myths, allegories, to feed this imagination.

That's the gist of Russell Kirk's presidential address to the Philadelphia Society in 1984. The conservatives didn't like being scolded for nearly letting their most important intellectual quarterly go broke. They didn't like being told that two terms of Reagan would *not* restore all order, authority, and virtue. Consequently, Kirk got a standing ovation at the beginning but not at the end of his speech.[1]

Notwithstanding that, the Kirk enterprise to revive the moral imagination still proceeds, and at many levels. Kirk announces that he has many more weapons in store for a "new campaign against present dominations and powers." The latest is a further assault on the "myth and allegory" front, a new book of short stories called *Watchers at the Strait Gate.*

The "strait gate" of the title is, of course, the difficult passage into eternal life of Matthew 7:14. We do not normally see ghosts because, after all, they are supposed to be elsewhere: They come back from the strait gate (or fail to get through it on the first pass) because of something wrong that the events of the ghost story will work out for them. The "watchers" are mysterious keepers of the gate, fearsome to the spirits who try to pass. But the returning spirits become watchers on earth, reminding us that we are not alone, and that mortal affairs have some importance even to those who now live beyond time in transcendental realms.

These stories of horror and mystery tell of benign as well as vengeful ghosts. The characters are apparently facets of Kirk's own self, family, and acquaintances; the settings are places he has known. The dust jacket reminds us that Kirk lives in a haunted house (Piety Hill), so we may also conclude that the ghosts in the book are composites of ghosts Kirk has known.

Yet all of Kirk's books are haunted, after a fashion, by *literary* ghosts. One of the charming things about Kirk's style is the way his mind casts up rags and echoes from the immense volume of his reading. In one story, I encountered all sorts of Burke and Eliot allusions, but also a reference to the Hindu doctrine of *maya* or illusion (which probably comes from Paul Elmer More's essay on a decadent poet). This palimpsest or tapestry of literary quotation (the stylistic principle of Eliot's poetry and Burke's prose) is itself evidence of immortality and evokes a sense of communion with dead writers who live forever in our language. The style, in fact, lulls one into a receptiveness to the idea of ghosts who suggest themselves not by appearances but by touch, voice, odor, or traces of their work. And so do human beings leave traces of themselves to be found hereafter—at least for the imaginative and historically minded: like Kirk's dead book col-

T. John Jamieson's essay on Eliot, Babbitt, and Maurras will appear in the upcoming festschrift, Irving Babbitt in Our Time *(Catholic University of America).*

[1]Still, Kirk did receive the 1984 Ingersoll Prize for conservative letters and two of Kirk's best nonfiction works have just been reprinted as quality paperbacks with two new postscripts: *Eliot and His Age* ($12.95), a biographical-critical study of Eliot's cultural conservatism which serves as an excellent introduction to the poetry, and *Enemies of the Permanent Things* ($9.95), a highly readable book of permanent value on the topic of cultural and political norms, with chapters on writers like Orwell and Voegelin. (Available from Sherwood Sugden & Co., 1117 Eighth St., La Salle, IL 61301)

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lector whose personality could be known by the underlined favorite passages in his books.

There is some confusion among conservatives about exotic persons Eric Voegelin called Gnostics. Russell Kirk apparently comes from a family of them. Now there are many kinds of Gnostics: millenarian revolutionaries, who would make the Marxist New Man their only god, are one kind; mystical theosophists, who imagine themselves surrounded by gods and daimons of all sorts, are another. The latter kind seek to recover the transcendent truths of religion by a perverse route, but they are seekers nonetheless. Kirk's forebears, who held seances at Piety Hill, and even had a Spiritualist Church in Mecosta, were Gnostics of this relatively harmless breed. Kirk himself knows that there is no *science* to the spirit, but rather that spirituality erupts *mysteriously* in human thoughts and actions, in dreams, visions, desires, and fears. Thus Kirk is not a Gnostic but a Christian metaphysician.

Some earlier metaphysicians, the seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonists, sought to counter modern science's materialist dogma with the evidence of ghost-sightings and things that go bump in the night. That is one strategy, ultimately futile because it violates the transcendence of the transcendent. If one chooses not to work through the difficult language of a philosophy of transcendence, then one must take the route of myth. But, strangely, such myths have a way of becoming literally true. Kirk's novel, *Lord of the Hollow Dark*, told of a strange cult (its politics radical, its religion Gnostic) which ended in a Satanic orgy of mass self-murder. The defrocked priest who led the cult intended all the time only to deliver souls to the Devil. As an allegory, *Lord of the Hollow Dark* explained the reality of evil as rebellion against God and hatred of His creation; then we suddenly heard of Jonestown.

Kirk's ghosts all have some unfinished business to attend to, or someone to help in time of need. Often strange, eccentric, mad, or misunderstood persons, their spirits come back with clear purpose; morally ambiguous in life, they return to death as agents of poetic justice. They appear in familiar places to familiar people; it seems, therefore, that they appear only to the well-rooted, not to the New Class—to quaint, thoughtful individualists left behind in decayed neighborhoods by the march of urban regress, and not to bland, ambitious conformists who live by new technologies and people new bureaucracies. (My favorite individualists in the book are the traditional priests who preserve the old religion in obscure parishes.)

I believe these stories are to be taken as fables which show the reality of evil, in all its horror, as well as the power of the justice which will ultimately triumph over it. They are also myths which play upon our sense of the lingering presence of human personalities, in order to reveal to us the Eternal Social Contract. Wherever we are, we are there by the grace of previous human and divine effort; by maintaining our consciousness of it, we may preserve the accomplishments of the past and add something of our own to bequeath to posterity. □

DOS PASSOS: A LIFE

Virginia Spencer Carr/Doubleday/$24.95

Terry Teachout

With the 1936 publication of *The Big Money*, the final volume of his *U.S.A.* trilogy, John Dos Passos seemed firmly established as the leading American novelist of the thirties; indeed, Jean-Paul Sartre, writing as late as 1947, called Dos Passos "the greatest writer of our time." Then the bottom fell out. By 1951, Arthur Mizener's claim that "John Dos Passos has very nearly achieved the rank of a neglected novelist" was pretty much taken for granted; by 1975, the posthumous publication of Dos Passos's final novel, *Century's Ebb*, attracted the attention of only one serious critic.

What happened? To Dos Passos himself, the answer was perfectly clear: His political beliefs had gotten him blacklisted by the literary left. Initially acclaimed as a socially conscious anti-war novelist with decided Communist leanings, Dos Passos first got into trouble with his critical backers after a sobering visit to Spain in 1937 convinced him that the Russians weren't all they were cracked up to be; with the 1949 publication of *The Grand Design*, a long, angry novel whose principal villain was none other than Franklin D. Roosevelt, Stalinoid reviewers like Granville Hicks began regularly dismissing the author of *U.S.A.* as "bewildered, ill-tempered, often petulant, never passionate." Four months before his death, Dos Passos wrote to a friend about the "strong tide of prejudice" that had prevented his later books from getting a fair hearing:

> Mike Gold, a fanatic with a delicate nose for heresy, had been hailing me as a proletarian writer and fellow traveler. Suddenly he smelt a social-fascist rat. . . . The Commies decided I was a goddamn reactionary and let loose. The amount of influence the Communists have had on the liberal ingangs that have made a hash of nonpartisan literary criticism in this country would make an interesting study.

The story of John Dos Passos's fall from critical grace is a book in itself; anybody who starts out writing for *The New Masses* and ends up writing for *National Review* is doubtless inherently deserving of a good biography. (Whittaker Chambers certainly qualifies.) And Dos Passos's life, politics aside, was a biographer's paradise, a fantastic tale that discouraged plausibility at every turn; the illegitimate son of an eccentric corporate lawyer and a well-bred daughter of Maryland society, he hurtled from Harvard to World War I to Hemingway to Sacco and Vanzetti to the Spanish Civil War to Edmund Wilson to *National Review* with a dizzying vigor that could have come straight out of the pages of *U.S.A.* or *Midcentury* with minimal editing.

Townsend Ludington, a Dos Passos scholar, launched a pre-emptive strike on the title of definitive Dos Passos biographer a few years ago with his *John Dos Passos: A Twentieth Century Odyssey*, a long, sober-sided, liberal-minded survey of Dos Passos's life and work. Mr. Ludington may not have been all that happy with where his subject ended up, but he was clearly determined to show with reasonable objectivity how he got there. The results, though a trifle stuffy, were perfectly acceptable; no further biographical efforts, it seemed, would be necessary for the foreseeable future.

The foreseeable future turned out to be four years long, for we now have a new Dos Passos biography. *Dos Passos: A Life* is a huge slab of data assembled by Virginia Spencer Carr, Carson McCullers's maudlin biographer, proclaimed by its dust jacket to be "a rich, fascinating biography of a literary titan" written by "a master interviewer" with "the cooperation of Dos Passos' wife and daughter." Rich, fascinating, titanic, masterly, approved by the wife and kids: At 624 pages of agate-sized print, what more could you want?

An editor, for openers. Miss Carr may be a master interviewer, but she certainly has no business getting anywhere near a typewriter without a bodyguard. Her book starts off with a prologue cast in the form of a prose poem (no kidding) about Dos Passos's father. This effusion, and the three others like it with which the larger sections of *Dos Passos: A Life* are marked off, is a naive and painful pastiche of Dos Passos's own badly dated, Whitmanesque biographical narrative style; surely no responsible editor would have permitted Miss Carr to shovel such nonsense into an ostensibly serious biography.

Things do get better in the prose department, a few clunky academic fanfares ("Dos Passos may have had more satisfying interdependencies, but none was more influencing") notwithstanding. The main problem with the text proper is its extreme and inappropriate length, the direct result of Miss Carr's inability to omit unnecessary detail for the sake of overall clarity. Her sins in this department are far too numerous to list: detailed analyses of Dos Passos's juvenile verse, a list of twenty-seven popular books published in 1925, a lengthy paragraph enumerating the kinds of people who made the cover of *Time* in the twenties and thirties, a catalogue of authors who won the Nobel Prize for literature instead of Dos Passos. *Dos Passos: A Life* is so clotted with this kind of thing that important details get lost in the shuffle or omitted entirely. (Miss Carr, for example, provides lengthy excerpts from an exchange of letters between Dos Passos and Hemingway regarding a Dos Passos review of *The Sun Also Rises* for the *New Masses*—without bothering to quote any of the review itself.) Moreover, enough factual boners emerge in the general welter of confusion to make the attentive reader suspicious of Miss Carr's detail work; she claims at one point that "*Our Town* was awarded the 1938 Pulitzer Prize for fiction" and elsewhere asserts that William F. Buckley, Jr., "Yale's most prominent radical as a student in the early 1950s . . . was not a standard-bearer of conservatism."

All of this is particularly unfortunate because Miss Carr's book contains a great deal of valuable material, particularly on Dos Passos's later years, that Townsend Ludington either overlooks or ignores. She may be con-

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fused about the political affiliations of the young Bill Buckley, but she at least took the trouble to interview him (as Ludington did not) and to present the results of her revealing interview in *Dos Passos: A Life.* On the whole, Miss Carr seems to have a clearer sense of Dos Passos's *personality* than does Mr. Ludington; she certainly conveys it more vividly, useless details and all.

Still, it is hard to overlook Miss Carr's flaws as an author and biographer. It's nice to know the name of the primer from which Dos Passos studied Russian in 1928, but it would be equally nice to have a convenient checklist of his published writings—and nicer still to have some thoughtful discussion of them. Miss Carr, who obviously has read every word John Dos Passos managed to get into print, seems to be operating on the assumption that her readers have done the same thing; her book contains neither plot summaries nor critical discussions of Dos Passos's work. It is, in short, a "pure" biography rather than a "critical" biography; and, given the current state of Dos Passos criticism and the prior existence of a perfectly competent "pure" biography, it is for the general reader a more or less pointless endeavor.

This last deficiency is the most frustrating of all. Dos Passos *needs* to be reevaluated in a literate and systematic way. He is, along with Dreiser, the great unread American classic, and the reasons are perfectly clear: the size of his output, the color of his politics, the unstylishness of his technique. Dos Passos's "contemporary chronicles" are to the modern, post-Jamesian novel of character as non-Euclidean geometry is to geometry; books like *U.S.A.* and *Midcentury,* those sprawling conglomerations of "newsreels" and "Camera Eyes" and detachable biographies of everybody from Henry Ford to Jimmy Dean, have little or nothing to do with the literary sensibility of our time. Thus, they are not read and will not be read, given the way things work in our literary establishment, until somebody writes a first-rate critical biography of Dos Passos, one that properly fuses life and work into a coherent and arresting whole.

There are more than a few people around who see Dos Passos as a unique and important figure in the history of American literature: an American Orwell whose stature has been clouded by the unremitting hostilities of the literary left. I'm not sure that I'm willing to go quite that far—but had a *really* gifted biographer like Matthew Bruccoli written *Dos Passos: A Life,* Dos Passos's reputation and achievement might finally have come into proper focus for readers like me. As it is, we are left with the unassimilated raw materials of a great biography. Rich and fascinating, yes; Dos Passos's life is in itself a "contemporary chronicle" of supreme interest. But not the major reclamation job we needed—not by a long shot. □

SPECTATOR'S JOURNAL

MEXICO, NO DOMINO

by Mary Ball Martínez

Conservative monitors of the Central American political scene regularly refer to what they call the "domino theory." They envision Marxist subversion, like pieces in a game, moving northward from Nicaragua to push over the government of El Salvador, then in quick succession those of Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico until revolution rages along the Rio Grande.

Writing in *Conservative Digest* Robert Caldwell warns: "Whether the nightmare [a Castro-type regime at the Texas frontier] materializes depends on what happens in Guatemala" because "Mexico is the big prize." For him "the domino theory was never more valid." John Hutchinson in *National Review* says "Central America is a place to defend the world" since "the southern approaches of the United States are no longer safe" and "when the dominoes start falling to the north Mexico, weakened by poverty and corruption, will fall fastest of all." He foresees, and says many Central American observers foresee, a Mexican "convulsion" and finally "the Great Mexican Collapse."

I don't. The domino theory as a succession of political inevitabilities offers too simple a scenario. Not only does it fail to take into account elementary facts about the history and geography of the nations involved, but it puts the present situation of the key country, Mexico, badly out of focus.

Mary Ball Martínez reports frequently from Latin America for The American Spectator.

It is always a temptation to program the future from the excitement of current events, but looking deeper it becomes clear that Soviet penetration of Latin America did not begin with Daniel Ortega or even with Fidel Castro. The Red presence there is nearly as longstanding as in Russia itself. Already in the early 1920s it was the "in" thing among Mexican intellectuals to sport bright red armbands bearing the hammer and sickle. Mexican fashion has changed a good deal since then. Over coffee in the southern town of Tuxtla-Gutierrez a few months ago, I asked the regional head of the far-left Mexican Workers party (PMT) if their insignia was the hammer and sickle.

"Oh no! Don't you know the average Mexican has a horror of the hammer and sickle? Here, this is our symbol," and he made a few squiggles on a paper napkin. "It's Aztec."

I teased: "But when you finally come to power, what then?"

He grinned: "Hammer and sickle, of course!"

Coming to power for the PMT or any of the other little far-left parties that peck away at the tough, fifty-year-old hide of Mexico's political colossus, the PRI, *Partido Revolucionario Institucional,* is as likely as snow falling in Acapulco. One of the fringe groups is the Communist party itself. Shunned by voters as if it were promoting leprosy, the PCM decided a few years ago that a change of name was in order. Now as the PSUM (Unified Socialists) it shares Mexico's few pro-Marxist votes with parties like the PMT.

But if it is true that the people reject Communism, why is Mexican foreign policy so left-leaning, so tediously anti-USA? History and party policy. If Texans remember the Alamo, Mexicans remember the day in 1848 when they found that 51 percent of their country had been signed away in the wake of an unnecessary little war few of them knew was going on. It happened in the bewildering first decades of independence when Mexicans had hardly got used to losing their three-century-old status as New Spain, the glory of a worldwide empire. Independence put an end to a colonial defense system wherein Spanish seaports and outposts from Oregon to Chile had been fortified against the depredations of English pirates, Protestant preachers, Dutch and even Russian commercial adventurers. Octavio Paz has argued that had Mexico remained Spanish the trauma of 1848 could not

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have occurred. Be that as it may, Mexican schoolchildren are told early on that the *Norteamericanos* took away half their country. Mexicans of today, as inheritors of the architectural and cultural treasures of New Spain, resent the designations "third world" and "developing nation." Do-good organizations like the American Peace Corps are not admitted.

Political leaders are forced to take into consideration this sometimes strident nationalism. Mexican foreign policy must always appear to be independent of Washington. Whereas a few political columnists carry anti-gringoism to extremes, "anti-gringo" is not a synonym for "pro-Soviet." The current American Ambassador, ex-actor John Gavin, parries the barbs with equanimity. "They've even started blaming us for the weather," he joked at a luncheon in California. He has also wisely said that Mexican-American relations are a marriage without possibility of divorce. Gavin can take heart in a perceptible trend on the part of educated Mexicans toward favoring the policies of President Reagan and the American right. The hitherto ineffectual conservative National Action party made unexpected gains in several local elections last year, while the weekly magazine of widest circulation is the staunchly conservative *Impacto.* In reality the ruling PRI, despite continual reference to a revolution few Mexicans are of an age to remember, has become a notably staid, bourgeois institution.

The current domino theory would lump together this large, stubborn land with the five little republics to its south, all of which could fit into one of its larger states, and expect it, as part of such an improbable line-up, to "fall fastest of all." There were a few days in August 1982 when the world waited for Mexico to fall. The nation's banks, taken over by a government that admitted to owing $80 billion abroad, remained closed under army guard and the peso fell sharply. It was a crisis of major proportions, but there was no collapse nor are there any signs of one now.

Remarkably, in spite of severe hardship, there has been no important social unrest. A good deal has appeared in the American press about the healthy relations between labor and government in Mexico. Little, however, has been said about another stabilizing factor, relations between the Catholic Church and the government. This accord is an odd one, being between politicians who are Freemasons by tradition and prelates of a religion their predecessors persecuted. It works this way: The government agrees to overlook nearly all the old anti-religious laws (which laws, however, remain on the books) and in return the bishops refrain from heaping on the government the kind of disparagement Catholic bishops have come to see as their mission toward governments up and down the Americas. Pious and peaceable, the hierarchy of Mexico has promoted neither liberation theology nor those nurseries of discontent known as basic communities, while they have treated radical bishops Sergio Mendez Arceo of Cuernavaca and Samuel Ruiz of San Cristobal as outsiders.

The domino theorists ask us to believe that this nation of 75 million people, strong enough to weather unprecedented financial disaster, is about to collapse because Nicaragua, a nation of three million, three countries removed, has a Marxist government. Cuba, be it noted, is less than half as far from Mexico as Nicaragua and a quarter of a century of Marxism there has not caused Mexico to collapse. There is water between? Between Nicaragua and Mexico, although Americans seem as yet hardly aware of it, lies a brave anti-Communist fortress, Guatemala.

To insist that Nicaragua poses no threat to Mexico is not to express the hope that the Sandinistas stay in power. During a short stopover in Eastern Europe last summer, conversation with an East German woman gave me an insight into Nicaraguan reality I might not have gained inside the country itself. The wife of a communications expert on contract to the Sandinista regime, she had been living for two years among the governing elite in Managua. When I met her she had come away ahead of her husband, "unable" as she put it "to go on watching the heartless exploitation of such poor, simple people." Living conditions, she said, were appalling, with ration cards the government's whip to force adolescents to fight the contras. I asked her about the contras. "But everybody is a contra! They hate the way things are, especially they hate all the foreigners in their country, Germans like my husband, all the Czechs, the Cubans, the Chileans. Even the children sabotage everything we do." As she talked, any notion I might have had about Sandinistas dominoing their way to Houston gave way to picturing a rescue operation hardly more complicated than the one in Grenada.

Washington, however, moves in mysterious ways when it comes to Latin America. Instead of making an effective effort to free the suffering people of Nicaragua, it invites Ortega's little gang of tyrants to a "dialogue." But that move is no more baffling than the continuing discrimination against Guatemala or the promotion to the presidency of El Salvador of Napoleon Duarte. More incredible still, there is reason to think that the disinformation known as the domino theory originated in Washington. In May of last year John R. Horton, senior analyst of Latin America for the CIA, is known to have handed in a detailed report on Mexico only to be asked for a revision which would show the country to be so unstable politically and economically as to pose a threat to the United States. Horton refused, insisting there were no facts to support such a thesis. Within days he resigned from the CIA and the revision job was given to another analyst.

Havoc in Mexico is basic to the domino theory. So is another fallacy: compression of the Latin American subversion story into a tale based on events of the last few years. Excitement cools when it is discovered that El Salvador boasted a Communist party in the late 1920s and something they called a "red army" by 1930. Marxism south of the border has had its ups and downs for over half a century, shifting from country to country not, as conservative pundits would have it, right up the Pan American Highway, but rather like underground sludge oozing in wherever it finds an opening, surfacing whenever it finds support. The shift comes each time a door slams shut. Then it is that the activist elite panics out of one country in order to sneak into another. Left-sympathizing Archbishop Penados del Barrio of Guatemala City can be sure that many of the *desaparecidos* (disappeared ones) he holds prayer vigils for as part of his disparagement program are already gnawing away at the fragile underpinnings of, say, neighboring Belize.

It was an organizer from Belize, then British Honduras, who brought the Marxist activism he had picked up during a stint in the American Seaman's Union to workers in the United Fruit Company back in the 1920s. Working out of Marxist headquarters in San Salvador he attempted to set up a Communist party in Guatemala, was arrested and executed. Many of his colleagues fled to Cuba to assist at the first *golpe de estado* of, believe it or not, Fulgencio Battista. Meanwhile strongmen Ubico in Guatemala and Osorio in El Salvador took over those two presidencies and would succeed in keeping Central America virtually subversion-free until 1944.

That year there was a general leftist upsurge as Soviet victories in Europe sparked enthusiasm among Central American students already influenced by Mexican intellectuals and the wandering Chilean poet, Pablo Neruda. Both Osorio and Ubico were ousted, and in faraway Czechoslovakia an Institute for Latin American Studies was set up as a training school for revolution. An international congress was called and Central Americans were invited to Prague for coaching in ideology, infiltration, and sabotage.

For the next six years the target was again Guatemala where the new president, Arevalo, made little effort to stem Marxist infiltration. The 1951 elections brought in the avowed leftist, Col. Jacobo Arbenz, one of the *golpistas* who had overthrown President Ubico. As chief executive Arbenz proceeded to make of Guatemala what Cuba is today, the Soviet outpost in America. By the time half a dozen thoroughly alarmed Latin American governments had broken relations with Guatemala, Washington gave effective support to

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another military man, Col. Castillo Armas, who replaced Arbenz. Many of the Arbenz crowd fled to the backwoods of Cuba where they offered the emerging rebel leader, Fidel Castro, their experience in the new techniques of peasant revolution. Once Castro took over, Guatemalan activists returned home to begin the long guerrilla struggle that lasted through 1982. Meanwhile in South America the professional revolutionaries, Cubans and Central Americans among them, were converging on Chile ahead of the election of Salvador Allende and when his regime collapsed another exodus ensued. The woman from East Germany told me that most of the key positions in the bureaucracy of Nicaragua are held by Chilean Communists who found their way there while Somoza was still in power.

Just now, thousands of miles from Mexico, Texas, and the Rio Grande, the Latin American subversion story is reaching a ferocious climax. In Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia drugs processed in hundreds of clandestine laboratories scattered through the jungles are being flown out of hidden airstrips to provide international revolution with financing undreamed of up to now. A Red cocaine mafia holds all three major South American countries in a relentless grip. "The scourge of my country, this marriage of vice and violence!" Peruvian President Baluande recently told the United Nations. His address was a cry for help. Terrorism in cities and mountain villages has forced this notably democratic statesman to keep Peru in a nearly continuous state of emergency.

How does the Latin American Marxist elite look on this plunge into large scale organized crime? One of their number, Colombia's Nobel Prize winner, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, told the *Village Voice*: "We all do what we can. Some of us write, some make movies and some traffic in drugs. Drug traffic gives us a necessary breathing space. All this will have to be looked at objectively some day."

Decent indeed, the Mexican scene, in comparison with the goings on in South America. Decent, peaceful, and quiet. And if that seems unnatural, too good to be true, an explanation comes to mind. It is not improbable that Mexico, situated between the Americas like Switzerland in the midst of Western Europe, is more useful to the international left as a neutral way station than as one more battlefield. Such a possibility would explain the serenity, unique in Latin America, of government relations with labor and with the Catholic Church. Certainly it is remarkable that several drastic government moves against local Red surfacings brought no organized condemnation from the international media, no zeroing in of the human rights establishment. There was the bloody put-down of student-led riots in 1968 followed by a decisive army campaign against incipient guerrilla trouble in the state of Guerrero. Three years ago when PSUM politicians made their first feeble election gains as municipal counselors in a town in Oaxaca, the governor simply replaced them with men of the PRI. Then last May Interior Minister Manuel Bartlett, evidence in hand that refugee camps along the southern border were being transformed into training grounds for subversion by Bishop Ruiz and his priests,[1] called on United Nations refugee personnel to join him in forcibly transferring some 40,000 Central Americans, mostly indigenous Guatemalans, farther up country to a diocese where the bishop is a conservative. Whereas every little grumble of Latin American churchmen is routinely blown up by the media to arouse worldwide compassion, the anguished protests of Monsignor Ruiz never got beyond the local press. □

[1]See my article, "Clerical Materialism in Mexico's Southeast," *TAS*, April 1984.

CORRESPONDENCE

(continued from page 7)

the answer, and neither is a continuing series of broken Soviet treaties. The proper answer for a free people is as good a defense as possible, and a spit-in-their-eye philosophy.

Why not try it? It would be much, *much* less expensive, much safer, and much more conducive to individual freedom. We might even like it!

—Lannon F. Stafford
Daily News Digest
Phoenix, Arizona

NEA Concerns

It was with great interest that I read the article which appeared in the September 1984 edition of *The American Spectator* entitled, "Excellence in Education: The First Year and Beyond."

I paid particular attention to the piece written by Chester E. Finn, Jr. entitled, "The Excellence Backlash: Sources of Resistance to Educational Reform." I would like to clarify two points made in that article dealing with NEA.

First of all, on page 14, item 9, I am quoted as follows: "With such a heavy emphasis on science and math, where will our writers, poets, artists and musicians come from?" The statement is correct, but the context in which it was used by Mr. Finn does not represent the true context in which it was originally made.

Several months ago, I was asked by a reporter my impression of the impact of efforts to increase the graduation requirements and to strengthen the curriculum, especially the heavy emphasis on science and math. I responded that we (educators) need to raise the graduation requirements and to also strengthen the curriculum to make it more challenging. We need to make sure all children master the basics, i.e., reading, writing, arithmetic, as well as science, computer technology, foreign languages, and the fine arts. As rationale, I shared with the reporter my perception of what is really occurring regarding the reform movement.

Traveling across the country I have been made aware of a real concern expressed by parents and educators that the heavy emphasis being placed on science and math is causing many students not to select music, art, and humanities, or vocational courses as part of their curriculum. For example, in a number of school districts, including my own, the number of students enrolled in music has dropped by 50 percent.

Most students are not born with the gift to simply play a musical instrument or to paint pictures. Their talents must be developed. They must be trained to play a musical instrument or to paint expertly. Obviously, every person—musician, artist, dancer, poet, teacher, doctor, journalist—needs to have a solid educational background, but we must not forget the fine arts or the humanities.

Secondly, near the end of Mr. Finn's article he states: "But over the Fourth of July weekend the National Education Association again vowed resistance to anything resembling higher standards for teachers, peer review of classroom performance, merit-based pay, or career ladders. (Instead, the NEA suggested a high across-the-board salary increase.)" Unfortunately, and characteristically, Mr. Finn's statement is not an accurate reflection of what transpired at the Representative Assembly this summer.

NEA did vote to recommend that starting salaries for teachers be raised. Why not? We believe teachers deserve to be paid salaries commensurate with their skills and responsibilities, so that the profession can compete with industry and with other professions in our society. Nine out of every ten teachers who leave the profession do so because of inadequate salaries. Furthermore, the delegates did vote to oppose merit pay. We continue to believe that merit pay is not the answer to the problems we face in education as we try to attract new teachers and keep the many good teachers we already have.

However, NEA delegates *did not* vote to oppose peer review. To the contrary, they voted to *support* a study of current evaluation systems, including peer review, for the purpose of identifying systems which best strengthen the effectiveness of teachers in the classroom. NEA believes that every teacher should be evaluated annually and that the evaluation procedure must be a comprehensive one designed to help teachers improve their instructional and professional skills. NEA has been on record as supporting meaningful teacher evaluation for many years.

Finally, we voted to *increase* standards for teachers entering the profession. Our vote underscores the action of the 1981 Representative Assembly which supported the "Profiles of Excellence," calling for revision and upgrading of teacher training programs. That includes, in our opinion, better selection criteria for students entering colleges and universities, two years of liberal arts training, a careful selection of candidates to enter the teaching profession, a more rigorous teacher training program with a higher emphasis on the mastery of the basics *and* subject matter, classroom management, and the ability to impart knowledge and to work with children. In addition, we called for more rigorous exit criteria, including oral and written tests, student teaching, as well as an overall high grade point average.

It is unfortunate that Mr. Finn, as is his custom, did not bother to ask anyone at NEA what our positions really are on the issues he insists on raising. Obviously, he did not accurately reflect the NEA's positions.

The National Education Association will continue to work to establish high expectations and standards in our schools, for a pleasant and orderly learning environment, for a rigorous and challenging curriculum, and for high standards for the members of the teaching profession.

—Mary Hatwood Futrell
President
National Education Association
Washington, D.C.

Chester E. Finn, Jr. replies:

I have no quarrel with Mrs. Futrell about "the humanities" if by that term she means the serious study of history and literature, and I certainly have no objection to school curricula that include the fine and applied arts—provided these are supplements to and not replacements for the central academic disciplines.

I, too, believe that most teachers are underpaid, notwithstanding the 180-day year that most of them work. The problem is that while some teachers are grossly underpaid, because they are outstanding teachers, a hand-

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ful are overpaid, because they are dreadful teachers. A grown-up profession would not only accept these distinctions in performance, it would make them itself through a serious peer-review system. At the Minneapolis meeting that Mrs. Futrell says I misrepresented, the delegates ratified the statement that "the NEA is unalterably opposed to so-called merit pay plans. Additionally, the NEA is opposed to any alternative compensation plans that act as a substitute for the proportionate across-the-board salary increases all teachers need and deserve."

This is the predictable behavior of an antiquated union but not that of a responsible professional association. As for "peer review," yes, the NEA summoned up a study of "the systems currently used to evaluate teachers." These "systems" so rarely include peer review today that it seems quite unlikely that much will be learned on that particular point. In any case, conducting a study is a time-honored means of avoiding a decision. A grown-up profession would embrace the *principle* of peer review and then perhaps conduct a study of the best means by which to carry it out.

Federalist Pierre

John Muggeridge's article on Trudeaumania, "Canada's Crack-Up" (*TAS*, October 1984), describes most of what we've been enduring quite well. His opinions on Pierre's chief accomplishment, bilingualism, are absurd. Quebec is not analogous to Hispanics in your sunshine states. There are around 5 million of them and they were here second, after the Indians. Separatism was a quite real possibility; defusing it will likely be seen as Trudeau's sole accomplishment. His disinterest in economics and the West made him justly hated out here, but many of us give him credit for binding French Canada into our federal system.

—Richard Baer
Victoria, British Columbia

Fine Points

I read with interest Virgil Nemoianu's review of *The Enthusiast: A Life of Thornton Wilder* (*TAS*, November 1984).

My own enthusiasm sank, however, when I encountered the phrase "Wilder wrote 656 pages of notes about *Finnegan's Wake* . . . " I am accustomed to such literary gangsterism from the commissars at *Time* and *New York* magazine, but not from the copy desk of the *Spectator*.

Although the revisionists haven't yet succeeded in rewriting Joyce's masterpiece, more and more reviewers have accepted the notion that Joyce somehow left out an apostrophe in his title.

The title "Finnegans Wake" conveys two opposing ideas: the wake, or funeral vigil, of the great-god Finnegan; and the waking up of all Finnegans. The two words embody Giovanni Battista Vico's cyclical theory of history, which underpins the novel. We finnish (fin, fine, finn) and we begin egan or again. (My thanks—and apologies—to Anthony Burgess, *Re Joyce*, for the above elucidation.)

Here's to hoping that Mr. Nemoianu's appropriation was unintentional and not premeditated.

—David Turner
Atlanta, Georgia

Windy Moralizers

It is with a profound sense of inadequacy that I dare to enter the lists against so overwhelming a master of the flashing wit and flawless documentation; but as Christopher Marlowe said, "I'm armed with more than complete steel—the justice of my quarrel." My familiarity with debate is limited to knowing that debate is what you put on de hook.

I'm afraid one man's umbrage is another man's cavil, but here is the point at issue. In your "Windy Moralizers" (Editorials, *TAS*, November 1984) you assert that on the question of religion in politics there has been nothing else but hypocrisy and cant. That it has been a debate "in which hardly an accurate statement has been heard, including the President's August 23 claim that 'morality's foundation is religion.' That would be news to Plato. As for today, religion may be the moral foundation for many but not for those honorable atheists and agnostics for whom religion, as commonly defined, has no usefulness whatsoever."

For you to posit that Plato would, somehow, be surprised to hear morality founded in religion, is not a little startling in view of his affirmation in his last dialogue, *The Laws*, "It is God who is, for you and me, the measure of all things." (See *The Roots of American Order*, Russell Kirk, p. 85.)

C.S. Lewis adjured that "a Christianity which does not see moral and religious experience converging to meet at infinity, not at a negative infinity, but in the positive infinity of the living yet superpersonal God, has nothing, in the long run, to divide it from devil worship; and a philosophy which does not accept value as eternal and objective can lead us only to ruin." Lewis goes on to say:

> Nor is the matter of speculative importance. Many a popular "planner" on a democratic platform, many a mild-eyed scientist in a democratic laboratory means, in the last resort, just what the Fascist means. He believes that "good" means whatever men are conditioned to approve. He believes that it is the function of him and his kind to condition men; to create consciences by eugenics, psychological manipulation of infants, state education and mass propaganda. Because he is confused, he does not yet fully realize that those who create conscience cannot be subject to conscience themselves. But he must awake to the logic of his position sooner or later; and when he does, what barrier remains between us and the final division of the race into a few conditioners who stand themselves outside morality and the many conditioned in whom such morality as the experts choose is produced at the experts' pleasure? If "good" means only the local ideology, how can those who invent the local ideology be guided by any idea of good themselves? The very idea of freedom presupposes some objective moral law which overarches rulers and ruled alike. Subjectivism about values is eternally incompatible with democracy. We and our rulers are of one kind only so long as we are subject to one law. But if there is no Law of Nature, the *ethos* of any society is the creation of its rulers, educators and conditioners; and every creator stands above and outside his own creation.

As to your oxymoron, "*honorable* atheists and agnostics" (my emphasis), I don't think you really want to defend that position, do you? Well, perhaps you do. The definition in my Webster's New Universal Abridged Dictionary that seems most apt to your inference would be: "2. actuated by principles of honor or a scrupulous regard to probity, rectitude, or reputation; as he is an *honorable* man." To arrive at probity, rectitude, or reputation without an appeal to objective values, is to abandon eternal truths for temporal hopes, solid rock for shifting sands. As Cicero said, in *De Legibus*, " . . . only a madman could maintain that the distinction between the honorable and the dishonorable, between virtue and vice, is a matter of opinion, not of nature."

—Don Cramer
Cumberland, Wisconsin

Gay and Other Ills

In what field does H. Peter Metzger of Boulder, Colorado hold a Ph.D.? Not, presumably, in comparative sexuality. He seems unaware, in his oddly ignorant letter (Correspondence, *TAS*, November 1984), that the mouth-to-anus contact on which he builds his etiology for AIDS is neither omnipresent in homosexual behavior nor absent in heterosexual behavior. If Dr. Metzger's theory were correct, AIDS should have appeared in the general population, since there are many more heterosexuals out there doing peculiar things to each other than there are homosexuals doing same.

The inadequacy of Dr. Metzger's education is fully established when he states, "Naturally, those human societies which condemned such contact as taboo quickly became much healthier than those which didn't and in the normal course of natural selection, the former survived as the human norm at the expense of the latter." This apparently means, in Dr. Metzger's terms, that since the full development of Man, there have been no homosexuals, and indeed no perverse heterosexuals. But what of *history*, one wonders? Has Dr. Metzger forgotten history? Were there no homosexuals among the ancient Babylonians? Among the

(continued on page 51)



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CURRENT WISDOM

Wall Street Journal

Miss Barbara Ehrenreich and Miss Jane O'Reilly, authoresses both, put their persecution complexes to use in analyzing the fair Geraldine's recent catastrophe:

Chins up, ladies. We should have known all along there had to be a catch. Looking back, we should have realized it was too easy for us to put the first woman on a national ticket. It was, after all, just under 200 years since the Constitution was written, only 136 years since Seneca Falls, only 64 years since women got the vote. The resistance, when we said "How about a woman?" was suspiciously weak—just a bit of mumbling about raging hormones and a few references to a couple of shadowy white male southern contenders for the VP slot.

There were even some small signs that they might have thought it was a good year for a woman to run. After all, with Walter Mondale at the head of the ticket, there was no danger of her winning. But we were, just as they said, neophytes in the hardball world of macho politics. . . .

Meanwhile, Mrs. Ferraro, apparently unaware that her real role in the 1984 campaign was to run around providing verisimilitude to the otherwise totally ephemeral proceedings, flew staunchly from city to city, event to event. She was assisted on the ground by an absurdly underfinanced band of feminists, freeze voters and Rainbow coalition veterans who had been deluded into believing they were participating in an historic event. Some of us, who didn't catch on until the very end, kept waiting for the Democratic "handlers" to "unleash" the gender-gap issues and mobilize the women's vote.

It never happened. It wasn't supposed to. Think about it. What kind of man wants to owe his victory to a woman?

[November 8, 1984]

The Nation

Mr. Roger Wilkins of the *Nation*'s editorial board and the Institute for Policy Studies makes bold to apprise all thinking Americanos of our President's most minute secret:

Pundits have offered a variety of explanations for Ronald Reagan's enduring popularity, but none of them encompasses the whole truth. There is one explanation, though, that is rarely written about in the press or even discussed in polite company. Reagan's dirty little secret is that he has found a way to make racism palatable and politically potent again.

That his policies are not only unfair but also demonstrably racist is crystal clear.

[November 3, 1984]

Northwestern Review

A leading collegiate newspaper reports on the intellectual adventures of another enlightened prof:

For those who have followed with interest History Professor Bonnie Blustein's Northwestern career, the news of her recent arrest on charges of battery and resisting arrest was not at all surprising. It was in fact a most fitting finale to her pathetic stay here.

If you haven't been paying attention, Blustein was arrested on Oct. 9 following an altercation at Norris Center with CAS senior Frank Wohl. The right-wing Wohl was walking to Norris when the left-wing Blustein and her companion, Antonio David Jimenez, spotted him. Blustein reportedly called Wohl a fascist a--hole, and in reference to his recent sojourn to Central America, shouted that it was "too bad [he] didn't get killed [by communist guerillas] down there."

The professor then started kneeing Wohl in the back of his legs to vent her revolutionary frustration. In the ensuing shouting match, Jimenez allegedly started swinging at Wohl, who promptly threw him to the ground in defense. Blustein then began kicking Wohl and hitting him with her purse.

Witnesses called police, and soon five DPS officers converged on Norris and tried to arrest Blustein and Jimenez, who had moved inside by this time. Blustein reportedly shouted insults at the officers, calling them racist, fascist pigs (three of the five were black), and attacked one of them with her purse and a shower of Coke. Police finally handcuffed Blustein and Jimenez and packed them off to jail in separate squad cars.

[October 26, 1984]

Los Angeles Times

Orphic vibrations from the dirt perceived by a modern Bernini, Miss Vida Freedom:

Although photography and photographic concerns have been central to her art for years, Freeman began as a ceramicist. "In working with earth, first as a source of clay, I started thinking about why I use it both as subject and medium. I think now that it is the sense of being connected—or grounded—both to myself and to the earth. By concentrating on the earth in this way, I seem to be able to sense all that has taken place before and all that is yet to happen."

[October 22, 1984]

Washington Post

Still more literary license among the illiterates:

PONTIAC, Mich.—"To understand my presidential campaign," the polite, cheerful candidate said last week to an interviewer from WPON Radio here, "you only have to understand one principle: To be born female in our society is to be born behind enemy lines."

[October 29, 1984]

F.B.I.S.

An eloquent interlude during one of Hong Kong Governor Sir Edward Youde's autumnal press conferences:

[Reporter] I have a following question. Just because Chinese leaders have earlier said that if there are disturbances in Hong Kong, they will take over Hong Kong, if there is no guarantee, and we have this kind of unexpected things happen, then what can we do?

[Youde] Well, I have no reason to expect, and I'm sure the Chinese Government have no reason to expect, that there will be any disturbances in Hong Kong. And indeed after, if there was any suggestion of that, which I don't think there was, there will be even less, it seems to me, of that possibility now that a satisfactory agreement has been initialed in Peking. I accept that that's not quite logical, if you say that it was not going to happen anyway, the chances of it happening are now even less, but I think my meaning will be reasonably clear.

[September 28, 1984]

Village Voice

Another inscrutable passage served up for the woebegone readers of the *Voice*:

I smell the fear. I don't like it.

"Have you registered to vote?" Mark asked.

"Damn sure have. Wanna get that bastard out," I answered.

"What about you?" he asked the other two women present. Both mumbled and buried their heads in imaginary work. A chill came over the room.

"A friend of mine just came back from Kentucky where she grew up. Republican country. She was wearing a 'Dump Reagan' button. Said she was warned by a couple of people to watch where she wore it." Glancing at the women I continued, "You know, what bothers me most is the climate is such that it really scares me to say what I think. Like Big Brother really is watching. If I say I oppose Reagan, my income might dry up. And that to me is not what America is about."

[November 6, 1984]

San Francisco Chronicle

Ralph B. Elias, a sadly unaccoladed scholar and reader of San Francisco's famed *Chronicle*, rests his case:

Editor—Reagan and his cabal must be removed at the November general election. They stink.

The Oxford English Dictionary definition of stink is "to emit a strong, offensive odor, to smell foully." But the literal meaning is insufficient to convey the enormity of the Reagan entourage's wrongdoing. It is responsible for the deterioration of life everywhere on this planet. The ambience it has produced of fear, disgust and hate can't be adequately described.

Any American who votes to retain Reagan and his ilk is either misinformed, masochistic, venal, crazy or a combination of these attributes.

—Ralph B. Elias
San Francisco

[September 14, 1984]

Desert Dispatch
(Barstow, California)

Feminist columnist and sage, Rusty Brown, lucubrates according to the highest standards of New Age Liberalism and ends with the most auspicious view of Rome's Decline ever uttered in historic Barstow, California:

Men in soft pink polo shirts. Women in mannish, oversized herringbone jackets.

Men buying cream for their skin and getting facials. Women buying boxer shorts with fly fronts to wear under their jeans.

What's behind it all?

When unisex clothing first appeared in the late 60s, some were shocked and worried about its effect. My files yield a news magazine article from 14 years ago, in which Charles Winick, a professor of anthropology and sociology at City University of New York, warned that sexual ambiguity foreshadows a culture's decline.

He cited as examples the crumbling of ancient Greece and the Roman Empire, when the lines between the sexes became less distinct. Roman leaders, he said, decried the "foppish, feminine, perfumed males," and Caesar was likened to "every man's wife and every woman's husband."

If this was an accurate description of Caesar, he was no doubt strong yet tender, assertive yet compassionate. And if the empire fell because of those traits, it would only mean Caesar was ahead of his time.

[September 18, 1984]

Daily Bulletin
(Santa Clara, California)

A timely notice of still more New Age doings in progressive Santa Clara:

Rights of Passage: A Celebration of Midlife and Menopause: by the Militant Menopausal Women.

Renee Ingold plays Classical violin Jonah's Wail, 10th & San Carlos, 8-11:30. $1 donation. Baked goods, coffee, tea, juice for sale. We regret that Jonah's Wail is not wheel chair accessible.

[October 12, 1984]

The Nation

The editors of an eminent journalistic asylum receive a reasonable complaint:

I salute the excellent special issue of September 29, "Fifteen Years of the Burger Court," and the choice of Herman Schwartz as guest editor. However, I couldn't help but notice that of the contributors only one was black, and he was solicited to write on racial aspects of the Court's decisions, while the only women were asked to write jointly one article on sex discrimination rulings of the Court. All other contributors were white males.

[November 3, 1984]

The Progressive

Still more dispiriting news for the lugubrious readers of a venerable source of flumdiddle:

The economic and psychological imperatives of the American empire propel us inexorably toward intervention and war. They also direct us down a wasteful and destructive path of existence. We devote precious time, energy, and human resources to develop technologies that perpetuate our power. And in the process, we become enslaved.

[October 1984]

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

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

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CORRESPONDENCE
(continued from page 48)

Egyptians? Among the Israelites? Among the medieval Christians? (Has Dr. Metzger read Dr. Boswell on this piquant subject?) Among the Moslems? Among the black Africans of varied types and persuasians? Why did AIDS not appear among the ancient Greeks?

A clue to Dr. Metzger's mental fog is provided by another of his surprising sentences: "Likewise, it is today no surprise to those who understand epidemiology to see that when a small population among us decides to revive the sub-human practice of mouth-to-anus contact, the way homosexuals do, that a heretofore unknown but not truly extinct virus, such as AIDS, should suddenly reappear in that population." Now all becomes clear: Dr. Metzger appears to believe that homosexuality only recently has developed, or only recently in significant numbers to be important, and that the new sexual pioneers have reawakened a virus dormant since Cro-Magnon man. This is wonderful science fiction, but most irresponsible if taken for science.

The actual facts are that homosexuality has been a part of the *norm* of human experience throughout history and in all known populations; and that AIDS has only recently reappeared for reasons which are presently unknown. Dr. Metzger has fallen into two of the commonest of traps: the idea that increased reportage of a phenomenon implies increased incidence (thus homosexuality, newly reported, must be new); and the idea that the population in which a disease or condition appears is to be blamed for it.

It seems to this reader that Dr. Metzger's letter represents a misguided attempt to medical-ize and scientific-ize what is in fact an untenable position: namely, the quasi-religious notion that AIDS is "God's judgment on homosexuals," or something of the sort, here worked out in terms of pseudo-science. This kind of thing is easy enough to refute rationally. For example, if we accept the principle that the population in which a disease or condition appears is to be blamed for it, does this mean that "Infant Crib Death Syndrome" is God's judgment on infants? That sickle cell anemia is God's judgment on Negroes? That vaginitis is God's judgment on women? And what of the fact, frequently noted in this connection, that Lesbians are God's Chosen Few?

It is certainly much more difficult to refute sound and substantial work in the field of gay studies such as that of Buchanan and Muir (*TAS*, August and November 1984). And there seems no question that certain elements in gay society need to "clean up their act." However, before Buchanan and Muir is fully accepted as "this devastating exposé . . . etc., etc.," it might well be worthwhile to raise a question about their methodology.

Sociologists have often been criticized as being biased in viewing the world through the eyes of the urban poor, and as being deaf to complaints that much of the human world does not consist of the urban poor. In a very similar way, and for similar reasons, gay studies are presently clouded by skewed studies based on relatively small numbers of urban gays, especially those who see doctors. When Muir states in his reply to Metzger, " . . . the 'modal form' of sexual behavior in the gay community *is* (or *was* until recently) frequent, impersonal sexual contact," he may well be perpetuating a major conceptual error. This error, in my view, is the result of two factors: 1) bias toward reporting only certain levels of urban gays; and 2) bias on the part of those gays doing the reporting and conceptualizing, who are frequently radical, militant, and non-representative.

It might be fruitful for Buchanan and Muir to re-examine their materials for bias, in light of the following points: 1) In the United States alone, there are approximately twenty million aware homosexuals, and this is a low figure in that it does not include those who are pretending not to be gay, and those who are under the age of, roughly speaking, sixteen; 2) of this gross population, only a relatively small percentage are the "fast-track" urbans on whose statistics so much work is based; 3) the great majority of these gays, who are scarcely reported on at all, may well be as healthy and sensible as any compatible group of heterosexuals; 4) at the very least, there is no justification for assuming otherwise without evidence. Is it possible that Buchanan and Muir, in their "devastating exposé," are describing only a non-representative sample of American gays?

—Theodore W. Thieme
Bloomington, Indiana

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

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

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

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

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

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

8649. $29.95/**$16.95**

1610. $18.95/**$13.95**



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

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

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

4820. $20.00/**$13.50**



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